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Technology licensing under optimal tax policy

  • Arijit Mukherjee
  • Yingyi Tsai

    ()

This paper examines the role of government policy in technology licensing decision. We show that both the outside and the inside innovators license a new product (or drastic process innovation) to all potential licensees in the presence of tax/subsidy policies. An implication of our analysis is that a monopolist producer may prefer technology licensing in a homogeneous goods industry. Our results also provide a rationale for franchising to multiple sellers. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-012-0277-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 108 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 231-247

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:108:y:2013:i:3:p:231-247
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

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