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Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization

Author

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  • Korpela, Ville
  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Zachariassen, Julius

Abstract

Behavioral implementation studies the social choice rules that a planner can implement when individuals’ choice behavior need not be rational. Existing results cannot determine which social choice rules are behaviorally implementable when individuals’ choices exhibit significant choice anomalies such as decoy effect, choice overload, and compromise effect. We improve the situation by fully identifying the class of social choice rules behaviorally implementable by individual-based rights structures. In this framework, the planner designs an individual-based rights structure, which specifies rights of individuals to change the status-quo outcome of the society. It turns out that the key to a full characterization is to understand which condition should replace unanimity when individuals’ choices are non-rational.

Suggested Citation

  • Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Zachariassen, Julius, 2026. "Behavioral implementation by individual-based rights structures: A full characterization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:241:y:2026:i:c:s0167268125004846
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107367
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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