Competition And Welfare: The Implications Of Licensing
If firms with asymmetric costs can engage in technology licensing, we show that welfare may be higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Under fixed-fee licensing, consumer surplus and welfare are higher under Cournot competition if the technological difference between the firms is moderate. Under royalty licensing, if the bargaining power of the licenser is not very high and the technological difference between the firms is large, consumer surplus and welfare are higher under Cournot competition. We also show that technology licensing has important implications on the profit differential between Bertrand and Cournot competition. Copyright © 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
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Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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