Patent licensing with Bertrand competitors
We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of quantity effect and profits effect.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/TeoriaEconomica|
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DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi
itemq0744, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
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