Technology Adoption in a Differentiated Duopoly - Cournot versus Bertrand
This paper compares equilibrium technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly under two alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption, that is, on cost-efficiency of the industry, under two alternative modes of product market competition. The possibility of ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. If the cost of technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing effect of the technology is high. On the other hand, if the technology reduces the marginal cost of production by a very low amount, Cournot competition may lead to higher cost-efficiency than Bertrand competition.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.eaber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2006. "Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 999-1015, December.
- Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1993.
"The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 519-534.
- Bester, H. & Petrakis, E., 1991. "The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry," Papers 9136, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Bester, H. & Petrakis, E., 1991. "The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry," Discussion Paper 1991-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Aghion, Philippe & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1997. "Competition and growth with step-by-step innovation: An example," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 771-782, April.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2000.
"Costly technology adoption and capital accumulation,"
00-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2002. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(2), pages 489-502, April.
- Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 97-12, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Development and Comp Systems 9802001, EconWPA.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
- Radhika Lahiri & Shyama Ratnasiri, 2007.
"Concerning Inequality, Technology Adoption, and Structural Change,"
International Advances in Economic Research,
International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 13(4), pages 527-528, November.
- Radhika Lahiri & Shyama Ratnasiri, 2006. "Concerning Inequality, Technology Adoption, and Structural Change," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 207, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2005:i:6:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Leung, Charles Ka Yui & Tse, Chung Yi, 2001. "Technology Choice and Saving in the Presence of a Fixed Adoption Cost," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 40-48, February.
- Boone, Jan, 2001. "Intensity of competition and the incentive to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 705-726, April.
- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Jensen, Richard, 1992. "Innovation Adoption and Welfare under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 173-80, June.
- Bonanno, Giacomo & Haworth, Barry, 1998. "Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 495-510, July.
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Amir, Rabah & Jin, Jim Y., 2001. "Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 303-317, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eab:microe:22388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shiro Armstrong)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.