Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2024

• Banerjee, Sreoshi, 2024, "On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in "generalized" sequencing games," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120188, Feb.
• zhao, guo & Chai, Yingming, 2024, "A Sufficient Condition for Weakly Acyclic games with Applications," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120789, Apr.
• Berliant, Marcus & Boyer, Pierre, 2024, "Politics and income taxes: progress and progressivity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120864, May.
• Lillethun, Erik & Sharma, Rishi, 2024, "Strategic Cyberwarfare," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121299, Jun.
• Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024, "A labor-managed Bertrand oligopoly game with lifetime employment as a strategic commitment," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121486, Jul.
• Zola, Maurizio Angelo, 2024, "A Novel Integrated Algebraic/Geometric Approach to the Solution of Two by Two Games with Dominance Principle," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121763, Apr.
• Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Thorsteinsson, Palmar, 2024, "Productivity or privilege: Game-theoretic and experimental models of social class," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 122275, Aug.
• Zola, Maurizio Angelo, 2024, "A Novel Dominance Principle based Approach to the Solution of Two Persons General Sum Games with n by m moves," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 122312, Oct.
• Zola, Maurizio, 2024, "A Novel Differential Dominance Principle based Approach to the solution of More than Two Persons n Moves General Sum Games," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 122448, Oct.
• Beck, Dominik, 2024, "The dominance of reputation in continuous time: Experimental insights from a market entry game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 122772, Nov.
• Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024, "Endogenous timing in a mixed triopoly with state-owned, labour-managed and capitalist firms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 123007, Dec.
• Schroeder, Andreas, 2024, "A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 123069.
• Timothy N. Cason & Alex Tabarrok & Robertas Zubrickas, 2024, "Signaling Quality: How Refund Bonsues Can Overcome Information Asymmetries in Crowdfunding," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1339, May.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2024, "Pareto-Improvements, Welfare Trade-Offs and the Taxation of Couples," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 518, Dec.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Cuiling Zhang, 2024, "The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 04-2024, Mar.
• Shurojit Chatterji & Takashi Kunimoto & Paulo Daniel Salles Ramos, 2024, "Compellingness in Nash Implementation," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 2-2024, Feb.
• Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran, 2024, "Robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in general mechanisms," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 10-2025, Mar.
• Shreya Malhotra, 2024, "Impact of Divorce Law Liberalisation on Domestic Violence," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , volume 23, issue 2, pages 223-243, December, DOI: 10.1177/09767479221096712.
• Dávid Csercsik & Anne Neumann, 2024, "A Solidarity Mechanism to Allocate Stored Natural Gas in Crisis," The Energy Journal, , volume 45, issue 5, pages 91-103, September, DOI: 10.1177/01956574241253982.
• Rongyu Wang, 2024, "Strategic Entry with Correlated Private Information," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , volume 36, issue 2, pages 133-165, July, DOI: 10.1177/02601079221100885.
• Walid Hadhri & Chema Abderrazak, 2024, "How Consumers Choose the Green Electricity Product Instead of Conventional Electricity? A Welfare Analysis Approach," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 12, issue 3, pages 235-259, December, DOI: 10.1177/23210222221100600.
• Vivek Suneja & Debashree Das, 2024, "Impact of Social Preferences, Trust and Behavioural Norms on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 12, issue 3, pages 326-344, December, DOI: 10.1177/23210222231174755.
• Luca Anderlini & Larry Samuelson & Daniele Terlizzese, 2024, "When is Trust Robust?," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 710, Mar.
• Luca Anderlini & Gaon Kim, 2024, "Tournament Auctions," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 712, Mar.
• Luca Anderlini & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2024, "The Law of General Average," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 725, Jun.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2024, "The Attack-and-Defense Conflict with the Gun-and- Butter Dilemma," Working Papers, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, number 2024003, Jun.
• Jesper Breinbjerg & Trine Tornøe Platz & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2024, "Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 336, issue 3, pages 1551-1572, May, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9.
• Andrea Caravaggio & Luigi De Cesare & Andrea Di Liddo, 2024, "Optimal water tariffs for domestic, agricultural and industrial use," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 337, issue 3, pages 1135-1165, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-05822-y.
• Franz Wirl, 2024, "Dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments: correction and extension," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, volume 32, issue 2, pages 483-505, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10100-023-00860-6.
• A. Zapata & A. M. Mármol & L. Monroy & M. A. Caraballo, 2024, "Altruistic preferences in global emission games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, volume 32, issue 3, pages 843-864, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10100-023-00890-0.
• Akihiko Yanase & Ngo Van Long, 2024, "Mixed Market Structure and R &D: A Differential Game Approach," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 14, issue 1, pages 97-132, March, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00504-z.
• Wout Vos & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2024, "Influencing Opinion Networks: Optimization and Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 14, issue 4, pages 959-980, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00543-6.
• Zhengping Zhang, 2024, "The buffer role of emotions in international conflict: theoretical evidence supporting for patriotic education," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 25, issue 4, pages 487-503, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00320-0.
• Byeong-hyeon Jeong, 2024, "The cost of proportional representations in electoral system design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 47-56, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00261-1.
• Ethan Holdahl & Anne van den Nouweland, 2024, "Minimally incomplete sampling and convergence of adaptive play in $$2\times 2$$ 2 × 2 games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-14, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00262-0.
• Anne-Christine Barthel & Eric Hoffmann, 2024, "On ordered equilibria in games with increasing best responses," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 12, issue 2, pages 191-198, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00272-y.
• Ludovic Tangpi & Xuchen Zhou, 2024, "Optimal investment in a large population of competitive and heterogeneous agents," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 28, issue 2, pages 497-551, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00527-9.
• Yoshitaka Okano & Eiji Goto, 2024, "Groups versus individuals, partial lying, and social image concern in a dice-rolling experiment," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 301-331, April, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00139-0.
• Giorgio Calcagnini & Slađana Pavlinović Mršić & Laura Policardo & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2024, "Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 19, issue 4, pages 587-615, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00380-1.
• Giorgio Calcagnini & Slađana Pavlinović Mršić & Laura Policardo & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2024, "Correction to: Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 19, issue 4, pages 617-618, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00386-9.
• Cary Deck & Zachary Dorobiala & Paan Jindapon, 2024, "Indefinitely repeated contests with incumbency advantage," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 232-254, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00154-2.
• Abraham Aldama & Daniel Draganoff & Gantavya Pahwa, 2024, "An experiment in the role of identity in fostering coordination," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 294-309, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00158-y.
• Christian König-Kersting, 2024, "On the robustness of social norm elicitation," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 10, issue 2, pages 531-543, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-024-00178-2.
• Shaohua Qin, 2024, "The Non-cooperative Game and Cooperative Game Between Independent Innovation Firm and Imitative Innovation Firm," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), volume 15, issue 2, pages 5443-5465, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13132-023-01166-3.
• Miltiadis Makris, 2024, "Covid and social distancing with a heterogenous population," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 1, pages 445-494, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01377-2.
• Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico & Davide Fiaschi & Fausto Gozzi, 2024, "Mobility decisions, economic dynamics and epidemic," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 1, pages 495-531, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01485-1.
• Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2024, "Sunk costs, entry and clustering," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 3, pages 747-782, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01504-1.
• Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Carlos Oyarzun, 2024, "Testing under information manipulation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 3, pages 849-890, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01514-z.
• Rabah Amir & Igor V. Evstigneev & Valeriya Potapova, 2024, "Unbeatable strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 891-920, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0.
• Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, 2024, "Diversification and information in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 1, pages 263-294, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01532-x.
• Hideo Konishi & Nicolas Sahuguet & Benoît S. Y. Crutzen, 2024, "Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 1, pages 69-100, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9.
• Peixuan Li & Chuangyin Dang & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2024, "Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 2, pages 347-387, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01565-w.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2024, "Perfect robust implementation by private information design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 753-787, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01548-3.
• Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters, 2024, "Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 789-813, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01550-9.
• Brishti Guha, 2024, "Plea bargaining when juror effort is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 945-977, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01551-2.
• Shaofei Jiang, 2024, "Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 1, pages 43-70, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00852-5.
• Francesc Dilmé, 2024, "A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 673-693, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00874-z.
• Ludovic A. Julien, 2024, "Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 325-371, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00878-9.
• Malte Braack & Christian Henning & Johannes Ziesmer, 2024, "Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 373-421, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00882-z.
• Kwanghyun Kim, 2024, "On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 579-608, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00883-y.
• János Flesch & Dries Vermeulen & Anna Zseleva, 2024, "Finitely additive behavioral strategies: when do they induce an unambiguous expected payoff?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 695-723, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00892-5.
• Janna Hinz & Andreas Nicklisch & Mey-Ling Sommer, 2024, "Reciprocity models revisited: intention factors and reference values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 2, pages 299-324, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00898-z.
• Pablo Amorós, 2024, "Nash implementation of supermajority rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 53, issue 3, pages 811-825, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-024-00888-1.
• Georges Sarafopoulos & Despoina Terzopoulou & Kosmas Papadopoulos, 2024, "Dynamics of a Duopoly Game in R&D Efforts with Asymmetric Information," Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, Springer, in: Maria Mavri & Patricia Ikouta Mazza & Anastasios Karasavvoglou & Persefoni Polychronidou, "Economic Growth, Prosperity and Sustainability in the Economies of the Balkans and Eastern European Countries", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-58437-4_7.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Fumihiro Yonekura, 2024, "King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 1-19, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00328-8.
• Raghul S. Venkatesh, 2024, "Communication and coordination with constraints," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 89-124, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00336-8.
• Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024, "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 1, pages 125-150, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7.
• Ranojoy Basu & Conan Mukherjee, 2024, "Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 2, pages 313-330, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x.
• Aditya Kuvalekar & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2024, "A fair procedure in a marriage market," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 28, issue 3, pages 533-550, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4.
• Britta Butz & Pablo Guillen Alvarez & Christine Harbring, 2024, "Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, volume 18, issue 10, pages 2925-2951, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x.
• Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2024, "Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 63, issue 3, pages 677-715, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01508-3.
• Yohan Pelosse, 2024, "A Non-Cooperative Shapley Value Representation of Luce Contests Success Functions," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-01, Feb.
• Yohan Pelosse, 2024, "Correlated Equilibrium Strategies with Multiple Independent Randomization Devices," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-05, Mar.
• Yohan Pelosse, 2024, "Decentralized Coalition-Proof Pure Nash Equilibrium: Existence And Uniquenesse," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2024-09, Dec.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Erik Ansink, 2024, "Towards fully decentralized environmental regulation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-035/VIII, May.
• Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2024, "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 603ef683-1dca-4c30-b7e8-2.
• Hsieh, Chih Sheng & Deer, Lachlan & Koenig, Michael & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2024, "Social Networks and Collective Action in Large Populations: An application to the Egyptian Arab Spring," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number d03852a7-c5e7-4be0-8583-1.
• Jon H. Fiva & Federica Izzo & Janne Tukiainen, 2024, "The Gatekeeper’s Dilemma: Political Selection or Team Effort," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 164, Jan.

2023

• Nicola Campigotto & Marco Catola & Simone D’Alessandro & Pietro Guarnieri & Lorenzo Spadoni, 2023, "Curbing Energy Consumption through Voluntary Quotas: Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2023/299, Jul.
• Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2023, "International mixed triopoly, privatization and subsidization," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 116070, Jan.
• Brams, Steven & Ismail, Mehmet S. & Kilgour, Marc, 2023, "Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The m-n Rule," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 116352, Feb.
• Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2023, "Closing the Psychological Distance: The Effect of Social Interactions on Team Performance," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117042, Apr.
• Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2023, "Why firms should care for consumers: Complementary goods," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117305, May.
• Gómez-Rámirez, Leopoldo & Sánchez, Gonzalo E., 2023, "On the need to anticipate behavioral responses to policies: the case of multiple refilings on taxpayer behavior in Ecuador," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117825, Jun.
• Berliant, Marcus & Boyer, Pierre, 2023, "Politics and income taxes: progress and progressivity," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118099, Jul.
• De Francesco, Massimo A. & Salvadori, Neri, 2023, "Bertrand-Edgeworth game under oligopoly. General results and comparisons with duopoly," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118237, Aug.
• Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2023, "Endogenous timing in an international mixed duopoly with a foreign labor-managed competitor," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118561, Sep.
• Banerjee, Sreoshi, 2023, "Stability and fairness in sequencing games: optimistic approach and pessimistic scenarios," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118680, Sep.
• Guerrazzi, Marco & Candido, Giuseppe, 2023, "The determination of the price of capital goods: A differential game approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119118, Nov.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2023, "Maximizing a preference relation on complete chains and lattices," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119148, Nov.
• Armstrong, Mark & John, Vickers, 2023, "Multibrand price dispersion," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119322, Nov.
• David Gill & Yaroslav Rosokha, 2023, "Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1332, May.
• David Gill & Zachary Knepper & Victoria Prowse & Junya Zhou, 2023, "How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1337, Nov.
• Dario Debowicz & Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2023, "Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 661, Mar.
• Yves Breitmoser & Lian Xue & Jiwei Zheng & Daniel John Zizzo, 2023, "Organizational Design and Error Propagation: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Papers Series, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia, number 666, Dec.
• Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023, "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 382, Feb.
• Alessandra Allocca, 2023, "“No Man is an Island”: An Empirical Study on Team Formation and Performance," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 389, Feb.
• Fabian Gerstmeier & Yigit Oezcelik & Michel Tolksdorf, 2023, "Rebate Rules in Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Introducing the Bid-Cap Rule," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 392, Mar.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anastasia Danilov & Martin G. Kocher, 2023, "The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 401, Jun.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2023, "The Taxation of Couples," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 405, Jun.
• Cédric Argenton & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Wieland Müller, 2023, "Cournot Meets Bayes-Nash: A Discontinuity in Behavior in Finitely Repeated Duopoly Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 460, Nov.
• Lea Heursen & Eva Ranehill & Roberto Weber, 2023, "Are Women Less Effective Leaders than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 472, Dec.
• Moreno-Cruz, Juan & Harding, Anthony, 2023, "A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy," RFF Working Paper Series, Resources for the Future, number 23-24, May.
• Timo Goeschl, 2023, "(Un)Trustworthy Pledges And Cooperation In Social Dilemmas," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, number 23/1070, May.
• Rongyu Wang, 2023, "Bayesian Games with Rationally Inattentive Players," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , volume 35, issue 2, pages 139-171, July, DOI: 10.1177/02601079221083491.
• M. Punniyamoorthy & Sarin Abraham & Jose Joy Thoppan, 2023, "A Method to Select Best Among Multi-Nash Equilibria," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 11, issue 1, pages 101-127, April, DOI: 10.1177/23210222211024388.
• Elvio Accinelli & Armando García & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera & Jorge Zazueta, 2023, "On the Strategic Complementarity of Skilled Workers and Technological Innovation: Which Determines Which?," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 11, issue 2, pages 206-234, August, DOI: 10.1177/23210222211024383.
• Aidas Masiliūnas, 2023, "Learning in Rent-Seeking Contests with Payoff Risk and Foregone Payoff Information," Working Papers, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, number 2023002, Jan.
• Sumon Bhaumik & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Ralitza Dimova & Hanna Fromell, 2023, "Identity, Communication, and Conflict: An Experiment," Working Papers, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, number 2023009, Apr.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anastasia Danilov & Martin G. Kocher, 2023, "The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior," Working Papers, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, number 2023012, May.
• Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Sang-Hyun Kim, 2023, "The Central Influencer Theorem: Spatial Voting Contests with Endogenous Coalition Formation," Working Papers, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics, number 2023019, Aug.
• Wilfredo L. Maldonado & Jessica A. Barbosa, 2023, "Determinants of Agricultural Fires: An Aggregative Games Approach," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2023_12, Sep.
• Maria Montero, 2023, "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 13, issue 2, pages 525-548, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00460-0.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2023, "An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 13, issue 2, pages 589-609, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00463-x.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023, "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 13, issue 2, pages 440-461, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00465-9.
• Greg Leo & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2023, "Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 13, issue 2, pages 510-524, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00467-7.
• G.-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa & Dominik Karos, 2023, "Farsighted Rationality in Hedonic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 13, issue 2, pages 462-479, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00474-8.
• Arsen Palestini & Giuseppe Pignataro, 2023, "Inequality assessment in a dynamic framework with heterogenous agents," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, volume 40, issue 2, pages 469-494, July, DOI: 10.1007/s40888-022-00275-7.
• Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami & Weiye Chen, 2023, "Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 1-25, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00242-w.
• Aner Sela, 2023, "Is there free riding in group contests?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 191-201, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00250-w.
• Benjamin Brooks & Philip J. Reny, 2023, "A canonical game—75 years in the making—showing the equivalence of matrix games and linear programming," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 171-180, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00252-8.
• Xiangyu Shi, 2023, "Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 243-254, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4.
• He Liu & Yun Bai & Zhiguang Huang & Han Qiao & Shouyang Wang, 2023, "Private banking development in China under two organizational structures: Economic analysis from an organizational innovation perspective," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, volume 9, issue 1, pages 1-23, December, DOI: 10.1186/s40854-023-00535-w.
• Yunhong Li & Zuo Quan Xu & Xun Yu Zhou, 2023, "Robust utility maximisation with intractable claims," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 4, pages 985-1015, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00512-2.
• Mariana Khapko, 2023, "Asset pricing with dynamically inconsistent agents," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 4, pages 1017-1046, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00516-y.
• Papiya Ghosh & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2023, "Decomposition of accident loss and decoupled liability assignment: A class of negligence rules," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 58, issue 1, pages 119-140, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-022-00144-x.
• Amarjyoti Mahanta, 2023, "Ad valorem tax versus tax per unit of output in a Bertrand competition with strictly increasing marginal cost," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 58, issue 1, pages 105-117, June, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00189-6.
• Ai Takeuchi & Erika Seki, 2023, "Overcoming problems of coordination and freeriding in a game with multiple public goods: dynamic contribution with information provision," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 379-411, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00133-6.
• Hubert János Kiss & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia & Vita Zhukova, 2023, "Group contest in a coopetitive setup: experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 18, issue 3, pages 463-490, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-022-00373-6.
• Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Simon Schopohl & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023, "Key players in network-oriented interventions," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 18, issue 4, pages 879-907, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00394-9.
• Manja Gärtner & Robert Östling & Sebastian Tebbe, 2023, "Do we all coordinate in the long run?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 16-33, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-022-00125-z.
• Nathan W. Chan & Leonard Wolk, 2023, "Reciprocity with stochastic loss," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 51-65, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00129-3.
• Eugenio Verrina, 2023, "Upset but (almost) correct: a conceptual replication of Di Tella, Perez-Truglia, Babino and Sigman (2015)," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 327-336, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00136-4.
• Fabian Dvorak, 2023, "stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 337-349, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00141-7.
• Vladimir Petkov, 2023, "Prize formation and sharing in multi-stage contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 1, pages 259-289, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01407-z.
• Akira Okada, 2023, "Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 427-452, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01410-4.
• Felipe R. Durazzo & David Turchick, 2023, "Welfare-improving misreported polls," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 523-565, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01413-9.
• Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2023, "Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 591-623, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01417-5.
• Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023, "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 743-780, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01422-8.
• Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023, "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 803-840, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01425-5.
• Ben Chen & José A. Rodrigues-Neto, 2023, "The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 841-885, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01426-4.
• Sander Heinsalu, 2023, "Greater search cost reduces prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 3, pages 923-947, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01432-6.
• Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023, "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 4, pages 983-1007, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01433-5.
• Teruyoshi Kobayashi & Tomokatsu Onaga, 2023, "Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 1, pages 251-287, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01457-x.
• Sarvesh Bandhu & Ratul Lahkar, 2023, "Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 685-721, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01474-w.
• Yuta Yasui, 2023, "Revealed preference tests for price competition in multi-product differentiated markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1115-1144, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01487-z.
• Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2023, "Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1069-1114, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01492-2.
• Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023, "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 4, pages 1289-1327, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01497-x.
• Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023, "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 117-155, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5.
• Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023, "(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 175-193, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00814-3.
• Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang & Lixue Zhou, 2023, "Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 1, pages 303-332, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00820-5.
• Takuma Wakayama & Takehiko Yamato, 2023, "Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 517-553, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00828-x.
• R. A. Edwards & R. R. Routledge, 2023, "Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 569-586, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00830-3.
• Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023, "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 649-685, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00834-z.
• Torsten Heinrich & Yoojin Jang & Luca Mungo & Marco Pangallo & Alex Scott & Bassel Tarbush & Samuel Wiese, 2023, "Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 3, pages 703-735, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00837-4.
• Manuel Foerster, 2023, "Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 1291-1316, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1.
• Ville Korpela, 2023, "Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 993-1007, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00849-0.
• Dong Liang & Yunlong Wang & Zhigang Cao & Xiaoguang Yang, 2023, "Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 1111-1151, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00853-4.
• Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023, "Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 4, pages 957-992, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0.
• Lonnie Turpin, 2023, "A Unique Mixed Equilibrium Payoff in Quantum Bimatrix Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, volume 196, issue 3, pages 1119-1124, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10957-023-02170-y.
• Matthias Blonski & Ulf Lilienfeld-Toal, 2023, "Moral hazard with excess returns," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, number 6, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11579-023-00344-w.
• Dhritiman Gupta, 2023, "Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 1, pages 221-244, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00273-4.
• Peter Wagner, 2023, "Seller experimentation and trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 2, pages 337-357, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00294-7.
• Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023, "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 2, pages 419-438, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2.
• Dmitry Sedov, 2023, "Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 3, pages 505-546, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x.
• John Duffy & Alexander Matros & Zehra Valencia, 2023, "Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 725-761, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00318-2.
• Ranojoy Basu & Conan Mukherjee, 2023, "Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 27, issue 4, pages 763-790, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00320-8.
• Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2023, "A connections model with decreasing returns link-formation technology," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 31-61, March, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-022-00266-8.
• Kira Pronin & Jonathan Woon, 2023, "Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 60, issue 4, pages 625-645, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01430-6.
• Tetsuya Kawamura & Yusuke Osaki & Go Ohtani & Ryuji Saito, 2023, "Reciprocity is Different: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game Between Japanese Domestic and International Students," The Review of Socionetwork Strategies, Springer, volume 17, issue 2, pages 167-178, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12626-023-00143-1.
• Matthew Embrey & Christian Seel & J. Philipp Reiss, 2023, "Gambling in Risk-Taking Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School, number 0623, Jul.
• Ralph-Christopher Bayer & Marco Faravelli & Carlos Pimienta, 2023, "The Wisdom of the Crowd: Uninformed Voting and the Efficiency of Democracy," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2023-08, Apr.
• Rafiq Friperson & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2023, "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 23-035/V, Jun.
• Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023, "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2023-006.
• de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023, "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2023-011.
• Li, Peixuan & Dang, Chuangyin & Herings, P.J.J., 2023, "Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 5b68f5d7-3209-4a1b-924c-6.
• de Vos, Wout & Borm, Peter & Hamers, Herbert, 2023, "Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6d555d3d-5f45-42e7-8b71-c.
• Finn Christensen, 2023, "Comparative Statics for Difference-in-Differences," Working Papers, Towson University, Department of Economics, number 2023-08, Nov, revised Apr 2025.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Jiang, Ge & Shi, Fei, 2023, "Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110977.
• Lu, Feifei, 2023, "Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 223, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110996.
• Li, Bo & Wu, Zenan & Xing, Zeyu, 2023, "Optimally biased contests with draws," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111076.
• Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2023, "Coalition formation problems with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111112.
• Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahkar, Ratul, 2023, "Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111113.
• Avoyan, Ala & Romagnoli, Giorgia, 2023, "Paying for inattention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111114.
• Baik, Kyung Hwan, 2023, "Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 227, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111130.
• De Vito, Nicodemo, 2023, "Directed lexicographic rationalizability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 227, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111134.
• Decker, Christian, 2023, "The order of move in a conversational war of attrition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 228, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181.
• Vaz, João & Shogren, Jason, 2023, "Cooperation under oath: A case for context-dependent preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111229.
• Yildirim, Mustafa, 2023, "When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 230, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111233.
• Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2023, "Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 230, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111243.
• Lattimer, Timothy R.B. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2023, "Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111265.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Jiang, Ge, 2023, "A hybrid revision protocol of action and links and social coordination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111298.
• Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2023, "Complete-rent-dissipation contest design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346.
• Hsieh, Yue-Da & Qian, Xuewen & Qu, Chen, 2023, "Iterated bounded dominance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111360.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, 2023, "A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111383.
• Raimondo, Roberto, 2023, "Strictly competitive games with infinitely many strategies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111410.
• Healy, Paul J. & Park, Hyoeun, 2023, "Model selection accuracy in behavioral game theory: A simulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104362.
• Drouvelis, Michalis & Pearce, Graeme, 2023, "Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104372.
• Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2023, "Free riding in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104378.