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From Private to Public Common Agency

  • Etienne Billette de Villemeur
  • Bruno Versaevel

This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (2001, J. Econ. Theory 100, 93-128) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal’s gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities.

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Paper provided by HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 02-06.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0206
Contact details of provider: Postal: Institut d'économie appliquée HEC Montréal 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine Montréal, Québec H3T 2A7
Phone: (514) 340-6463
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  1. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1996. "Complements and substitutes in common agency," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 325-345, December.
  2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
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