IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v181y2026ics0014292125002387.html

Inconvenient truths: A note on information avoidance and the price of fairness

Author

Listed:
  • van der Weele, Joël J.
  • Figueroa-Sisniega, Cristina

Abstract

Previous literature has shown that people are often reluctant to learn whether individually profitable actions have negative consequences for others. In an experimental allocation decision, we vary the ‘inconvenience’ of becoming informed about the payoffs of another player by changing the costs and benefits of choosing the fair outcome. Making the fair allocation cheaper to implement turns out to have a multiplier effect, raising both altruistic choices of informed subjects and the fraction of subjects that chooses to become informed. Thus, in situations of uncertainty, subsidizing altruistic choices to decision makers could be an effective tool for raising social welfare. By contrast, variations in the size of recipients’ potential payoffs have a smaller effect on ignorance and fair choices.

Suggested Citation

  • van der Weele, Joël J. & Figueroa-Sisniega, Cristina, 2026. "Inconvenient truths: A note on information avoidance and the price of fairness," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:181:y:2026:i:c:s0014292125002387
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292125002387
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105188?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hestermann, Nina & Le Yaouanq, Yves & Treich, Nicolas, 2020. "An economic model of the meat paradox," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Feiler, Lauren, 2014. "Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 253-267.
    3. Pace, Davide D. & Imai, Taisuke & Schwardmann, Peter & van der Weele, Joël J., 2025. "Uncertainty about carbon impact and the willingness to avoid CO2 emissions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    4. Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2022. "The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4815-4834, July.
    5. Zachary Grossman & Joël J. van der Weele, 2017. "Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 173-217.
    6. Amasino, Dianna R. & Oosterwijk, Suzanne & Sullivan, Nicolette J. & van der Weele, Joël, 2025. "Seeking or ignoring ethical certifications in consumer choice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    7. Amasino, Dianna R. & Oosterwijk, Suzanne & Sullivan, Nikki & van der Weele, Joël, 2025. "Seeking or ignoring ethical certifications in consumer choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126097, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    9. Zachary Grossman, 2014. "Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(11), pages 2659-2665, November.
    10. Silvia Saccardo & Marta Serra-Garcia, 2023. "Enabling or Limiting Cognitive Flexibility? Evidence of Demand for Moral Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(2), pages 396-429, February.
    11. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
    12. Christine L Exley & Judd B Kessler, 2023. "Information Avoidance and Image Concerns," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(656), pages 3153-3168.
    13. Russell Golman & David Hagmann & George Loewenstein, 2017. "Information Avoidance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 96-135, March.
    14. repec:oup:jconrs:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:675-697. is not listed on IDEAS
    15. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Grossman, Zack & Hua, Tony, 2025. "Willful ignorance in social decisions: robust, yet contextually sensitive," MPRA Paper 124968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2024. "Avoiding the cost of your conscience: belief dependent preferences and information acquisition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 491-547, July.
    3. Amasino, Dianna R. & Oosterwijk, Suzanne & Sullivan, Nikki & van der Weele, Joël, 2025. "Seeking or ignoring ethical certifications in consumer choice," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 126097, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Amasino, Dianna R. & Oosterwijk, Suzanne & Sullivan, Nicolette J. & van der Weele, Joël, 2025. "Seeking or ignoring ethical certifications in consumer choice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    5. Konstantin Offer & Dorothee Mischkowski & Zoe Rahwan & Christoph Engel, 2024. "Deliberately Ignoring Unfairness: Responses to Uncertain Inequality in the Ultimatum Game," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2024_06, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    6. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Perino, Grischa & Treich, Nicolas & Tyran, Jean-Robert & Wang, Stephanie W., 2024. "Self-signaling in voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    7. Moradi, Homayoon, 2018. "Selfless ignorance: Too good to be true," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    8. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Orland, 2020. "Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?," CEPA Discussion Papers 17, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    9. Garcia, Thomas & Massoni, Sébastien & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2020. "Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    10. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020. "The development of social strategic ignorance and other regarding behavior from childhood to adulthood," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    11. Robert Stüber, 2020. "The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 848-872, September.
    12. Friedrichsen, Jana & Momsen, Katharina & Piasenti, Stefano, 2022. "Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100, pages 1-1.
    13. Davide Pace & Joël van der Weele, 2020. "Curbing Carbon: An Experiment on Uncertainty and Information about CO2 emissions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-059/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2022. "The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4815-4834, July.
    15. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2020. "Expressive Voting vs. Self-Serving Ignorance," Working Papers 2020-33, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    16. Gangadharan, Lata & Grossman, Philip J. & Xue, Nina, 2024. "Belief elicitation under competing motivations: Does it matter how you ask?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    17. Weiwei Tasch & Daniel Houser, 2018. "Social Preferences and Social Curiosity," Working Papers 1067, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    18. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2023. "Information avoidance: Self-image concerns, inattention, and ideology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 386-400.
    19. Grossman, Zachary & Hua, Tony & Thori Lind, Jo & Nyborg, Karine, 2025. "Unwillingly Informed: the Prosocial Impact of Third-Party Informers," Memorandum 2/2025, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    20. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2023. "Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 45-74, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:181:y:2026:i:c:s0014292125002387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.