Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2026

• Nano Barahona & Juan-Pablo Montero & Pedro Skorin, 2026, "Competition and Misconduct in Certification Markets with Externalities," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35422, Jul.
• Alessandro Lizzeri & Yichuan Lou & Jacopo Perego, 2026, "The Limits of Verifiability: Credibility and Flexibility in Communication," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 35712, Sep.
• Tabashnikova, D. & Sandomirskaia , M., 2026, "The optimal design of elimination tournaments with a superstar," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 71, issue 2, pages 12-35, DOI: 10.31737/22212264_2026_2_12-35.
• Noriaki Matsushima & Kazuki Nishikawa & Jiaying Qiu, 2026, "The effects of minimum wage in inter-regional duopoly competition," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 26E003, Mar.
• Frones, Luis, 2026, "Speak or wait: Strategic delay and the value of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 258, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112752.
• Xu, Hanping & Wu, Bin & Chen, Enxian, 2026, "Asymptotic Nash implementation in large congestion-type games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 259, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112768.
• Iwanaga, Yuki & Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2026, "Welfare bounds for linear-quadratic network games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 260, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112824.
• Hatakeyama, Tetsutaro, 2026, "Incentives and discrimination: A functional optimization approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 262, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112889.
• Corchón, Luis C. & Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe & Moreno, Bernardo, 2026, "Collusion when players take turns," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112918.
• Tumenjargal, Enkhbayar, 2026, "Uniqueness of equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112942.
• Pham, Ngoc Anh, 2026, "Optimal advantage allocation in repeated contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 263, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112949.
• Park, Sung-Hoon & Shogren, Jason F., 2026, "Combining two fee-shifting mechanisms in a bilateral delegation contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 264, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112908.
• Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Wikman, Peter, 2026, "A note on asymptotic stability and game blocks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 264, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112990.
• Deng, Shanglyu & Li, Ruiqi & Wu, Zenan, 2026, "Multi-prize contests under dual utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 266, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113059.
• van der Weele, Joël J. & Figueroa-Sisniega, Cristina, 2026, "Inconvenient truths: A note on information avoidance and the price of fairness," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 181, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188.
• Le Bris, David & Sekeris, Petros G., 2026, "Kinship, group loyalty and conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105276.
• Cartwright, Edward & Chai, Yidan & Xue, Lian, 2026, "Are my team members pro-social? Information about social value orientation influences cooperation in public good games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105333.
• Backhaus, Teresa & Breitmoser, Yves, 2026, "Individual strategy choice in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105407.
• Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026, "Double standards: When stakeholders disagree with spectators in repugnance judgments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105415.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Koo, Bonsoo & Mourdoukoutas, Fotios & Pantelous, Athanasios A., 2026, "Competitive insurance pricing in a duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 330, issue 3, pages 972-994, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2025.08.026.
• Rottner, Claudio, 2026, "Watt’s better? Pay-as-bid vs. Uniform pricing in electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109284.
• Fei, Xinyue & Lyu, Cheng & Ding, Yibo, 2026, "Energy flexibility procurement strategy in competitive demand response markets: Dual-channel supply chain perspective," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109542.
• Banerjee, Ameet Kumar & Mishra, Neelesh Kumar & Mishra, Neetu & Klein, Tony & Sensoy, Ahmet, 2026, "Gaining ground or losing foothold: Game-theoretic lens to unveil strategic bargaining between oil exporters and importers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104802.
• Hausken, Kjell & Wang, Guizhou, 2026, "A game-theoretic model of cryptocurrencies, fiat currencies and assets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2026.105226.
• Wang, Peng & Zhang, Zhixiang & Zhao, Junzhu & Zheng, Zehao, 2026, "Diamond–Dybvig’s bank runs model revisited: Three types of investors," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 117, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2026.105314.
• Kirk, Nicholas H., 2026, "Sustainable exploitation equilibria for dynamic games with irreversible failure," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109992.
• Bartesaghi, Paolo & Beretta, Edoardo & Desogus, Marco & Korn, Ralf, 2026, "Cash or card – combat or coexistence? A non-cooperative differential game approach," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109582.
• Iskakov, Alexey & Iskakov, Mikhail, 2026, "Equilibrium in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2026.109823.
• Baumann, Leonie, 2026, "Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 192-211, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.007.
• Chandan, Rahul & Paarporn, Keith & Kovenock, Dan & Alizadeh, Mahnoosh & Marden, Jason R., 2026, "The art of concession in General Lotto games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 89-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.006.
• García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2026, "Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 149-163, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.005.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2026, "Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 98-108, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.12.002.
• Roel, Marcus & Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2026, "Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 153-185, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.010.
• Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026, "Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 22-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2026, "Outcome destabilization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 34-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.004.
• Kim, Jeongbin & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2026, "An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 395-417, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.009.
• Klein Teeselink, Bouke & van Dolder, Dennie & van den Assem, Martijn J. & Dana, Jason D., 2026, "High-stakes failures of backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 418-439, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.001.
• Compte, Olivier, 2026, "Endogenous barriers to learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 440-463, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.003.
• Velez, Rodrigo A. & Brown, Alexander L., 2026, "The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 516-534, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.005.
• Friedman, Evan & Gonçalves, Duarte, 2026, "Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 571-591, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.002.
• Bland, James R. & Turocy, Theodore L., 2026, "Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 592-618, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.008.
• Bland, James R., 2026, "Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 619-636, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.005.
• Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2026, "Failing to correctly aggregate signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 122-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.003.
• Feng, Jun & Jin, Jia & Zhao, Sasa & Derrington, Edmund & Qin, Xiangdong & Fu, Shiguang & Shen, Qiang & Dreher, Jean-Claude, 2026, "Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 167-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.011.
• Stringhi, Alessandro, 2026, "Guilt and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 191-218, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.008.
• Oishi, Takayuki & Tajika, Tomoya, 2026, "River-sharing problem with floods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 283-298, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.011.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2026, "Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 317-329, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.006.
• Amir, Rabah & Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro, 2026, "Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 348-366, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.014.
• Chatterji, Shurojit & Kunimoto, Takashi & Ramos, Paulo, 2026, "Compellingness in Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 35-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.008.
• Park, In-Uck & Smyrniotis, Efthymios, 2026, "Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 547-562, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.04.008.
• Wu, Jiabin, 2026, "The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 584-604, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.002.
• Hafalir, Isa & Kesten, Onur & Luo, Donglai & Sherstyuk, Katerina & Tao, Cong, 2026, "Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 63-79, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.013.
• Kovenock, Dan & Song, Jian & Trevisan, Francesco, 2026, "Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 691-716, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.003.
• Kasberger, Bernhard & Martin, Simon & Normann, Hans-Theo & Werner, Tobias, 2026, "Algorithmic cooperation: A comparison with human play in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 113-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.001.
• Bouchta, Mohamed & Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2026, "Strong Nash implementation and economic applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 286-309, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.010.
• Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan, 2026, "Weak* dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 320-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.004.
• Sharma, Nishtha, 2026, "The persistence of disadvantages: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 329-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.005.
• Jiao, Peiran & Nax, Heinrich H. & Zong, Jichuan, 2026, "Information paths and learning in games: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 444-482, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.005.
• Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2026, "How to replace public communication with private one," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 483-491, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.008.
• Foo, Ki Vin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2026, "Kuhn’s theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 564-583, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.07.007.
• Bravard, Christophe & Chaudhuri, Promit K. & Sarangi, Sudipta & Tzavellas, Hector, 2026, "Network attrition: Theory and policy implications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 71-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.06.002.
• Ballard, Joe S. & Boosey, Luke, 2026, "Dynamic coordination with switching costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 89-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.014.
• Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Jungbauer, Thomas & Preuss, Marcel & Williams, Cole, 2026, "Optimally informative rankings and consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103282.
• Guerra, Alice & Lavie, Shay & Turrini, Enya, 2026, "Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107343.
• Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Çağlayan, Deren, 2026, "Costly argumentation in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107353.
• Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Zachariassen, Julius, 2026, "Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367.
• Antsygina, Anastasia, 2026, "Optimal information disclosure in competing contests with budget constrained players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 241, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107392.
• Onderstal, Sander & Shalvi, Shaul & Soraperra, Ivan, 2026, "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 242, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107403.
• Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2026, "Curtailed ambition: Endogenous power shift and preventive war," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 242, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107413.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Roomets, Alex, 2026, "Dissolving an ambiguous partnership," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 243, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107453.
• Chao, Matthew & Shin, Euncheol, 2026, "Culture-specific social constructs and their implications for cross-cultural experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 245, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107491.
• Bershadskyy, Dmitri & Dinges, Laslo & Fiedler, Marc-André & Greif, Jannik & Al-Hamadi, Ayoub & Ostermaier, Nina & Weimann, Joachim, 2026, "Lie against AI: Revealing private information through AI in an economic experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 245, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107547.
• Gallier, Carlo & Ockenfels, Axel & Sturm, Bodo, 2026, "More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 246, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107559.
• Sentana, Juan & Gómez-Bengoechea, Gonzalo, 2026, "Déjà Vu? When the Lab Mimics the Field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107593.
• Hu, Shiang-Hung & Lin, Po-Hsuan & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi & Wang, Yu-Hsiang, 2026, "Strategy method effects in centipede games: An optimal design approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107599.
• Cuellar, Pablo & Rentschler, Lucas, 2026, "Adversarial bargaining with exogenous shocks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 248, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107654.
• Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2026, "Market selection of strategic thinking types," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107690.
• Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2026, "A strategic analysis of narcoterrorism: counterterrorism, terrorist extortion, and illicit drug trafficking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107698.
• Bosco, Davide & Portoghese, Luca, 2026, "Complementarity, congestion and information design in epidemics with strategic social behaviour," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 249, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107715.
• Grossman, Zachary & Hua, Tony & Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine, 2026, "Unwillingly informed: the prosocial impact of third-party informers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103330.
• Deojain, Saumya & Lindequist, David, 2026, "Greener thy neighbor? On the welfare effects of protectionist climate policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2026.103366.
• Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei & Zhou, Junjie, 2026, "Sequential network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 232, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145.
• Sobel, Joel, 2026, "On the relationship between damage and deception," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106148.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2026, "Limit-of-All-Finite equilibria in infinite normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106161.
• Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2026, "Player strength and effort in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106164.
• Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2026, "Localized perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106183.
• Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme, 2026, "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106227.
• Kunimoto, Takashi & Zhang, Cuiling, 2026, "Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: The use of two-stage mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103191.
• Chopra, Anand & Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2026, "Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103196.
• Castellon Koltun, Gil Bar & Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2026, "The maxmin value of repeated games with incomplete information on one side and tail-measurable payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103214.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2026, "A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103227.
• Hanato, Shunsuke, 2026, "Final-offer arbitration with reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103228.
• Béal, Sylvain & Munich, Léa & Solal, Philippe & Techer, Kevin, 2026, "Cooperative games with unpaid players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103238.
• Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric & Faure, Mathieu, 2026, "Sharing opportunities under externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103249.
• Triêu, Anh & Bos, Iwan & Schröder, Marc & Vermeulen, Dries, 2026, "Maximal matchings," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103254.
• Song, Myungkoo, 2026, "Sorting and matching under rank uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103269.
• Gubar, Elena A. & Owen, Livia & Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J. & Gerschuk, Tatyana V., 2026, "On the dynamics of coordinated hierarchies: Economic growth versus poverty traps," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2026.103287.
• Badra, Yassine & Chopard, Bertrand & Liu, Huizhong, 2026, "R&D cooperation and spillovers: When do research joint ventures improve welfare?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102489.
• Julien, Ludovic A. & Yebarth, Gagnie P., 2026, "A note on Pareto-optimal taxation mechanism in noncooperative strategic bilateral exchange," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102492.
• Crescenzi, Michele, 2026, "Nested removal of strictly dominated strategies in infinite games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102552.
• Arabzadeh, Hamzeh, 2026, "Wage bargaining structure and political budget cycles: A policy game approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102576.
• Bergmann, Tobias & Moretti, Nikolaj, 2026, "Trading budget deficits for public investment: Optimal deficit rules for present-biased governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2026.102852.
• Vosooghi, Sareh & Arvaniti, Maria & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2026, "Climate coalitions with sophisticated policy makers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105593.
• Ruqsana, Benhur, 2026, "Public goods in a network: A Bayesian approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 1, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101113.
• Olaizola, Norma & Valenciano, Federico, 2026, "Connections models with diminishing marginal rate of substitution link-formation technologies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2026.101130.
• Clist, Paul & Hong, Ying-yi, 2026, "Dishonesty and justifications: Evidence from the second roll of a dice game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102501.
• Zamboni, Luca, 2026, "Persuasion of a confirmation-biased agent," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102553.
• Gerstmeier, Fabian & Oezcelik, Yigit & Tolksdorf, Michel, 2026, "“Making the cut”: Introducing rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102554.
• Lauber, Arne & March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2026, "Three-player round-robin tournaments in the lab: Lottery contests vs. all-pay auctions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102605.
• Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2026, "Lease or sale: When a durable goods monopolist can choose supply chain openness," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2026.104882.
• Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga & Francesco Zanetti, 2026, "Imperfect Information, Composition of Demand Shocks, and the Flattening of the Phillips Curve," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2026-31, May.
• Weinhold, Diana & Andersen, Lykke, 2026, "Adversarial procurement in two-value space: insights and evidence for conservation siting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 138837, Jun.
• Elizabeth C. Klee & Arazi Lubis & Chase Ross & Sharon Y. Ross & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2026, "The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2026-037, Jun, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2026.037.
• Livia Ower & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2026, "On the Synergy of Universal Floors and Conditional Incentives: Escaping Poverty Traps," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_12.rdf.
• Edgar J. Sánchez-Carrera & Elvio Accinelli & Humberto Muñiz, 2026, "Tourism-Led Growth or Tourism Poverty Traps? A Coordination Model of Institutions, Informality, and Local Linkages," Working Papers - Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, number wp2026_19.rdf.

2025

• Clark, Derek J. & Kundu, Tapas & Nilssen, Tore, 2025, "Investment and endogenous efficiency in a contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112131.
• Volij, Oscar, 2025, "Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk: A correction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112139.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 2025, "Group conflict, group composition, and policy convergence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112162.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2025, "On the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium in the Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112166.
• Qian, Xuewen & Qu, Chen, 2025, "Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 247, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112178.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2025, "Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112285.
• Robertson, Matthew J., 2025, "Procurement with competing insiders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 250, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112289.
• Gans, Joshua S. & Holden, Richard, 2025, "An ordinal solution to King Solomon’s dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 252, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112333.
• Baik, Kyung Hwan & Min, Daehong, 2025, "Reimbursement in contests with bilateral delegation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 253, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112371.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Liu, Shulin & Mill, Wladislaw & Wang, Xiangyu, 2025, "Spiteful bidding in first-price all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 254, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112462.
• Cai, Zhengyang, 2025, "The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 254, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112485.
• Osei, Ernest Lartey & Majumdar, Dipjyoti, 2025, "Strategyproof and fair allocation of a perfectly divisible private commodity with (restricted) single-dipped preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112466.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2025, "Corruption and renegotiation in procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112496.
• Sasaki, Yasuo, 2025, "School choice with rank-dependent priorities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112501.
• Cai, Yichuan, 2025, "Optimal matching in best-of-three team contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112505.
• He, Qingrong & Lee, Dongwoo & Shi, Qichao, 2025, "Limited power of outside options: New evidence from ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 255, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112506.
• Cardona, Daniel & Claveria-Mayol, Marc & Ponsatí, Clara, 2025, "Contests with endogenous claims: Conflict dissipation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 256, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112572.
• Feng, Xin & Song, Shuangteng, 2025, "Information acquisition in all-pay contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 256, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112585.
• Arnold, Patrick & Möller, Marc & Roux, Catherine, 2025, "The last shall be first: Innovation as a head-to-head race," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 257, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112694.
• Hou, Yueyi & Wang, Hongwei & Shi, Guanqun, 2025, "Collusion prevention mechanism in PPP highway projects: Optimal government subsidy, toll and penalty," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2025.100399.
• Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2025, "Garbling an evaluation to retain an advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104940.
• Allouch, Nizar & Bhattacharya, Jayeeta, 2025, "The Key Class in Networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104950.
• Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2025, "Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105051.
• Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2025, "Repeated contests with commitment types," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105055.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2025, "Do we need a (large) committee?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105074.
• Stäbler, Jonathan, 2025, "Disclosure policy in contests with sabotage and group size uncertainty," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105120.
• Accinelli, E. & Giombini, G. & Muñiz, H. & Owen, L. & Policardo, L. & Carrera, E.J. Sánchez, 2025, "On the game of going green: How do consumers, firms, and banks struggle to escape environmental traps?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105157.
• Feess, Eberhard & Lippert, Steffen & Martini-Tibbs, Jamie & Tremewan, James, 2025, "Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105160.
• Fießinger, Felix & Stadje, Mitja, 2025, "Time-consistent asset allocation for risk measures in a Lévy market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 321, issue 2, pages 676-695, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2024.09.049.
• Wang, Jing & Lan, Yanfei & Xu, Shuxian & Zou, Hongyang & Du, Huibin, 2025, "Subsidy reduction policies in clean product promotion: Pre-announced or dynamic?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108182.
• Landry, Joel R., 2025, "How heterogeneity in perceived external benefits differently affects federal and state efforts to address climate change," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108422.
• Oh, Saesin & Kim, Sunjin & Ryu, Doojin, 2025, "Sequential game of an emissions trading scheme," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108824.
• Campigotto, Nicola & Catola, Marco & D’Alessandro, Simone & Guarnieri, Pietro & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2025, "Curbing energy consumption through voluntary quotas: Experimental evidence," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108881.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Thongtai, Chanon & Pecora, Nicolò, 2025, "Assessing the potential for biofuel production within a conventional fuel system," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108991.
• Rathke, Alex A.T., 2025, "Revisiting the state-space model of unawareness," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.106583.
• Weksler, Ran & Zik, Boaz, 2025, "The economics of excuses: Job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 56-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.006.
• Ui, Takashi, 2025, "Strategic ambiguity in global games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 65-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.004.
• Gill, David & Knepper, Zachary & Prowse, Victoria & Zhou, Junya, 2025, "How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 82-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007.
• Grabiszewski, Konrad & Horenstein, Alex, 2025, "Understanding dynamic interactions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 96-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010.
• Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib & Bruno, Jorge & Foucart, Renaud & SenGupta, Sonali, 2025, "Efficient public good provision between and within groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 183-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.006.
• Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Homa & Feizi, Mehdi, 2025, "Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 27-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2025, "Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 295-311, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.003.
• Anderlini, Luca & Samuelson, Larry & Terlizzese, Daniele, 2025, "When is trust robust?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 34-47, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.015.
• Kandel, Emanuel & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Winter, Eyal, 2025, "Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 401-414, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007.
• Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Machowska, Dominika & Topolyan, Iryna, 2025, "Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 93-105, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.001.
• Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Liu, Yiran & Yu, Yang, 2025, "Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 1-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.007.
• Gaunersdorfer, Andrea & Hofbauer, Josef, 2025, "Learning in unprofitable games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 108-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.001.
• Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval, 2025, "Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 148-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003.
• Chan, Keith Jin Deng, 2025, "Inefficiency in a frictionless market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 59-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.011.
• Kopsacheilis, Orestis & van Dolder, Dennie & Isler, Ozan, 2025, "Conditional cooperation under uncertainty: The social description-experience gap," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 241-256, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.012.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2025, "Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 293-312, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.001.
• Song, Yangbo, 2025, "Social learning among opinion leaders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 451-473, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.011.
• Sekeris, Petros G., 2025, "Propaganda and conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 569-585, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006.
• Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2025, "Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 622-644, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.012.
• Degan, Arianna & Li, Yushen & Xie, Huan, 2025, "Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 94-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.011.
• Cheng, Xiaoyu, 2025, "Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 149-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017.
• Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2025, "Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 267-284, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.004.
• Meier, Martin & Perea, Andrés, 2025, "Reasoning about your own future mistakes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 302-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.010.
• Funai, Naoki, 2025, "Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 351-376, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.09.011.
• Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian & Huck, Steffen & Humphreys, Macartan, 2025, "Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 79-96, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011.
• Ghossoub, Mario & Li, Bin & Shi, Benxuan, 2025, "Bowley-optimal convex-loaded premium principles," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 157-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2025.01.006.
• Li, Dongchen & Zeng, Yan & Zhao, Yixing, 2025, "The impact of intermediaries on insurance demand and pricing," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 143-156, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2025.03.002.
• Zhang, Pengfei & Li, Ji, 2025, "Notice-and-takedown as dispute resolution: An empirical analysis of GitHub notices," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2025.106281.
• Brookins, Philip & Matros, Alexander & Tzachrista, Foteini, 2025, "Sequential contests with incomplete information: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106808.
• Chakraborty, Anujit & Fenig, Guidon, 2025, "From me to we: Beating procrastination in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106900.
• Gallice, Andrea & Grillo, Edoardo, 2025, "Shifting social norms through endorsements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903.
• Chang, Yang-Ming & Sellak, Manaf, 2025, "Alliances and strategic advantage in sequential-move contests: Implications for offensive vs. defensive strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 231, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106908.
• Caparrós, Alejandro & Blanco, Esther & Finus, Michael, 2025, "Institution formation in weakest-link games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106943.
• Orland, Andreas, 2025, "Sharing rules in Bertrand duopolies with increasing returns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106968.
• Block, Juan I. & Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K., 2025, "Leaders and social norms: On the emergence of consensus or conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106970.
• Amir, Rabah & Bose, Arup & Pal, Debashis & Topolyan, Iryna, 2025, "Risk aversion and the punishment paradox in a crime game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 233, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106985.
• Henkel, Joachim & Rønde, Thomas, 2025, "Being the best or being the only one – Dichotomous R&D strategy choices by startups aiming for acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 234, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107024.
• Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren, 2025, "Doing good in the digital world," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106991.
• Bandhu, Sarvesh & Lahkar, Ratul, 2025, "Implementing efficiency with equality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107046.
• Bühren, Christoph & Dannenberg, Astrid & Händel, Philipp, 2025, "The demand for complete and incomplete punishment institutions to promote cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 235, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107071.
• Greiff, Matthias & Kempa, Karol, 2025, "Avoiding catastrophic climate change: Heterogeneous abatement costs and voting on redistribution in a threshold public good experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 236, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107067.
• Li, Ming & Sadakane, Hitoshi, 2025, "When does coordination require centralization? The roles of organizational inertia and diversity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107114.
• Belloc, Filippo & Dughera, Stefano & Landini, Fabio, 2025, "Incentive pay, managerial skills and span of control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107151.
• Lane, Tom & Zhou, Minghai, 2025, "Voluntary quality disclosure in the Labour market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107152.
• Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Cohen, Chen & Darioshi, Roy & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2025, "Optimal reimbursement schemes in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107163.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber & Tzavellas, Hector, 2025, "Endogenous multiplex networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107192.
• Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2025, "Strategic information transmission and social preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 237, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107194.
• Dong, Xiaoqi & Fu, Qiang & Serena, Marco & Wu, Zenan, 2025, "R&D contest design with resource allocation and entry fees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 238, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107168.
• van Oldeniel, Mark & Peter, Noemi, 2025, "Endogenous cool-off periods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 238, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107237.
• Boudreau, James W. & Buzard, Kristy & Mathews, Timothy & Rentschler, Lucas & Sanders, Shane D., 2025, "Damaging conflict: All-pay auctions with negative spillovers and bimodal bidding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 239, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107255.