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A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Shubik

    (Yale University, martin.shubik@yale.edu)

Abstract

A simultaneous double auction market with bid and offer cards was used in classes on the theory and history of money and financial institutions and occasionally in classes on the theory of games. The prime purpose in using this game was to teach the students how to construct process models of economic phenomena. The second purpose was to consider the properties of the double auction market. The third purpose was to interpret the experimental results and link them to theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Shubik, 2005. "A double auction market: Teaching, experiment, and theory," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 36(2), pages 166-182, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:simgam:v:36:y:2005:i:2:p:166-182
    DOI: 10.1177/1046878105277536
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Shubik, 2002. "The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, June.
    2. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 785-806, July.
    3. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
    4. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(2), pages 111-111.
    5. Mendelson, Haim, 1982. "Market Behavior in a Clearing House," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1505-1524, November.
    6. Ariel Rubinstein, 1989. "Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment, chapter 7, pages 243-259, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Vernon L. Smith, 1965. "Experimental Auction Markets and the Walrasian Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 387-387.
    8. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
    9. Starr, Ross M, 1976. "Decentralized Nonmonetary Trade," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 1087-1089, September.
    10. Dubey, Pradeep, 1982. "Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 111-126, January.
    11. Bak, P. & Paczuski, M. & Shubik, M., 1997. "Price variations in a stock market with many agents," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 430-453.
    12. Antoni Bosch-Domenech & Shyam Sunder, 2000. "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 257-284, December.
    13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    14. Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1981. "Information Conditions, Communication and General Equilibrium," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(2), pages 186-189, May.
    15. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-1151, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Precha Thavikulwat, 2009. "Social Choice in a Computer-Assisted Simulation," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 40(4), pages 488-512, August.
    2. Gert Jan Hofstede & Elizabeth J. Tipton Murff, 2012. "Repurposing an Old Game for an International World," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 43(1), pages 34-50, February.
    3. Precha Thavikulwat, 2017. "Recipes for Structural Fairness in Games," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 48(5), pages 670-694, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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