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Kinship, group loyalty and conflict

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  • Le Bris, David
  • Sekeris, Petros G.

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical model rooted in Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiyya, or group loyalty, analyzing the role of kinship in conflict and territorial expansion. We predict that groups with strong kinship bonds are more successful in expanding their territorial control in low-stakes setups. The opposite happens if groups contest large and highly valuable territories. In line with our predictions, across history cohesive kin-based groups have dominated in early or low-stakes conflicts, while modern states rely on weaker kinship structures to expand. The model explains the vulnerability of early states as emphasized by James C. Scott. We also rationalize setups studied by Scott, where predatory states are surrounded by a strong kin periphery that escapes the central power control.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Bris, David & Sekeris, Petros G., 2026. "Kinship, group loyalty and conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:184:y:2026:i:c:s0014292126000206
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105276
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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