IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/wisagr/12640.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Enhancing Rural Women'S Access To Capital: Why It Is Important And How It Can Be Done. The Case Of Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Fletschner, Diana K.

Abstract

Improving access to capital for low wealth households is a vital part of any rural development strategy, especially one designed to rectify long standing rural inequality and to generate broadly-based growth. In addition, there may be further benefits from specifically targeting the capital needs of rural and low-income women. Most credit programs oriented to increase access to credit for poor households are based on a "gender neutral" approach. However, unless specifically targeted, women tend to have inferior access to financial resources than do men. This differential deserves special consideration from policy makers given presumed social welfare and productivity gains to be had from specifically enhancing women's productive capacity within the household. This paper introduces the rationale for enhancing women's access to capital, documents the particular factors that constrain women's credit access from conventional financial intermediaries, and presents a review of the international experience with women-targeted credit programs. Finally, it reviews the position of rural women in Colombia with an emphasis on the position of women within the Colombian financial sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Fletschner, Diana K., 2000. "Enhancing Rural Women'S Access To Capital: Why It Is Important And How It Can Be Done. The Case Of Colombia," Staff Papers 12640, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:wisagr:12640
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12640
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12640/files/stpap437.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.12640?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Cheryl Doss & Ben Senauer, 1994. "Strengthening Agricultural and Natural Resource Policy through Intrahousehold Analysis: Discussion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1226-1228.
    3. Zeller, Manfred & Sharma, Manohar, 1998. "Rural finance and poverty alleviation," Food policy reports 8, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, March.
    5. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1046, October.
    6. Duncan Thomas, 1990. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 635-664.
    7. Doss, Cheryl R., 1994. "Models Of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation: Assumptions And Empirical Tests," Staff Papers 14196, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    8. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    9. Baydas, Mayada M. & Meyer, Richard L. & Aguilera-Alfred, Nelson, 1994. "Discrimination against women in formal credit markets: Reality or rhetoric?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1073-1082, July.
    10. Christine Jones, 1983. "The Mobilization of Women's Labor for Cash Crop Production: A Game Theoretic Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(5), pages 1049-1054.
    11. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
    12. Folbre, Nancy, 1986. "Hearts and spades: Paradigms of household economics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 245-255, February.
    13. Folbre, Nancy, 1984. "Household Production in the Philippines: A Non-neoclassical Approach," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 303-330, January.
    14. Razavi, Shahra, 1997. "Fitting gender into development institutions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(7), pages 1111-1125, July.
    15. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fletschner, Diana, 2000. "Enhancing Rural Women's Access to Capital: Why It Is Important and How It Can Be Done. The Case of Colombia," Staff Paper Series 437, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    2. Smith, Lisa C. & Chavas, Jean-Paul, 1999. "Supply response of West African agricultural households," FCND discussion papers 69, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    3. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Arthur-Holmes, Francis & Abrefa Busia, Kwaku, 2020. "Household dynamics and the bargaining power of women in artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa: A Ghanaian case study," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Agarwal, Bina, 1997. ""Bargaining" and gender relations," FCND discussion papers 27, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    6. Elissa Braunstein & Nancy Folbre, 2001. "To Honor and Obey: Efficiency, Inequality, and Patriarchal Property Rights," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 25-44.
    7. Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2007. "Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 138-155, January.
    8. Heggeness, Misty L., 2020. "Improving child welfare in middle income countries: The unintended consequence of a pro-homemaker divorce law and wait time to divorce," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    9. Bergolo, Marcelo & Galván, Estefanía, 2018. "Intra-household Behavioral Responses to Cash Transfer Programs. Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 100-118.
    10. Matthias Doepke & Michèle Tertilt, 2019. "Does female empowerment promote economic development?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 309-343, December.
    11. Doss, Cheryl R., 1994. "Models Of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation: Assumptions And Empirical Tests," Staff Papers 14196, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    12. Marcos A. Rangel & Duncan Thomas, 2019. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," Working Papers 2019-070, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    13. Rubalcava, L. & Thomas, D., 2000. "Family Bargaining and Welfare," Papers 00-10, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    14. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Kanbur, Ravi, 1993. "Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift theburden of proof?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1217, The World Bank.
    15. Thomas, Duncan & Contreras, Dante & Frankerberg, Elizabeth, 2002. "Distribution of power within the household and child health," MPRA Paper 80075, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2002.
    16. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2021. "Bargaining in the Family," CHILD Working Papers Series 88 JEL Classification: D1, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    17. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2002. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 37-72, February.
    18. Thomas, Duncan & Rangel, Marcos, 2020. "Decision-Making in Complex Households," CEPR Discussion Papers 14278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1998. "Efficiency in intrahousehold resource allocation," FCND discussion papers 55, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    20. Haider, Hamza & Smale, Melinda & Theriault, Veronique, 2018. "Intensification and intrahousehold decisions: Fertilizer adoption in Burkina Faso," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 310-320.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labor and Human Capital;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:wisagr:12640. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dauwius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.