Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2026

• Elshan Garashli, 2026, "Multi-sender cheap talk with almost common information," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2026-22, Oct.
• Elshan Garashli, 2026, "Strategic Communication with Partial Expertise," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2026-23, Oct.
• Luciana Yeung & Antonio Bruno de Carvalho Morales, 2026, "Litigation as a "win-win" game: A Theoretical Perspective and Empirical Evidence from Brazilian Labor Courts," Economics and Politics Working Paper Series, Economics and Politics Research Group (EPRG), University of Brasília, number 124/2026, Aug, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23484849.
• Ludovic A. Julien & Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2026, "A Note on Pareto-Optimal Taxation Mechanism in Noncooperative Strategic Bilateral Exchange," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05427342.
• Marie Christine Apedo-Amah & Habiba Djebbari & Roberta Ziparo, 2026, "Communication and production in the family farm: Theory and evidence from rural Togo," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05545153.
• Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2026, "Good Cop, Bad Cop: Delegating Interrogations," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05566465, Feb, DOI: 10.1086/736800.
• Michel Le Breton & Paul Castañeda Dower & Gunes Gokmen & Шломо Вебер, 2026, "Did the Cold War Produce Development Clusters in Africa," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05573607, Mar, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103776.
• Johannes Hörner & Jérôme Renault, 2026, "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-05761011, Sep, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2026, "Optimal Belief Equilibrium," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-05739251, Sep.
• Frédéric Koessler & Vasiliki Skreta, 2026, "Informed communication equilibrium," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05124399, Feb.
• Romain Biard & Mostapha Diss & Salma Larabi, 2026, "A weighted mechanism for minority voting in sequential voting," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05485544, Jan.
• Piotr Dworczak & Alexey Smolin, 2026, "Robust Trust," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05504993, Feb.
• John W. E. Cremin, 2026, "Sleeping Newcomb," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05594456, Apr.
• Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2026, "Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05611088, May, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6313975.
• Sylvain Zeghni, 2026, "Metropolitan Climate Negotiations as a Decentralized Public Good Game Theory, Evidence, and Institutional Implications," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05618795, May.
• John Cremin, 2026, "Sleeping Beauty Loses Her Magic Psychic Powers," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05687168, Jun.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2026, "Optimal Belief Equilibrium," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-05739251, Sep.
• Moira Gidseg, 2026, "A Bliss Point Model of Distributional Preferences," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 2601, Oct.
• Moira Gidseg, 2026, "The Value of Choice," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 2602, Oct.
• Mohlin, Erik & Rigos, Alexandros, 2026, "Preferences as Heuristics," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics, number 2026:8, Sep.
• Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2026, "When is a contest "additive"? A characterization of strategic equivalence," Working Papers in Economics and Statistics, Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics, number 3/2026, Jul.
• Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga & Francesco Zanetti, 2026, "Imperfect Information, Composition of Demand Shocks, and the Flattening of the Phillips Curve," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, number 2026/057, Mar.
• Polachek, Solomon & Romano, Kenneth & Tonguc, Ozlem, 2026, "Strategic Reasoning and Sensitivity to Stakes in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games: LLMs vs. Human Proposers," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 18545, Apr.
• Jin Hyung Lee, 2026, "Competitive Bidding Strategy in an Auction with Random Cutoff - Randomness is Always Unpredictable?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 68, issue 3, pages 2199-2228, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-025-11087-9.
• Niclas Berggren, 2026, "Rules without morals: modeling Buchanan’s relatively absolute absolutes," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, volume 61, issue 3, pages 181-208, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-026-09867-1.
• Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2026, "How Important are IEAs for Mitigation if Countries are of the Homo Moralis Type?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 89, issue 3, pages 1-42, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-025-01055-0.
• Hindriks Jean & Nishimura Yukihiro, 2026, "The enforcement dilemma of the global minimum tax," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, volume 33, issue 1, pages 3-27, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10797-025-09905-9.
• M. Martin Boyer & Franca Glenzer, 2026, "Adverse selection with sequential risks," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, volume 73, issue 2, pages 309-349, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11166-026-09505-w.
• Kerim Keskin, 2026, "A game theory approach to football predictions," Public Choice, Springer, volume 206, issue 1, pages 241-261, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01317-x.
• Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2026, "Buchanan meets Tullock: aid, contests, and the Samaritan’s Dilemma," Public Choice, Springer, volume 206, issue 1, pages 47-79, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01323-z.
• Ratul Lahkar, 2026, "An evolutionary model of rent-seeking and inequality norms in a Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, volume 208, issue 1, pages 249-275, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01359-1.
• Oksana Loginova, 2026, "Private Labels and Wholesale Contracts in Online Marketplaces," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, volume 69, issue 1, pages 13-39, August, DOI: 10.1007/s11151-026-10047-3.
• Marco Faravelli & Benedict Gordon & Joshua Huisman & Vera L. te Velde, 2026, "What drives voter turnout? Experimental insights on collectivism and probability weighting," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 100, issue 2, pages 427-449, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10079-3.
• Zeyu Liu & Daniel Friedman & Simon Weidenholzer, 2026, "Allocation among multiple selves," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 100, issue 2, pages 593-611, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10086-4.
• Anastasia Antsygina, 2026, "Optimal information disclosure in contests with communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 100, issue 4, pages 1103-1154, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10101-8.
• Chen Ling & Shravan Luckraz & Bruno Antonio Pansera, 2026, "Comparative dynamics in a dynamic oligopoly model of capital accumulation," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 100, issue 4, pages 1079-1102, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10102-7.
• Joshua B. Miller, 2026, "Penney’s game odds from no-arbitrage," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 101, issue 1, pages 103-117, August, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-026-10123-w.
• Aman Ray & Srikanth B. Pai, 2026, "Centripetal Structure in Electoral Competition with Alienation-Based Abstention," Working Papers, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India, number 2026-312, Oct.
• Aman Ray & Srikanth B. Pai, 2026, "Are opposite-order equilibria impossible?," Working Papers, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India, number 2026-313, Oct.
• Chong Wang & Mingli Zheng, 2026, "Optimal Competitiveness in Partner Compensation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 182, issue 2, pages 244-266, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0036.
• Davide Bosco & Mario Gilli, 2026, "Symmetry-in-Asymmetry: On the Existence and Structure of Asymmetric Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Tullock Two-Group Contests," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 579, Jul.
• Davide Bosco & Mario Gilli & Lorenzo Portaluri, 2026, "The Leninist Vanguard's Dilemma: Information and Coordination in Revolutions," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 583, Nov.
• Stefano Barbieri & Yixuan Shi & Sven A. Simon, 2026, "Sign Stealing in Team Contests: Coordination, Unpredictability, and Competition Intensity," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2026-05, Oct.
• Kirill Rudov & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Leeat Yariv, 2026, "Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35170, May.
• Nano Barahona & Juan-Pablo Montero & Pedro Skorin, 2026, "Competition and Misconduct in Certification Markets with Externalities," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35422, Jul.
• Alessandro Lizzeri & Yichuan Lou & Jacopo Perego, 2026, "The Limits of Verifiability: Credibility and Flexibility in Communication," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35712, Sep.
• Ernest Liu & Stephen J. Redding & Bennett Smith-Worthington & David Y. Yang, 2026, "A Network Approach to Geopolitics," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35951, Oct.
• Tabashnikova, D. & Sandomirskaia , M., 2026, "The optimal design of elimination tournaments with a superstar," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 71, issue 2, pages 12-35, DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2026_2_12-35.
• Noriaki Matsushima & Kazuki Nishikawa & Jiaying Qiu, 2026, "The effects of minimum wage in inter-regional duopoly competition," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 26E003, Mar.
• Frones, Luis, 2026, "Speak or wait: Strategic delay and the value of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 258, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112752.
• Xu, Hanping & Wu, Bin & Chen, Enxian, 2026, "Asymptotic Nash implementation in large congestion-type games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 259, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112768.
• Iwanaga, Yuki & Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2026, "Welfare bounds for linear-quadratic network games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 260, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112824.
• Hatakeyama, Tetsutaro, 2026, "Incentives and discrimination: A functional optimization approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 262, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112889.
• Corchón, Luis C. & Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe & Moreno, Bernardo, 2026, "Collusion when players take turns," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112918.
• Tumenjargal, Enkhbayar, 2026, "Uniqueness of equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112942.
• Pham, Ngoc Anh, 2026, "Optimal advantage allocation in repeated contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112949.
• Park, Sung-Hoon & Shogren, Jason F., 2026, "Combining two fee-shifting mechanisms in a bilateral delegation contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 264, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112908.
• Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Wikman, Peter, 2026, "A note on asymptotic stability and game blocks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 264, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112990.
• Deng, Shanglyu & Li, Ruiqi & Wu, Zenan, 2026, "Multi-prize contests under dual utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 266, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113059.
• Bakshi, Dripto & Chougule, Shivam, 2026, "The curse of sabotage - efficiency in an attacker - defender framework with gun & butter," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113117.
• Hattori, Keisuke, 2026, "Procrastination traps and endogenous leadership in teams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113120.
• Sugiura, Shinya, 2026, "Peer-confirming equilibrium in anchor games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113122.
• Wang, Zeyuan & Fukuzumi, Masakazu, 2026, "Endogenous networks with constrained public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113156.
• Shui, Zhonghao & Cui, Beiqing & Wu, Jian, 2026, "Limited awareness and message feasibility in cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113178.
• Dias, Daniel A., 2026, "Do Ryder Cup captains randomize? Evidence from Sunday singles orders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113199.
• Zenou, Yves, 2026, "How to determine key players when spillovers are large," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113210.
• Bardier, Pierre & Dong-Xuan, Bach & Nguyen, Van-Quy, 2026, "The genericity of obvious manipulations under the Egalitarian Walrasian rule when preferences are linear," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 268, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113253.
• van der Weele, Joël J. & Figueroa-Sisniega, Cristina, 2026, "Inconvenient truths: A note on information avoidance and the price of fairness," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 181, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188.
• Le Bris, David & Sekeris, Petros G., 2026, "Kinship, group loyalty and conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105276.
• Cartwright, Edward & Chai, Yidan & Xue, Lian, 2026, "Are my team members pro-social? Information about social value orientation influences cooperation in public good games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105333.
• Backhaus, Teresa & Breitmoser, Yves, 2026, "Individual strategy choice in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105407.
• Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026, "Double standards: When stakeholders disagree with spectators in repugnance judgments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105415.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Koo, Bonsoo & Mourdoukoutas, Fotios & Pantelous, Athanasios A., 2026, "Competitive insurance pricing in a duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 330, issue 3, pages 972-994, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2025.08.026.
• Rottner, Claudio, 2026, "Watt’s better? Pay-as-bid vs. Uniform pricing in electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109284.
• Fei, Xinyue & Lyu, Cheng & Ding, Yibo, 2026, "Energy flexibility procurement strategy in competitive demand response markets: Dual-channel supply chain perspective," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109542.
• Lu, Zuliang & Li, Junman & Li, Mingsong & Cao, Zhihui & Xiang, Zhuran, 2026, "Comparative research and analysis on third-party governance based on market effects," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109570.
• Banerjee, Ameet Kumar & Mishra, Neelesh Kumar & Mishra, Neetu & Klein, Tony & Sensoy, Ahmet, 2026, "Gaining ground or losing foothold: Game-theoretic lens to unveil strategic bargaining between oil exporters and importers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104802.
• Hausken, Kjell & Wang, Guizhou, 2026, "A game-theoretic model of cryptocurrencies, fiat currencies and assets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2026.105226.
• Wang, Peng & Zhang, Zhixiang & Zhao, Junzhu & Zheng, Zehao, 2026, "Diamond–Dybvig’s bank runs model revisited: Three types of investors," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2026.105314.
• Kirk, Nicholas H., 2026, "Sustainable exploitation equilibria for dynamic games with irreversible failure," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109992.
• Bartesaghi, Paolo & Beretta, Edoardo & Desogus, Marco & Korn, Ralf, 2026, "Cash or card – combat or coexistence? A non-cooperative differential game approach," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109582.
• Iskakov, Alexey & Iskakov, Mikhail, 2026, "Equilibrium in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109823.
• Baumann, Leonie, 2026, "Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 192-211, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.007.
• Chandan, Rahul & Paarporn, Keith & Kovenock, Dan & Alizadeh, Mahnoosh & Marden, Jason R., 2026, "The art of concession in General Lotto games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 89-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006.
• García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2026, "Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 149-163, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2026, "Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 98-108, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002.
• Roel, Marcus & Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2026, "Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 153-185, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.010.
• Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026, "Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 22-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2026, "Outcome destabilization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 34-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004.
• Kim, Jeongbin & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2026, "An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 395-417, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.009.
• Klein Teeselink, Bouke & van Dolder, Dennie & van den Assem, Martijn J. & Dana, Jason D., 2026, "High-stakes failures of backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 418-439, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001.
• Compte, Olivier, 2026, "Endogenous barriers to learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 440-463, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.003.
• Velez, Rodrigo A. & Brown, Alexander L., 2026, "The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 516-534, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005.
• Friedman, Evan & Gonçalves, Duarte, 2026, "Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 571-591, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.002.
• Bland, James R. & Turocy, Theodore L., 2026, "Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 592-618, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.008.
• Bland, James R., 2026, "Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 619-636, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.005.
• Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2026, "Failing to correctly aggregate signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 122-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.003.
• Feng, Jun & Jin, Jia & Zhao, Sasa & Derrington, Edmund & Qin, Xiangdong & Fu, Shiguang & Shen, Qiang & Dreher, Jean-Claude, 2026, "Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 167-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.011.
• Stringhi, Alessandro, 2026, "Guilt and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 191-218, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.008.
• Oishi, Takayuki & Tajika, Tomoya, 2026, "River-sharing problem with floods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 283-298, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.011.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2026, "Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 317-329, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006.
• Amir, Rabah & Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2026, "Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 348-366, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.014.
• Chatterji, Shurojit & Kunimoto, Takashi & Ramos, Paulo, 2026, "Compellingness in Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 35-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.008.
• Park, In-Uck & Smyrniotis, Efthymios, 2026, "Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 547-562, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.008.
• Wu, Jiabin, 2026, "The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 584-604, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.002.
• Hafalir, Isa & Kesten, Onur & Luo, Donglai & Sherstyuk, Katerina & Tao, Cong, 2026, "Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 63-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.013.
• Kovenock, Dan & Song, Jian & Trevisan, Francesco, 2026, "Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 691-716, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003.
• Kasberger, Bernhard & Martin, Simon & Normann, Hans-Theo & Werner, Tobias, 2026, "Algorithmic cooperation: A comparison with human play in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 113-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.001.
• Bouchta, Mohamed & Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2026, "Strong Nash implementation and economic applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 286-309, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.010.
• Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan, 2026, "Weak* dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 320-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.004.
• Sharma, Nishtha, 2026, "The persistence of disadvantages: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 329-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.005.
• Jiao, Peiran & Nax, Heinrich H. & Zong, Jichuan, 2026, "Information paths and learning in games: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 444-482, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.005.
• Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2026, "How to replace public communication with private one," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 483-491, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.008.
• Foo, Ki Vin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2026, "Kuhn’s theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 564-583, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.007.
• Bravard, Christophe & Chaudhuri, Promit K. & Sarangi, Sudipta & Tzavellas, Hector, 2026, "Network attrition: Theory and policy implications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 71-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.002.
• Ballard, Joe S. & Boosey, Luke, 2026, "Dynamic coordination with switching costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 89-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.014.
• Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Jungbauer, Thomas & Preuss, Marcel & Williams, Cole, 2026, "Optimally informative rankings and consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103282.
• Guerra, Alice & Lavie, Shay & Turrini, Enya, 2026, "Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107343.
• Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Çağlayan, Deren, 2026, "Costly argumentation in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353.
• Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Zachariassen, Julius, 2026, "Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367.
• Antsygina, Anastasia, 2026, "Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392.
• Onderstal, Sander & Shalvi, Shaul & Soraperra, Ivan, 2026, "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 242, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403.
• Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2026, "Curtailed ambition: Endogenous power shift and preventive war," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 242, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Roomets, Alex, 2026, "Dissolving an ambiguous partnership," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 243, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107453.
• Chao, Matthew & Shin, Euncheol, 2026, "Culture-specific social constructs and their implications for cross-cultural experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 245, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107491.
• Bershadskyy, Dmitri & Dinges, Laslo & Fiedler, Marc-André & Greif, Jannik & Al-Hamadi, Ayoub & Ostermaier, Nina & Weimann, Joachim, 2026, "Lie against AI: Revealing private information through AI in an economic experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 245, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107547.
• Gallier, Carlo & Ockenfels, Axel & Sturm, Bodo, 2026, "More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 246, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107559.
• Sentana, Juan & Gómez-Bengoechea, Gonzalo, 2026, "Déjà Vu? When the Lab Mimics the Field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107593.
• Hu, Shiang-Hung & Lin, Po-Hsuan & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi & Wang, Yu-Hsiang, 2026, "Strategy method effects in centipede games: An optimal design approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107599.
• Cuellar, Pablo & Rentschler, Lucas, 2026, "Adversarial bargaining with exogenous shocks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107654.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2026, "Market selection of strategic thinking types," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107690.
• Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2026, "A strategic analysis of narcoterrorism: counterterrorism, terrorist extortion, and illicit drug trafficking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107698.
• Bosco, Davide & Portoghese, Luca, 2026, "Complementarity, congestion and information design in epidemics with strategic social behaviour," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107715.
• Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Dongwoo, 2026, "Endogenous syndicate formation in (rent-seeking) contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107736.
• Jackson, David F., 2026, "Reputation, punishment and the enforcement of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107737.
• Breig, Zachary & Pham, Hai Anh, 2026, "Finite foresight in Chomp," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 251, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107793.
• Grossman, Zachary & Hua, Tony & Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine, 2026, "Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103330.
• Deojain, Saumya & Lindequist, David, 2026, "Greener thy neighbor? On the welfare effects of protectionist climate policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103366.
• Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei & Zhou, Junjie, 2026, "Sequential network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145.
• Sobel, Joel, 2026, "On the relationship between damage and deception," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106148.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2026, "Limit-of-All-Finite equilibria in infinite normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106161.
• Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2026, "Player strength and effort in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106164.
• Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2026, "Localized perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106183.
• Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme, 2026, "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227.
• Wu, Jiabin, 2026, "Intergenerational cultural transmission with social interactions as an evolutionary game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106233.
• Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2026, "Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: The use of two-stage mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103191.
• Chopra, Anand & Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2026, "Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103196.
• Castellon Koltun, Gil Bar & Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2026, "The maxmin value of repeated games with incomplete information on one side and tail-measurable payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103214.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2026, "A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227.
• Hanato, Shunsuke, 2026, "Final-offer arbitration with reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103228.
• Béal, Sylvain & Munich, Léa & Solal, Philippe & Techer, Kevin, 2026, "Cooperative games with unpaid players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103238.
• Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Faure, Mathieu, 2026, "Sharing opportunities under externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103249.
• Triêu, Anh & Bos, Iwan & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2026, "Maximal matchings," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103254.
• Song, Myungkoo, 2026, "Sorting and matching under rank uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103269.
• Gubar, Elena A. & Owen, Livia & Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J. & Gerschuk, Tatyana V., 2026, "On the dynamics of coordinated hierarchies: Economic growth versus poverty traps," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103287.
• Badra, Yassine & Chopard, Bertrand & Liu, Huizhong, 2026, "R&D cooperation and spillovers: When do research joint ventures improve welfare?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102489.
• Julien, Ludovic A. & Yebarth, Gagnie P., 2026, "A note on Pareto-optimal taxation mechanism in noncooperative strategic bilateral exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102492.
• Crescenzi, Michele, 2026, "Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102552.
• Arabzadeh, Hamzeh, 2026, "Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576.
• Bergmann, Tobias & Moretti, Nikolaj, 2026, "Trading budget deficits for public investment: Optimal deficit rules for present-biased governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102852.
• Vosooghi, Sareh & Arvaniti, Maria & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2026, "Climate coalitions with sophisticated policy makers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105593.
• Ruqsana, Benhur, 2026, "Public goods in a network: A Bayesian approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101113.
• Olaizola, Norma & Valenciano, Federico, 2026, "Connections models with diminishing marginal rate of substitution link-formation technologies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101130.
• Clist, Paul & Hong, Ying-yi, 2026, "Dishonesty and justifications: Evidence from the second roll of a dice game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102501.
• Zamboni, Luca, 2026, "Persuasion of a confirmation-biased agent," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102553.
• Gerstmeier, Fabian & Oezcelik, Yigit & Tolksdorf, Michel, 2026, "“Making the cut”: Introducing rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102554.
• Lauber, Arne & March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2026, "Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605.
• Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2026, "Lease or sale: When a durable goods monopolist can choose supply chain openness," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2026.104882.
• Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga & Francesco Zanetti, 2026, "Imperfect Information, Composition of Demand Shocks, and the Flattening of the Phillips Curve," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2026-31, May.
• Weinhold, Diana & Andersen, Lykke, 2026, "Adversarial procurement in two-value space: insights and evidence for conservation siting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 138837, Jun.
• Liu, Ernest & Redding, Stephen J. & Smith-Worthington, Bennett & Yang, David Y., 2026, "A network approach to geopolitics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 141793, Oct.
• Barış Kaymak, 2026, "Aggression of the Weak," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, number 26-27, Oct, DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202627.
• Elizabeth C. Klee & Arazi Lubis & Chase Ross & Sharon Y. Ross & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2026, "The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2026-037, Jun, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2026.037.
• Livia Ower & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2026, "On the Synergy of Universal Floors and Conditional Incentives: Escaping Poverty Traps," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_12.rdf.
• Edgar J. Sánchez-Carrera & Elvio Accinelli & Humberto Muñiz, 2026, "Tourism-Led Growth or Tourism Poverty Traps? A Coordination Model of Institutions, Informality, and Local Linkages," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_19.rdf.

2025

• Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore, 2025, "Investment and endogenous efficiency in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112131.
• Volij, Oscar, 2025, "Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk: A correction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112139.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 2025, "Group conflict, group composition, and policy convergence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112162.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2025, "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112166.
• Qian, Xuewen & Qu, Chen, 2025, "Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112178.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2025, "Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2025, "Procurement with competing insiders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112289.
• Gans, Joshua S. & Holden, Richard, 2025, "An ordinal solution to King Solomon’s dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 252, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112333.
• Baik, Kyung Hwan & Min, Daehong, 2025, "Reimbursement in contests with bilateral delegation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 253, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112371.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Liu, Shulin & Mill, Wladislaw & Wang, Xiangyu, 2025, "Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 254, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112462.
• Cai, Zhengyang, 2025, "The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 254, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112485.
• Osei, Ernest Lartey & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2025, "Strategyproof and fair allocation of a perfectly divisible private commodity with (restricted) single-dipped preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112466.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112496.
• Sasaki, Yasuo, 2025, "School choice with rank-dependent priorities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112501.
• Cai, Yichuan, 2025, "Optimal matching in best-of-three team contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112505.
• He, Qingrong & Lee, Dongwoo & Shi, Qichao, 2025, "Limited power of outside options: New evidence from ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112506.
• Cardona, Daniel & Claveria-Mayol, Marc & Ponsatí, Clara, 2025, "Contests with endogenous claims: Conflict dissipation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 256, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112572.
• Feng, Xin & Song, Shuangteng, 2025, "Information acquisition in all-pay contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 256, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112585.
• Arnold, Patrick & Möller, Marc & Roux, Catherine, 2025, "The last shall be first: Innovation as a head-to-head race," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 257, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112694.
• Hou, Yueyi & Wang, Hongwei & Shi, Guanqun, 2025, "Collusion prevention mechanism in PPP highway projects: Optimal government subsidy, toll and penalty," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2025.100399.
• Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2025, "Garbling an evaluation to retain an advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104940.
• Allouch, Nizar & Bhattacharya, Jayeeta, 2025, "The Key Class in Networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104950.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2025, "Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105051.
• Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2025, "Repeated contests with commitment types," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105055.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2025, "Do we need a (large) committee?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074.