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Unbeatable strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Rabah Amir

    (University of Iowa)

  • Igor V. Evstigneev

    (University of Manchester)

  • Valeriya Potapova

    (Validus Risk Management)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the notion of an unbeatable strategy as a game-theoretic solution concept. A general framework (games with relative preferences) suitable for the analysis of this concept is proposed. Basic properties of unbeatable strategies are presented and a number of examples and applications considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir & Igor V. Evstigneev & Valeriya Potapova, 2024. "Unbeatable strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(4), pages 891-920, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:77:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01521-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unbeatable strategies; Relative preferences; Zero-sum games; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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