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The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games

Author

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  • Martin Shubik

    (Yale University martin.shubik@yale.edu)

Abstract

The use of lightly controlled games, primarily in classes in game theory, is discussed. The value of such games is considered from the viewpoint of both teaching and experimentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 2002. "The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:simgam:v:33:y:2002:i:2:p:139-156
    DOI: 10.1177/1046878102332002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Martin Shubik, 1979. "Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian and U.S. Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 517, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Teaching Economics with Classroom Experiments: A Symposium," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 603-610, January.
    5. Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Teaching Economics with Classroom Experiments: A Symposium," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 603-610, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik, 2005. "A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 36(2), pages 166-182, June.
    2. Gert Jan Hofstede & Elizabeth J. Tipton Murff, 2012. "Repurposing an Old Game for an International World," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 43(1), pages 34-50, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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