Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2023

• Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami & Weiye Chen, 2023, "Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-25, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Is there free riding in group contests?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 191-201, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00250-w.
• Benjamin Brooks & Philip J. Reny, 2023, "A canonical game—75 years in the making—showing the equivalence of matrix games and linear programming," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 171-180, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00252-8.
• Xiangyu Shi, 2023, "Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 243-254, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4.
• He Liu & Yun Bai & Zhiguang Huang & Han Qiao & Shouyang Wang, 2023, "Private banking development in China under two organizational structures: Economic analysis from an organizational innovation perspective," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-23, December, DOI: 10.1186/s40854-023-00535-w.
• Yunhong Li & Zuo Quan Xu & Xun Yu Zhou, 2023, "Robust utility maximisation with intractable claims," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 4, pages 985-1015, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00512-2.
• Mariana Khapko, 2023, "Asset pricing with dynamically inconsistent agents," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 4, pages 1017-1046, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00516-y.
• Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2023, "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligence rules," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 58, issue 1, pages 119-140, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-022-00144-x.
• Amarjyoti Mahanta, 2023, "Ad valorem tax versus tax per unit of output in a Bertrand competition with strictly increasing marginal cost," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 58, issue 1, pages 105-117, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00189-6.
• Ai Takeuchi & Erika Seki, 2023, "Overcoming problems of coordination and freeriding in a game with multiple public goods: dynamic contribution with information provision," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 379-411, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00133-6.
• Hubert János Kiss & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia & Vita Zhukova, 2023, "Group contest in a coopetitive setup: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 18, issue 3, pages 463-490, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-022-00373-6.
• Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Simon Schopohl & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023, "Key players in network-oriented interventions," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 18, issue 4, pages 879-907, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9.
• Manja Gärtner & Robert Östling & Sebastian Tebbe, 2023, "Do we all coordinate in the long run?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 16-33, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00125-z.
• Nathan W. Chan & Leonard Wolk, 2023, "Reciprocity with stochastic loss," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 51-65, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00129-3.
• Eugenio Verrina, 2023, "Upset but (almost) correct: a conceptual replication of Di Tella, Perez-Truglia, Babino and Sigman (2015)," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 327-336, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00136-4.
• Fabian Dvorak, 2023, "stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 337-349, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7.
• Vladimir Petkov, 2023, "Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 1, pages 259-289, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01407-z.
• Akira Okada, 2023, "Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 427-452, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01410-4.
• Felipe R. Durazzo & David Turchick, 2023, "Welfare-improving misreported polls," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 523-565, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01413-9.
• Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023, "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 591-623, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01417-5.
• Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023, "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 743-780, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01422-8.
• Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023, "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 803-840, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01425-5.
• Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2023, "The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 841-885, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01426-4.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2023, "Greater search cost reduces prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 923-947, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01432-6.
• Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023, "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 983-1007, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01433-5.
• Teruyoshi Kobayashi & Tomokatsu Onaga, 2023, "Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 1, pages 251-287, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01457-x.
• Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2023, "Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 685-721, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01474-w.
• Yuta Yasui, 2023, "Revealed preference tests for price competition in multi-product differentiated markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1115-1144, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01487-z.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2023, "Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1069-1114, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2.
• Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023, "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1289-1327, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01497-x.
• Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023, "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 117-155, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.
• Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023, "(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 175-193, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00814-3.
• Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang & Lixue Zhou, 2023, "Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 303-332, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00820-5.
• Takuma Wakayama & Takehiko Yamato, 2023, "Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 517-553, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00828-x.
• R. A. Edwards & R. R. Routledge, 2023, "Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 569-586, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00830-3.
• Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023, "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 649-685, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00834-z.
• Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023, "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 703-735, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4.
• Manuel Foerster, 2023, "Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 1291-1316, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1.
• Ville Korpela, 2023, "Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 993-1007, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0.
• Dong Liang & Yunlong Wang & Zhigang Cao & Xiaoguang Yang, 2023, "Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 1111-1151, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4.
• Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023, "Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 957-992, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0.
• Lonnie Turpin, 2023, "A Unique Mixed Equilibrium Payoff in Quantum Bimatrix Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, volume 196, issue 3, pages 1119-1124, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10957-023-02170-y.
• Matthias Blonski & Ulf Lilienfeld-Toal, 2023, "Moral hazard with excess returns," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, number 6, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11579-023-00344-w.
• Dhritiman Gupta, 2023, "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 1, pages 221-244, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4.
• Peter Wagner, 2023, "Seller experimentation and trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 2, pages 337-357, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00294-7.
• Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023, "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 2, pages 419-438, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2.
• Dmitry Sedov, 2023, "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 3, pages 505-546, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x.
• John Duffy & Alexander Matros & Zehra Valencia, 2023, "Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 725-761, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2.
• Ranojoy Basu & Conan Mukherjee, 2023, "Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 763-790, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8.
• Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2023, "A connections model with decreasing returns link-formation technology," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 31-61, March, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-022-00266-8.
• Kira Pronin & Jonathan Woon, 2023, "Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 60, issue 4, pages 625-645, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01430-6.
• Tetsuya Kawamura & Yusuke Osaki & Go Ohtani & Ryuji Saito, 2023, "Reciprocity is Different: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game Between Japanese Domestic and International Students," The Review of Socionetwork Strategies, Springer, volume 17, issue 2, pages 167-178, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12626-023-00143-1.
• Matthew Embrey & Christian Seel & J. Philipp Reiss, 2023, "Gambling in Risk-Taking Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School, number 0623, Jul.
• Ralph-Christopher Bayer & Marco Faravelli & Carlos Pimienta, 2023, "The Wisdom of the Crowd: Uninformed Voting and the Efficiency of Democracy," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2023-08, Apr.
• Rafiq Friperson & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2023, "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-035/V, Jun.
• Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023, "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2023-006.
• de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023, "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2023-011.
• Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023, "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 5b68f5d7-3209-4a1b-924c-6.
• de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023, "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6d555d3d-5f45-42e7-8b71-c.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Jiang, Ge & Shi, Fei, 2023, "Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110977.
• Lu, Feifei, 2023, "Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110996.
• Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023, "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111076.
• Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2023, "Coalition formation problems with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111112.
• Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahkar, Ratul, 2023, "Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111113.
• Avoyan, Ala & Romagnoli, Giorgia, 2023, "Paying for inattention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111114.
• Baik, Kyung Hwan, 2023, "Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 227, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111130.
• De Vito, Nicodemo, 2023, "Directed lexicographic rationalizability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 227, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111134.
• Decker, Christian, 2023, "The order of move in a conversational war of attrition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181.
• Vaz, João & Shogren, Jason, 2023, "Cooperation under oath: A case for context-dependent preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111229.
• Yildirim, Mustafa, 2023, "When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 230, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111233.
• Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2023, "Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 230, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111243.
• Lattimer, Timothy R.B. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2023, "Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111265.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Jiang, Ge, 2023, "A hybrid revision protocol of action and links and social coordination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111298.
• Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023, "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346.
• Hsieh, Yue-Da & Qian, Xuewen & Qu, Chen, 2023, "Iterated bounded dominance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111360.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, 2023, "A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111383.
• Raimondo, Roberto, 2023, "Strictly competitive games with infinitely many strategies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111410.
• Healy, Paul J. & Park, Hyoeun, 2023, "Model selection accuracy in behavioral game theory: A simulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104362.
• Drouvelis, Michalis & Pearce, Graeme, 2023, "Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104372.
• Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2023, "Free riding in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104378.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Szech, Nora, 2023, "Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104327.
• Arifovic, Jasmina & Duffy, John & Jiang, Janet Hua, 2023, "Adoption of a new payment method: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104410.
• Currarini, Sergio & Feri, Francesco & Hartig, Bjoern & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2023, "Transmission and use of information in network games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443.
• Castanheira, Micael & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Schotter, Andrew, 2023, "How Trump triumphed: Multi-candidate primaries with buffoons," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104506.
• Louis-Sidois, Charles & Mougin, Elisa, 2023, "Silence the media or the story? Theory and evidence of media capture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104533.
• Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Müller, Julia & Zitzelsberger, Sonja, 2023, "Asymmetric heterogeneities and the role of transfers in a public goods experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104561.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2023, "Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104566.
• Dominiak, Adam & Lee, Dongwoo, 2023, "Testing rational hypotheses in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104610.
• Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Platz, Trine Tornøe, 2023, "Decentralized task coordination," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 304, issue 2, pages 851-864, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026.
• Braouezec, Yann & Kiani, Keyvan, 2023, "Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: Do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 308, issue 1, pages 467-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.10.036.
• Cao, Jingyi & Li, Dongchen & Young, Virginia R. & Zou, Bin, 2023, "Reinsurance games with two reinsurers: Tree versus chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 310, issue 2, pages 928-941, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2023.04.005.
• Megy, Camille & Massol, Olivier, 2023, "Is Power-to-Gas always beneficial? The implications of ownership structure," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2023.107094.
• Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2023, "Large elections and interim turnout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 175-210, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.08.003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2023, "Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 68-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.013.
• Kor, Ryan & Zhou, Junjie, 2023, "Multi-activity influence and intervention," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 91-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.007.
• Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2023, "Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 126-142, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006.
• Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023, "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 254-280, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.009.
• Hagen, Martin, 2023, "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 281-298, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.002.
• Bicchieri, Cristina & Dimant, Eugen & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2023, "It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: Conditional norm-following and belief distortion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 321-354, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.005.
• Wu, Wenhao & Ye, Bohan, 2023, "Competition in persuasion: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 72-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.003.
• Velez, Rodrigo A., 2023, "Equitable rent division on a soft budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.008.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Sayan & Roy, Souvik, 2023, "The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: A deterministic approximation approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 133-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.003.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Feldman, Paul & Servátka, Maroš & Tarrasó, Jorge & Vadovič, Radovan, 2023, "Honesty in the city," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 15-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.007.
• Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023, "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 180-199, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.006.
• Leng, Ailin, 2023, "A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 115-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.005.
• Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Safi, Shahir, 2023, "Targeting in networks under costly agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 154-172, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.003.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2023, "Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 341-347, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.004.
• Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023, "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 348-362, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.006.
• Cui, Zhiwei, 2023, "Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 410-430, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.011.
• de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023, "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 481-501, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.007.
• Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2023, "Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 50-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.007.
• Haan, Marco A. & Heijnen, Pim & Obradovits, Martin, 2023, "Competition with list prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 502-528, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.012.
• Yousefimanesh, Niloofar & Bos, Iwan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023, "Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 529-555, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.001.
• Li, Xueheng, 2023, "Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 556-574, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.010.
• Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin G. & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard, 2023, "The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 73-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.005.
• Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2023, "Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 99-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.009.
• Chakraborty, Anujit, 2023, "Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 105-132, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.002.
• Lauber, Arne & March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2023, "Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 30-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.011.
• Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023, "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 503-514, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.007.
• Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023, "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 548-580, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.011.
• Whitmeyer, Mark, 2023, "Submission costs in risk-taking contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 101-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.014.
• Cho, Wonki Jo & Thomson, William, 2023, "Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 1012-1017, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.010.
• Fournier, Gaëtan & Francou, Amaury, 2023, "Location games with references," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 17-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.012.
• Guha, Brishti, 2023, "Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 209-225, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.003.
• He, Simin & Zhu, Xun, 2023, "Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 454-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.017.
• Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2023, "Lying for votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 46-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.015.
• Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023, "Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 527-551, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.003.
• Abbink, Klaus & Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2023, "Preventive wars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 552-569, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.018.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2023, "Communication between unbiased agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 613-622, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.008.
• Lu, Feifei & Shi, Fei, 2023, "Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 645-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.007.
• Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023, "Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 690-717, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.004.
• Della Lena, Sebastiano & Manzoni, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2023, "On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 765-793, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.012.
• Jeong, Daeyoung & Kim, Semin, 2023, "Stable constitutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 794-811, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.013.
• Allouch, Nizar & Jalloul, Maya & Duncan, Alfred, 2023, "Strategic default in financial networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 941-954, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.001.
• Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu & Yamamori, Tetsuo, 2023, "Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 955-977, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.009.
• Sun, Xiang & Xu, Jin & Zhou, Junjie, 2023, "Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 978-991, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.013.
• Aghamolla, Cyrus & Smith, Kevin, 2023, "Strategic complexity in disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101635.
• Abraham, Diya & Greiner, Ben & Stephanides, Marianne, 2023, "On the Internet you can be anyone: An experiment on strategic avatar choice in online marketplaces," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, pages 251-261, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.033.
• Takeuchi, Ai & Seki, Erika, 2023, "Coordination and free-riding problems in the provision of multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, pages 95-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.11.022.
• Astorne, Carmen, 2023, "Noisy Identity and Cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, pages 203-234, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.007.
• Tóbiás, Áron, 2023, "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, pages 50-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.003.
• Smyth, Andrew & Rodet, Cortney S., 2023, "Cooperation in indefinite games: Evidence from red queen games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, pages 230-257, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.02.001.
• Chen, Bo & Serena, Marco, 2023, "Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, pages 141-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.002.
• Meickmann, Felix C., 2023, "Cooperation in knowledge sharing and R&D investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, pages 146-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.033.
• Bose, Gautam & Dechter, Evgenia & Ivancic, Lorraine, 2023, "Conformity and adaptation in groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, pages 1267-1285, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.006.
• Strulik, Holger & Werner, Katharina, 2023, "Renewable resource use with imperfect self-control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, pages 778-795, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.020.
• Okada, Akira, 2023, "A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, pages 657-669, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.08.019.
• Basu, Kaushik & Pitsuwan, Fikri & Zhang, Pengfei, 2023, "The economics of profit-cap policy: Big Pharma, Big Tech, and the duopoly rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 215, issue C, pages 120-133, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.08.027.
• Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2023, "Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 215, issue C, pages 500-513, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.031.
• Balafoutas, Loukas & Faravelli, Marco & Fornwagner, Helena & Sheremeta, Roman, 2023, "Conflict in the pool: A field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 215, issue C, pages 60-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.08.028.
• Possajennikov, Alex & Saran, Rene, 2023, "(In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 42-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.003.
• Ezquerra, Lara & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín & Jimenez, Natalia & Kujal, Praveen, 2023, "The effect of wage proposals on efficiency and income distribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 469-493, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.006.
• Boucekkine, Raouf & Ruan, Weihua & Zou, Benteng, 2023, "The irreversible pollution game," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102841.
• Mo, Jiawei & Wu, Zenan & Yuan, Ye, 2023, "Air pollution kills competition: Evidence from eSports," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102886.
• Alt, Marius & Gallier, Carlo & Kesternich, Martin & Sturm, Bodo, 2023, "Collective minimum contributions to counteract the ratchet effect in the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102895.
• Plan, Asaf, 2023, "Symmetry in n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105549.
• Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023, "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105572.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2023, "Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585.
• Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2023, "Mediated talk: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105593.
• Dellis, Arnaud, 2023, "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105595.
• Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023, "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609.
• Roy, Nilanjan, 2023, "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105611.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023, "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105624.
• Pei, Harry, 2023, "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 210, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668.
• Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023, "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105676.
• Tatur, Tymon, 2023, "Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105677.
• Zeng, Yishu, 2023, "Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105690.
• Deng, Shanglyu, 2023, "Speculation in procurement auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105692.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Panebianco, Fabrizio & Pin, Paolo, 2023, "Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105700.
• Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2023, "Equality in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105701.
• Dargaj, Jakub & Simonsen, Jakob Grue, 2023, "A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105713.
• Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023, "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105715.
• Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2023, "A model of the formation of multilayer networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105718.
• Bayer, Péter & Kozics, György & Szőke, Nóra Gabriella, 2023, "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105720.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, 2023, "The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105731.
• Govindan, Srihari & Laraki, Rida & Pahl, Lucas, 2023, "On sustainable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105736.
• Vaccari, Federico, 2023, "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105740.
• Gersbach, Hans & Jackson, Matthew O. & Muller, Philippe & Tejada, Oriol, 2023, "Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105716.
• Byambadalai, Undral & Ma, Ching-to Albert & Wiesen, Daniel, 2023, "Changing preferences: An experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102808.
• Greiner, Ben, 2023, "Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102604.
• Bhattacharya, Haimanti & Dugar, Subhasish, 2023, "Undervaluation versus unaffordability as negotiation tactics: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102609.
• Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Espín, Antonio M. & Nieboer, Jeroen, 2023, "‘Born this Way’? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102623.
• Chuah, Swee-Hoon & Gächter, Simon & Hoffmann, Robert & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2023, "Who discriminates? Evidence from a trust game experiment across three societies," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102630.
• Xue, Lian & Sitzia, Stefania & Turocy, Theodore L., 2023, "Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102631.
• Amorós, Pablo, 2023, "Evaluation and strategic manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102828.
• Keisler, H. Jerome & Lee, Byung Soo, 2023, "Common assumption of rationality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102892.
• Crutzen, Benoît S.Y. & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2023, "Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102445.
• Lukyanov, Georgy, 2023, "Reputation for competence in a cheap-talk setting," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 3, pages 285-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2023.05.001.
• Liu, Duan & Qiu, Qi & Chen, Shou, 2023, "Timeliness of technological innovation and decisions of IPO timing and pricing," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, pages 498-519, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.03.034.
• Helmi, Mohamad Husam & Çatık, Abdurrahman Nazif & Akdeniz, Coşkun, 2023, "The impact of central bank digital currency news on the stock and cryptocurrency markets: Evidence from the TVP-VAR model," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.101968.
• Füllbrunn, Sascha & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2023, "Does trust break even? A trust-game experiment with negative endowments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.101982.
• Hörtnagl-Pozzo, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Oexl, Regine & Stracke, Rudi & Sunde, Uwe, 2023, "Heterogeneity in rent-seeking contests with multiple stages: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102029.
• Tan, Jonathan H W & Bolle, Friedel, 2023, "Intragroup punishment and intergroup conflict aversion weaken intragroup cooperation in finitely repeated games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102034.
• Borzino, Natalia & Fatas, Enrique & Peterle, Emmanuel, 2023, "In transparency we trust an experimental study of reputation, transparency, and signaling," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102061.
• Charroin, Liza, 2023, "Heterogeneity in sequential network formation games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102075.
• Caserta, Maurizio & Distefano, Rosaria & Ferrante, Livio & Reito, Francesco, 2023, "The Good of Rules: A pilot study on prosocial behavior," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102085.
• Wilfredo L. Maldonado & Jessica A. Barbosa, 2023, "Determinants of Agricultural Fires: An Aggregative Games Approach," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2023-51, Oct.
• Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Espín, Antonio M. & Nieboer, Jeroen, 2023, "Born this way? Prenatal exposure to testosterone may determine behavior in competition and conflict," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118581, Jun.
• Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023, "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2310, May.