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A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning

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  • Garoupa, Nuno R
  • Gata, Joao E

Abstract

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Garoupa, Nuno R & Gata, Joao E, 2002. "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 41-65, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:110:y:2002:i:1-2:p:41-65
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    Cited by:

    1. Caruso, Raul, 2007. "Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)," MPRA Paper 1438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2024. "Do China and Russia undermine Western sanctions? Evidence from DiD and event study estimation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 132-160, February.
    3. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036, September.
    4. Gutmann, Jerg & Neuenkirch, Matthias & Neumeier, Florian, 2023. "The economic effects of international sanctions: An event study," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1214-1231.
    5. Caruso Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-53, September.
    6. Raul Caruso, 2006. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution? A Contribution to Integrative Theory," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 53-72, February.
    7. Konstantin Yanovskiy & Sergey Zhavoronkov, 2005. "Politico_economic Aspects of Combat with Terrorism," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 82P, pages 116-116.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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