Technology Transfer In A Stackelberg Structure: Licensing Contracts And Welfare
We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether a leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than a follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when a follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2005.
Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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