IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/soceco/v120y2026ics221480432500165x.html

Dishonesty and justifications: Evidence from the second roll of a dice game

Author

Listed:
  • Clist, Paul
  • Hong, Ying-yi

Abstract

The widely-adopted die rolling experiment measures average lying behaviour. Its original design uses so-called control rolls; subjects should roll twice before reporting their first roll, for which they are paid. The second roll is a control, which is neither paid nor reported. This detail has received little attention in economics, but is the basis for Justified Dishonesty. This popular psychological idea argues observing counterfactuals reduces the internal lying cost. Specifically, it predicts subjects report the higher of their two rolls, switching relevant and irrelevant rolls if it pays to do so. Initial evidence appears compelling as data resemble its predictions. However current tests cannot distinguish between explanations, as we show other models can make virtually identical predictions without invoking counterfactuals. We test Justified Dishonesty’s mechanisms. First, we conduct a placebo test, finding that Justified Dishonesty’s predictions are accurate even when the proposed mechanism is not present. Second, we record both first and second (control) rolls. This enables a more direct test of the mechanism, which is strongly rejected in preregistered tests. Our results imply that whilst control rolls may slightly encourage cheating, they do so by altering standard lying costs rather than through a mechanism of switching rolls. This result underlines the importance of apparently inconsequential experimental features in influencing levels of lying behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Clist, Paul & Hong, Ying-yi, 2026. "Dishonesty and justifications: Evidence from the second roll of a dice game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:120:y:2026:i:c:s221480432500165x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102501
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221480432500165X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.socec.2025.102501?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Urs Fischbacher & Franziska Föllmi-Heusi, 2013. "Lies In Disguise—An Experimental Study On Cheating," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 525-547, June.
    2. Kiryl Khalmetski & Dirk Sliwka, 2019. "Disguising Lies—Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 79-110, November.
    3. Clist, Paul & Hong, Ying-yi, 2023. "Do international students learn foreign preferences? The interplay of language, identity and assimilation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018. "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 248-264.
    5. Simon Gächter & Jonathan F. Schulz, 2016. "Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies," Nature, Nature, vol. 531(7595), pages 496-499, March.
    6. Catrine Jacobsen & Toke Reinholt Fosgaard & David Pascual†Ezama, 2018. "Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide To The Dishonesty Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 357-387, April.
    7. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
    8. Colin F. Camerer & Anna Dreber & Felix Holzmeister & Teck-Hua Ho & Jürgen Huber & Magnus Johannesson & Michael Kirchler & Gideon Nave & Brian A. Nosek & Thomas Pfeiffer & Adam Altmejd & Nick Buttrick , 2018. "Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 2(9), pages 637-644, September.
    9. repec:osf:socarx:4hmb6_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
    11. Roger B. Newson, 2010. "Frequentist q-values for multiple-test procedures," Stata Journal, StataCorp LLC, vol. 10(4), pages 568-584, December.
    12. Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2019. "Preferences for Truth‐Telling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1115-1153, July.
    13. Ay, F. Ceren & Berge, Joel W. & Nødtvedt, Katrine B., 2024. "Strategic curiosity: An experimental study of curiosity and dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 287-297.
    14. Uri Gneezy & Agne Kajackaite & Joel Sobel, 2018. "Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(2), pages 419-453, February.
    15. Shalvi, Shaul & Dana, Jason & Handgraaf, Michel J.J. & De Dreu, Carsten K.W., 2011. "Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 181-190, July.
    16. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fries, Tilman & Parra, Daniel, 2021. "Because I (don’t) deserve it: Entitlement and lying behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 495-512.
    2. Ann‐Kathrin Crede & Frauke von Bieberstein, 2020. "Reputation and lying aversion in the die roll paradigm: Reducing ambiguity fosters honest behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(4), pages 651-657, June.
    3. Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Comportements (non) éthiques et stratégies morales," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 70(6), pages 1021-1046.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018. "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 248-264.
    5. Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2019. "Evasion of guilt in expert advice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 296-310.
    6. Garbarino, Ellen & Slonim, Robert & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Loss aversion and lying behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 379-393.
    7. Benistant, Julien & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Unethical behavior and group identity in contests," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 128-155.
    8. Benistant, Julien & Galeotti, Fabio & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2022. "Competition, information, and the erosion of morals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 148-163.
    9. Sun, Keh-Kuan & Papadokonstantaki, Stella, 2023. "Lying aversion and vague communication: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    10. Khalmetski, Kiryl & Rockenbach, Bettina & Werner, Peter, 2017. "Evasive lying in strategic communication," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 59-72.
    11. Gary Charness & Celia Blanco-Jimenez & Lara Ezquerra & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2019. "Cheating, incentives, and money manipulation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 155-177, March.
    12. Sandro Casal & Antonio Filippin, 2024. "The effect of observing multiple private information outcomes on the inclination to cheat," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(2), pages 543-562, April.
    13. Bašić, Zvonimir & Quercia, Simone, 2022. "The influence of self and social image concerns on lying," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 162-169.
    14. repec:grz:wpsses:2017-01 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Huber, Christoph & Huber, Jürgen, 2020. "Bad bankers no more? Truth-telling and (dis)honesty in the finance industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 472-493.
    16. Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    17. Andrea Albertazzi, 2022. "Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 37-67, July.
    18. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
    19. Aksoy, Billur & Palma, Marco A., 2019. "The effects of scarcity on cheating and in-group favoritism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 100-117.
    20. Benistant, Julien & Galeotti, Fabio & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2021. "The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating," IZA Discussion Papers 14014, IZA Network @ LISER.
    21. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant & Silvia Sonderegger, 2020. "It's Not a Lie If You Believe the Norm Does Not Apply: Conditional Norm-Following with Strategic Beliefs," CESifo Working Paper Series 8059, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:120:y:2026:i:c:s221480432500165x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.