Some Simple Games for Teaching and Research. Part 1: Cooperative Games
Over many years some simple cooperative games have been considered in lectures on game theory. The games were selected in order to provide insight into various normative theories of solution to n-person games. It is suggested that the results indicate that when solutions have outcomes in common, predictability is higher than when they are apart. The core is attractive but less so when it is heavily nonsymmetric.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1998|
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- Martin Shubik, 1979. "Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian and U.S. Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 517, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
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