Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2002

• Zhentang Zhang, 2002, "Managerial Incentives, Innovation and Product Market Competition," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 295.
• Rajgopal Kannan & Sudipta Sarangi & S. S. Iyengar, 2002, "Strategic Path Reliability in Information Networks," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 298.
• VIEILLE, Nicolas & WEIBULL, Jörgen W., 2002, "Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 755, Apr.
• LOVO, Stefano & ALBANO, Gian Luigi & GERMANO, Fabrizio, 2002, "On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 765, Sep.
• Federico Echenique, 2002, "Comparative Statics by Adaptive Dynamics and the Correspondence Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 70, issue 2, pages 833-844, March.
• Ed Hopkins, 2002, "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 70, issue 6, pages 2141-2166, November.
• Ahmed Anwar, 2002, "On the Co-Existence of Conventions," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 68, Nov.
• Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2002, "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 92, Sep.
• Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002, "A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 1, pages 225-232, June.
• Ravallion, Martin, 2002, "On the urbanization of poverty," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 2, pages 435-442, August.
• Yoav Wachsman, 2002, "A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 200216.
• Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002, "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-00465020, Feb, DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0887.
• Gaël Giraud & Céline Rochon, 2002, "Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-00498879, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00077-0.
• Nicolas Vieille & Jörgen Weibull, 2002, "Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00593648.
• Stefano Lovo & Gian Luigi Albano & Fabrizio Germano, 2002, "On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-00593867.
• Neugebauer, Tibor & Poulsen, Anders & Schramm, Arthur, 2002, "Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove game," Working Papers, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics, number 02-12, Jul.
• Voorneveld, Mark, 2002, "Preparation and toolkit learning," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 485, Jan.
• Le Coq, Chloé, 2002, "Strategic use of available capacity in the electricity spot market," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 496, Apr.
• Le Coq, Chloé & Orzen, Henrik, 2002, "Do Forward Markets Enhance Competition? Experimental Evidence," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 506, Aug, revised 01 Oct 2004.
• Strömberg, David, 2002, "Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies, number 706, Mar.
• Vieille, Nicolas & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002, "Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 577, Apr.
• Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002, "Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 582, Jun.
• Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & 石川, 竜一郎 & Matsuhisa, Takashi & 松久, 隆 & Hoshino, Yoshiaki & 星野, 良明, 2002, "No Speculation in Rational Expectations under Generalized Information," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-09, Nov.
• Matsuhisa, Takashi & 松久, 隆 & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & 石川, 竜一郎 & Hosino, Yoshiaki & 星野, 良明, 2002, "Core Equivalence in Economy under Generalized Information," Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-12, Dec.
• Choe, Chongwoo, 2002, "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 2002-7, Sep.
• Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2002, "A Mechanism Design for a Solution to the Tragedy of Commons," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number a424, Feb.
• Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters, 2005, "Nash Consistent Representation of Effectivity Functions through Lottery Models," Discussion Paper Series, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, number dp404, Sep.
• Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel, 2002, "From Private to Public Common Agency," Cahiers de recherche, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée, number 02-06, Jul.
• Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002, "Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, volume 26, issue 2, pages 285-298, May.
• Tito Cordella & Manjira Datta, 2002, "Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 43, issue 1, pages 137-153, February.
• C. Monica Capra & Jacob K Goeree & Rosario Gomez & Charles A Holt, 2002, "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 43, issue 3, pages 613-636, August.
• Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 2002, "The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 43, issue 4, pages 1157-1190, November.
• Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2002, "The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 115, Jun.
• Dragan Filipovich, 2002, "Free Riding And Incentives To Invest In The Reputation Of An Anonymous Group," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, volume 1, issue 1, pages 59-81, Marzo 200.
• Germán Coloma, 2002, "Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., volume 39, issue 116, pages 123-133.
• Paulo Trigo Pereira & Nuno Silva & João Andrade e Silva, 2002, "Positive and negative reciprocity in labor market," Working Papers Department of Economics, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa, number 2002/03.
• Volij, Oscar, 2002, "A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 10128, Sep.
• Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Winter, Eyal, 2002, "A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5259, Jan.
• Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2002, "Network Formation And Coordination: Bargaining The Division Of Link Costs," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 2002-27, Dec.
• Markus Pasche, 2002, "Playing Fair: Rationality and Norm-guided Behavior in Games," Working Paper Series B, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration, number 2002-02, Aug.
• M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002, "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, number 482, Oct.
• Holler Manfred J., 2002, "Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, volume 222, issue 5, pages 556-583, October, DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2002-0504.
• Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2002, "The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 5, issue 2, pages 111-131, October, DOI: 10.1023/A:1020365204768.
• Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002, "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 5, issue 3, pages 253-272, December, DOI: 10.1023/A:1020892405622.
• Dollar, David & Kraay, Aart, 2002, "Growth Is Good for the Poor," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 195-225, September.
• Pio Baake & Ulrich Kamecke & Hans-Theo Normann, 2002, "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 75, issue 2, pages 125-135, March, DOI: 10.1007/s007120200009.
• Garoupa, Nuno R & Gata, Joao E, 2002, "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning," Public Choice, Springer, volume 110, issue 1-2, pages 41-65, January.
• Garoupa, Nuno & Gata, John, 2002, ""A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning": Erratum," Public Choice, Springer, volume 112, issue 1-2, pages 211-211, July.
• Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002, "Dissipation in Rent-seeking Contests with Entry Costs," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University, number KERP 2002/11, Sep.
• Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002, "Joint Production Games with Mixed Sharing Rules," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University, number KERP 2002/16, Sep.
• Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002, "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University, number KERP 2002/22, Nov.
• Hans Haller & Subhadip Chakrabarti, 2002, "An Analysis of Advertising Wars," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 2002-03, Nov.
• Peter Bogetoft & Kurt Nielsen, 2002, "DEA Based Yardstick Competition in Natural Resource Management," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 2002-04, Nov.
• Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 2002, "Convergence to No Arbitrage Equilibria in Market Games," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 02-12, Oct.
• Richard Baron & Jaçques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2002, "Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 02-19, Sep, revised Nov 2002.
• Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G. & Sutter, Matthias, 2002, "Experimental 'beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 18165.
• John Spraggon, 2002, "Individual Decision Making in Exogenous Targeting Instrument Experiments," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications, McMaster University, number 2002-01, Jan.
• Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002, "Bargaining Outcomes as the Result of Coordinated Expectations: An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0204, Apr.
• Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002, "Endogenouse Social Preferences," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0209, Jun.
• Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002, "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0217, Apr.
• Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002, "The Demand for Punishment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics, number 0243, Sep.
• Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2002, "Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 158, issue 3, pages 408-419, September.
• Urs Steiner Brandt, 2002, "Actions Prior to Entering an International Environmental Agreement," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 158, issue 4, pages 695-714, December.
• Mario Gilli, 2002, "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 46, Mar, revised Mar 2002.
• Mario Gilli, 2002, "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 47, Mar, revised Mar 2002.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2002, "Reinforcement, repeated games, and local interaction," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 02-17.
• Possajennikov, Alexandre, 2002, "Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens : evolution of strategies and preferences in 2x2 games," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 02-04.
• Possajennikov, Alexandre, 2002, "Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 02-03.
• David Levinson, 2002, "The Economics of Traveler Information from Probes," Working Papers, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group, number 200201.
• Oscar Volij, 2002, "A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 016, Jan.
• P. Dubey & J. Geanakoplos, 2002, "From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics, number 02-01.
• P. Dubey & O. Haimanko & A. Zapechelnyuk, 2002, "Strategic Substitutes and Potential Games," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics, number 02-02.
• William T. Harbaugh & Anne van den Nouweland, 2002, "Demonstrating worker quality through strategic absenteeism," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers, University of Oregon Economics Department, number 2002-6, Jun, revised 14 Jun 2002.
• Steffen Huck & Wieland M¸ller, 2002, "The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: on Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 40, issue 2, pages 231-240, April.
• Stephen Morris, 2002, "Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, volume 18, issue 4, pages 433-445.
• William H. Sandholm, 2002, "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 69, issue 3, pages 667-689.
• Daniel John Zizzo, 2002, "On the Measurement of Harmony in Normal Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 116, Sep.
• Daniel John Zizzo, 2002, "Game Perception and Harmony in 3 x 3 Games: An Experiment in Cognitive Game Theory," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 118, Sep.
• Alan Beggs, 2002, "Large Deviations and Equilibrium Selection in Large Populations," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 129, Nov.
• Oliver Board, 2002, "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 137, Dec.
• Gerardo A. Guerra, 2002, "Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 87, Feb.
• David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002, "Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 89, Mar.
• David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2002, "A Multinomial Probit Model of Stochastic Evolution," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 90, Mar.
• Alan Beggs, 2002, "On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 96, Mar.
• Gerardo A. Guerra, 2002, "Crowding Out Trust: The Adverse Effects of Verification. An Experiment," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 98, Mar.
• Gerardo A. Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo, 2002, "Trust Responsiveness and Beliefs," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 99, Mar.
• Oliver Board, 2002, "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, number 244, Jan, revised Jan 2002.
• Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002, "The Economics of doping," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 37322.
• Paola Manzini & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2002, "On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Working Papers, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, number 456, Mar.
• Orzach, Ram & Overgaard, Per Baltzer & Tauman, Yair, 2002, "Modest Advertising Signals Strength," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 33, issue 2, pages 340-358, Summer.
• Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002, "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, volume 33, issue 4, pages 630-649, Winter.
• Leslie M. Marx & Francesco Squintani, 2002, "Individual Accountability in Teams," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 494, Jun.
• Martin Shubik, 2002, "The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games," Simulation & Gaming, , volume 33, issue 2, pages 139-156, June, DOI: 10.1177/1046878102332002.
• Pompermayer F.M. & Florian M. & Leal J.E., 2002, "A spatial price oligopoly model for refined petroleum products: an application to a Brazilian case," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 172, Jul.
• Roger Koppl & Barkley Rosser, 2002, "All that I have to say will already have crossed your mind," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 185, Jul.
• Stuart McDonald, 2002, "Using Simulated Annealing to Compute the Trembles of Trembling Hand Perfection," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 220, Jul.
• Carl Chiarella & Mauro Gallegati & Roberto Leombruni & Antonio Palestrini, 2002, "Asset Price Dynamics among Heterogeneous Interacting Agents," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 222, Jul.
• G.I. Bischi, & C. Chiarella & M. Kopel, 2002, "On Market Games with Misspecified Demand Functions : Long Run Outcomes and Global Dynamics," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 27, Jul.
• Saori Iwanaga Author-Name; Akira Namatame, 2002, "Minority Games of Heterogeneous Agents," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 32, Jul.
• Romans Pancs & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2002, "Schelling's Neighborhood Segregation Model Revisited," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 96, Jul.
• Giorgio Fagiolo, 2002, "Coordination, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics, number 98, Jul.
• Marco Celentani & Juan-José Ganuza, 2002, "Organized vs. Competitive Corruption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 109, issue 1, pages 293-315, January, DOI: 10.1023/A:1016364505439.
• Claudia Kemfert & Richard Tol, 2002, "Equity, international trade and climate policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, volume 2, issue 1, pages 23-48, March, DOI: 10.1023/A:1015034429715.
• John Morgan & Michael R. Baye, 2002, "Winner-take-all price competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 19, issue 2, pages 271-282.
• Rajiv Vohra & In-Koo Cho & Kevin Jewell, 2002, "A simple model of coalitional bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 19, issue 3, pages 435-457.
• Achim Wambach & Roman Inderst, 2002, "Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 19, issue 3, pages 525-548.
• Jacqueline Morgan & Lina Mallozzi & Sjur D. Flåm, 2002, "A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 1, pages 183-188.
• Matthew J. Ryan, 2002, "What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 1, pages 47-65.
• Klaus Ritzberger & Frank Milne, 2002, "Strategic pricing of equity issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 2, pages 271-294.
• Michael Kosfeld, 2002, "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 2, pages 321-339.
• Chen-Ying Huang, 2002, "Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 2, pages 401-412.
• Harrison Cheng, 2002, "Bertrand vs. Cournot equilibrium with risk averse firms and cost uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 3, pages 555-577.
• Per Svejstrup Hansen & Oddvar M. Kaarbøe, 2002, "Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 20, issue 4, pages 793-807.
• Ori Haimanko & Aner Sela & Ram Orzach & Ezra Einy, 2002, "Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 30, issue 3, pages 405-419.
• Antoni Calvó-Armengol, 2002, "On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 30, issue 4, pages 503-515.
• Ulrich Berger, 2002, "Best response dynamics for role games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 30, issue 4, pages 527-538.
• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2002, "Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 31, issue 1, pages 123-136.
• Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002, "On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 31, issue 1, pages 69-89.
• François Maniquet, 2002, "A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-15.
• Sandeep Baliga, 2002, "The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 7, issue 1, pages 17-26.
• Manipushpak Mitra, 2002, "Achieving the first best in sequencing problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 7, issue 1, pages 75-91.
• Dirk Simons, 2002, "Der Einfluss eines Aktivierungswahlrechtes für Entwicklungskosten auf Beteiligungsentscheidungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, volume 54, issue 8, pages 743-761, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF03372694.
• Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002, "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 19, issue 4, pages 811-823.
• Pio Baake & Hans-Theo Normann, 2002, "Collusive intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), volume 138, issue 3, pages 482-492, September, DOI: 10.1007/BF02707950.
• William Greene, 2002, "Convenient estimators for the panel probit model: Further results," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 02-06.
• Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2002, "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 02-069/1, Jul.
• J.B.G. Frenk & G. Kassay & V. Protassov, 2002, "On Borel Probability Measures and Noncooperative Game Theory," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 02-093/4, Sep.
• Tibor Neugebauer & Anders Poulsen & Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002, "Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 02-094/1, Oct.
• Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2002, "Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications to Noncooperative Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 02-126/1, Dec.
• Onderstal, A.M., 2002, "Socially Optimal Mechanisms," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-34.
• Dreef, M.R.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & van der Genugten, B.B., 2002, "On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-59.
• Thijssen, J.J.J. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M., 2002, "Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-70.
• Montero, M.P., 2002, "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-26.
• Riedl, A. & Vyrastekova, J., 2002, "Social Preference in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-5.
• Manzini, P. & Sadrieh, A. & Vriend, N.J., 2002, "On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-40.
• Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002, "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-79.
• Pham Do, K.H. & Norde, H.W., 2002, "The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-4.
• van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2002, "Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications in Noncooperative Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2002-108.
• Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Vriend, N.J., 2002, "The East End, the West End and King's Cross : On clustering in the four-player Hotelling game," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 1e3e12cd-ae62-49dc-8f43-1.
• Huck, S. & Müller, W. & Normann, H.T., 2002, "To commit or not to commit : Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 52f12df4-ce93-42ae-b8f4-5.
• Montero, M.P., 2002, "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7dba0283-bc13-4f2c-8f5e-5.
• Manzini, P. & Sadrieh, A. & Vriend, N.J., 2002, "On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 9524f3ea-067f-4805-bf09-c.
• Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002, "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number cd5dddf5-811b-4c0c-97d6-8.
• Huck, S. & Müller, W., 2002, "Absent-minded drivers in the lab : Testing Gilboa's model," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number d741c924-4e37-40ec-b617-4.
• van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2002, "Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications in Noncooperative Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number fc1f47c6-314f-4932-80c6-1.
• Guth, Werner & Kocher, Martin & Sutter, Matthias, 2002, "Experimental 'beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 74, issue 2, pages 219-228, January.
• Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002, "Corruption and competition in procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 7, pages 1273-1303, July.
• Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 46, issue 8, pages 1475-1500, September.
• Watson, Joel, 2002, "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 1, pages 176-199, January.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & van den Elzen, Antoon, 2002, "Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 1, pages 89-117, January.
• Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2002, "To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 2, pages 240-264, February.
• Milchtaich, Igal & Winter, Eyal, 2002, "Stability and Segregation in Group Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 2, pages 318-346, February.
• Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002, "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 2, pages 362-399, February.
• Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002, "Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 40, issue 2, pages 185-202, August.
• Kosfeld, Michael & Droste, Edward & Voorneveld, Mark, 2002, "A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 40, issue 2, pages 270-298, August.
• Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie, 2002, "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-25, October.
• Montero, Maria, 2002, "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 2, pages 309-321, November.
• Warneryd, Karl, 2002, "Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 2, pages 344-364, November.
• Zizzo, Daniel John, 2002, "Between utility and cognition: the neurobiology of relative position," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 1, pages 71-91, May.
• Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Andrew Muller, R., 2002, "Crowding-out voluntary contributions to public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 3, pages 305-317, July.
• Oechssler, Jorg, 2002, "Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 49, issue 3, pages 405-409, November.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002, "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 105, issue 2, pages 469-482, August.
• Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002, "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 106, issue 1, pages 1-16, September.
• Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2002, "On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 106, issue 1, pages 66-90, September.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002, "Entry and Vertical Differentiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 106, issue 1, pages 91-125, September.
• Anwar, A. W., 2002, "On the Co-existence of Conventions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 107, issue 1, pages 145-155, November.
• Oechssler, Jorg & Riedel, Frank, 2002, "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 107, issue 2, pages 223-252, December.
• Wagstaff, Adam, 2002, "Inequality aversion, health inequalities and health achievement," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, volume 21, issue 4, pages 627-641, July.
• Rapoport, Amnon & Chung Lo, Alison King & Zwick, Rami, 2002, "Choice of Prizes Allocated by Multiple Lotteries with Endogenously Determined Probabilities," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, volume 87, issue 1, pages 180-206, January.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Orzach, Ram & Sela, Aner, 2002, "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 37, issue 3, pages 247-258, May.
• Giraud, Gael & Rochon, Celine, 2002, "Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 38, issue 4, pages 441-463, December.
• Xue, Licun, 2002, "Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 43, issue 2, pages 165-176, March.
• Volij, Oscar, 2002, "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 1, pages 17-24, September.
• Asheim, Geir B., 2002, "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 2, pages 121-144, November.
• Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002, "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 1, pages 109-127, March.
• Belleflamme, Paul, 2002, "Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 1, pages 153-176, March.
• Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002, "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 83, issue 3, pages 325-345, March.