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Asymptotic Nash implementation in large congestion-type games

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Listed:
  • Xu, Hanping
  • Wu, Bin
  • Chen, Enxian

Abstract

This paper establishes an asymptotic implementation result in large congestion-type games. We show that if players in a large finite congestion-type game adopt the Nash equilibrium distribution of the corresponding continuum game, the resulting strategy profile forms an ɛn-Nash equilibrium with ɛn∼O(n−1/2). This provides a simple and practical way for players to achieve near-optimal outcomes without knowing the exact number of participants.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Hanping & Wu, Bin & Chen, Enxian, 2026. "Asymptotic Nash implementation in large congestion-type games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 259(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:259:y:2026:i:c:s0165176525006056
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112768
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2022. "Robust perfect equilibrium in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    2. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808, Elsevier.
    3. Enxian Chen Bin Wu Hanping Xu, 2024. "The equilibrium properties of obvious strategy profiles in games with many players," Papers 2410.22144, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2025.
    4. Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2020. "The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    5. Chen, Enxian & Wu, Bin & Xu, Hanping, 2025. "Equilibrium convergence in large games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    6. He, Wei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2017. "Modeling infinitely many agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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