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A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

Listed author(s):
  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Joao E. Gata

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

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File URL: https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/481.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 481.

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Date of creation: Jun 2000
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:481
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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  1. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
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  4. Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008. "The Paradox of Power," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
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  8. Skaperdas, S., 1990. "Conflict And Attitudes Toward Risk," Papers 90-91-05, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  9. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June.
  10. Kaempfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1989. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions--A Public Choice Approach: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1304-1306, December.
  11. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
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  13. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(1), pages 3-32, February.
  14. Leidy, Michael P, 1989. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions--A Public Choice Approach: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1300-1303, December.
  15. van Bergeijk, Peter A G, 1989. "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 385-404.
  16. Garfinkel, Michelle R, 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 50-68, March.
  17. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1984. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(1), pages 63-84, March.
  18. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-494, July.
  19. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
  20. Sanda Kaufman & George T. Duncan, 1992. "A Formal Framework for Mediator Mechanisms and Motivations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(4), pages 688-708, December.
  21. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
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