Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2022

• Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2022, "Behavioral Forces Driving Information Unraveling," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 354, Dec.
• Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kocher, Martin G. & Schudy, Simeon, 2022, "Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 358, Dec.
• Özgün Ekici & Bugra Caskurlu, 2022, "Location Choice under Spillovers," Business and Economics Research Journal, Bursa Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, volume 13, issue 1, pages 1-9.
• Michelle Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2022, "Trade, Insecurity, and the Costs of Conflict," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2022-8, Jun.
• Michelle Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2022, "International Trade and Stable Resolutions of Resource Disputes," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2022-9, Sep.
• Nicola Acocella, 2022, "The Current Status of Economic Policy as a Discipline," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, volume 75, issue 4, pages 391-406.
• Shurojit Chatterji & Takashi Kunimoto & Paulo Ramos, 2022, "Compellingness in Nash Implementation," Economics and Statistics Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics, number 10-2022, Jul.
• Klaus Beckmann, 2022, "Commitment versus Präemption: zum Wesen der Initiative," Working Paper, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, number 192/2022, Mar.
• Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022, "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , volume 21, issue 1, pages 27-42, June, DOI: 10.1177/0976747920941772.
• Łukasz Balbus & Wojciech Olszewski & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2022, "Iterative Monotone Comparative Statics," KAE Working Papers, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, number 2022-072, Feb, DOI: 10.33119/kaewps2022072.
• Raul Vladimir Gomez Diaz & Carlos Obed Figueroa Ortiz, 2022, "Inseguridad y juegos evolutivos," Sobre México. Revista de Economía, Sobre México. Temas en economía, volume 3, issue 5, pages 128-148.
• Luciana C. Fiorini & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2022, "Labor Supply in Pandemics Environments: An Aggregative Games Approach," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2022_18, Aug.
• László Á. Kóczy, 2022, "Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 318, issue 2, pages 1001-1027, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-022-04669-5.
• Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessio Muscillo & Paolo Pin, 2022, "Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 12, issue 4, pages 1101-1129, December, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00438-y.
• Leonardo Boncinelli & Alessio Muscillo & Paolo Pin, 2022, "Correction to: Efficiency and Stability in a Process of Teams Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 12, issue 4, pages 1130-1130, December, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00442-2.
• Roman Lukyanenko & Wolfgang Maass & Veda C. Storey, 2022, "Trust in artificial intelligence: From a Foundational Trust Framework to emerging research opportunities," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, volume 32, issue 4, pages 1993-2020, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12525-022-00605-4.
• Ori Haimanko, 2022, "Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 27-39, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00215-x.
• Yuhki Hosoya & Chaowen Yu, 2022, "On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 69-93, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00219-1.
• Sung-Hoon Park & Chad Settle, 2022, "Internalizing environmental damages and endogenous reimbursement in environmental conflicts: a game-theoretic analysis," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), volume 69, issue 4, pages 547-569, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12232-022-00405-4.
• Kiyotaka Yageta, 2022, "Watching, being watched, and human interactions: evidence from trust games," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 73, issue 1, pages 61-82, January, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-021-00087-7.
• Peter Michaelis & Thomas Ziesemer, 2022, "Minimum quality standards and benchmarking in differentiated duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 73, issue 3, pages 515-537, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-020-00050-y.
• Gian Italo Bischi & Federico Favaretto & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2022, "Long-term causes of populism," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 17, issue 1, pages 349-377, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-020-00300-7.
• Tetsuya Kawamura & Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse, 2022, "Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 17, issue 4, pages 927-946, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-022-00352-x.
• Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & David Lagziel, 2022, "Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 1, pages 91-119, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01327-4.
• János Flesch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Jasmine Maes & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2022, "Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 2, pages 695-719, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01201-y.
• Guilherme Carmona & Konrad Podczeck, 2022, "Approximation and characterization of Nash equilibria of large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 2, pages 679-694, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01314-9.
• David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2022, "Success in contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 2, pages 595-624, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4.
• Pavlo Prokopovych & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022, "On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 2, pages 625-654, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01372-7.
• Christian Basteck, 2022, "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 1, pages 161-208, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01353-w.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022, "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 1, pages 69-93, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01373-6.
• Marco Serena, 2022, "Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 3, pages 763-792, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01378-1.
• Emerson Melo, 2022, "On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application to network games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 3, pages 681-725, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01385-2.
• Christian Ewerhart, 2022, "A “fractal” solution to the chopstick auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1025-1041, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1052-1.
• Alan Gelder & Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2022, "All-pay auctions with ties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1183-1231, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01195-7.
• Samuel Häfner & Georg Nöldeke, 2022, "Sorting in iterated incumbency contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1103-1140, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01205-8.
• Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2022, "Large contests without single crossing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1043-1055, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01244-1.
• Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2022, "Introduction to the Special Issue on Contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 4, pages 1017-1023, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01470-0.
• Vi Cao, 2022, "An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 1, pages 53-85, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00785-x.
• Daniel Christopher Opolot, 2022, "On the relationship between p-dominance and stochastic stability in network games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 2, pages 307-351, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00794-w.
• Makoto Shimoji, 2022, "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 3, pages 451-481, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1.
• Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022, "Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 3, pages 589-605, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3.
• Benjamin Kang & James Unwin, 2022, "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, volume 15, issue 2, pages 145-160, August, DOI: 10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8.
• Marcel Nutz & Florian Stebegg, 2022, "Climate change adaptation under heterogeneous beliefs," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, number 3, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11579-022-00314-8.
• Cyrinus B. Elegbede & Ludovic A. Julien & Louis Mesnard, 2022, "On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 1, pages 43-73, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00253-8.
• Yusuke Iwase, 2022, "Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 1, pages 117-125, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00257-4.
• Mridu Prabal Goswami, 2022, "Non-dictatorial public distribution rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 2, pages 165-183, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00262-7.
• Dominic Keehan & Dodge Cahan & John McCabe-Dansted & Arkadii Slinko, 2022, "Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 3, pages 285-306, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00290-x.
• Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022, "To sell public or private goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 3, pages 385-415, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00305-7.
• Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2022, "Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 4, pages 635-649, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z.
• Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022, "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 26, issue 4, pages 605-633, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00282-3.
• Daniel Verdier, 2022, "Bargaining strategies for governance complex games," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, volume 17, issue 2, pages 349-371, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09407-9.
• Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour & Christian Klamler, 2022, "Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, volume 3, issue 2, pages 1-23, June, DOI: 10.1007/s43069-021-00115-7.
• Steven J. Brams & Markus Brill & Anne-Marie George, 2022, "The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 58, issue 2, pages 283-300, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01358-3.
• Deren Çağlayan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2022, "Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 59, issue 1, pages 119-137, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01381-4.
• Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2022, "General timing games with multiple players," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics, number 2022-02, Apr.
• Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Willi Semmler & Enrico Saltari, 2022, "A Nash equilibrium for differential games with moving-horizon strategies," CIMEO Working Paper Series, Centre for Investigation and Modelling of Experimental Observations (CIMEO), number 160, Mar.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Lauermann, Stephan, 2022, "Information aggregation in Poisson-elections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 1, January.
• Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2022, "Games with switching costs and endogenous references," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Zik, Boaz & Weksler, Ran, 2022, "Informative tests in signaling environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022, "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Balbus, Lukasz & Dziewulski, Pawel & Reffett, Kevin & Wozny, Lukasz, 2022, "Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Blume, Andreas & Park, In-Uck, 2022, "Quid pro quo: friendly information exchange between rivals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Benoit S Y Crutzen & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2022, "Comparative Politics with Intraparty Candidate Selection," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 22-073/VII, Oct.
• Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2022, "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2022-003.
• Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2022, "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center, number 2022-005.
• Argenton, Cedric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2022, "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A Discontinuity in Behavior Infinitely Repeated Duopoly Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 03d1f1c4-0f0f-4d7c-8428-4.
• Carvajal, Andrés & Song, Xinxi, 2022, "A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: Efficiency and implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110231.
• Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022, "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110314.
• Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2022, "Anchored strategic reasoning," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110330.
• Xiong, Yifan & Li, Ziyan, 2022, "Staffing problems with local network externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 212, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110338.
• Fu, Wentao & Hua, Di & Qian, Xuewen & Sun, Yang, 2022, "Constrained public goods in weighted networks with heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110332.
• Gächter, Simon & Starmer, Chris & Thöni, Christian & Tufano, Fabio & Weber, Till O., 2022, "Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110552.
• Amorós, Pablo, 2022, "Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110557.
• Carvajal, Andrés & Song, Xinxi, 2022, "Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110630.
• Lopez-Velasco, Armando R., 2022, "Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: Clarifications and some new insights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110707.
• Collie, David R., 2022, "CRRA utility and the sustainability of cooperation in infinitely-repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 221, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110897.
• Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022, "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103963.
• Pavesi, Filippo & Scotti, Massimo, 2022, "Good lies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103965.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2022, "Selective memory of a psychological agent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.104012.
• Vosooghi, Sareh & Caparrós, Alejandro, 2022, "Information disclosure and dynamic climate agreements: Shall the IPCC reveal it all?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104042.
• Danz, David & Engelmann, Dirk & Kübler, Dorothea, 2022, "Do legal standards affect ethical concerns of consumers?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104044.
• Kölle, Felix, 2022, "Governance and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104199.
• Foerster, Manuel & Voss, Achim, 2022, "Believe me, I am ignorant, but not biased," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104262.
• Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2022, "Trouble comes in threes: Core stability in minimum cost connection networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 297, issue 1, pages 319-324, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.05.044.
• Barbosa, Luciana & Rodrigues, Artur & Sardinha, Alberto, 2022, "Optimal price subsidies under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 303, issue 1, pages 471-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.024.
• Rayati, Mohammad & Teneketzis, Demosthenis, 2022, "Electricity market design and implementation in the presence of asymmetrically informed strategic producers and consumers: A surrogate optimization-based mechanism," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.105929.
• Liu, Hong & Li, Zaili, 2022, "Inside trading with public information and market regulation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 46, issue PA, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2021.102234.
• Toraubally, Waseem A., 2022, "Price dispersion and vanilla options in a financial market game," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2022.103305.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel, 2022, "Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 275-291, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.008.
• Orlova, Olena, 2022, "Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 29-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.006.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2022, "The Trembling Chairman Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 51-56, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.002.
• Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022, "Price discovery using a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 131, issue C, pages 57-83, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.001.
• Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2022, "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 133-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.002.
• Rampal, Jeevant, 2022, "Limited Foresight Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 166-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.001.
• Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022, "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 221-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.003.
• Konishi, Hideo & Pan, Chen-Yu & Simeonov, Dimitar, 2022, "Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 274-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.006.
• Ivanov, Maxim & Sam, Alex, 2022, "Cheap talk with private signal structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 288-304, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.005.
• Wu, Bin, 2022, "On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 305-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.004.
• Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2022, "Local public goods with weighted link formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 316-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.014.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Yuanzhu & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022, "Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 337-352, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.004.
• Tajika, Tomoya, 2022, "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 380-389, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.008.
• Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, 2022, "College admissions with tuition transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 400-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.006.
• Gomes, Armando, 2022, "Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 463-477, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010.
• Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022, "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 487-509, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.023.
• Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022, "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 592-597, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025.
• Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022, "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 1-27, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.018.
• Bahel, Eric & Ball, Sheryl & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2022, "Communication and cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 126-137, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.008.
• Jindapon, Paan & Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut & Viriyavipart, Ajalavat, 2022, "Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 202-229, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.005.
• Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022, "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 256-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.005.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2022, "The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 50-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.001.
• Pahlke, Marieke, 2022, "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 85-108, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.004.
• Dilmé, Francesc, 2022, "Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 1-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.008.
• Sémirat, Stéphan & Forges, Françoise, 2022, "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 242-263, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004.
• Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022, "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 264-280, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.006.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Shi, Fei, 2022, "Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 37-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.014.
• Gallo, Edoardo & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Roy, Nilanjan & Teh, Tat-How, 2022, "Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 75-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.015.
• Currarini, S. & Marchiori, C., 2022, "Issue linkage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 16-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.009.
• Barthel, Anne-Christine & Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2022, "Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 201-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.005.
• Tóbiás, Áron, 2022, "Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 327-337, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.012.
• Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran, 2022, "The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 96-109, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.001.
• Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022, "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 1-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005.
• Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2022, "The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 117-141, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.007.
• Norman, Thomas W.L., 2022, "The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 142-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.002.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022, "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 153-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.005.
• Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Su, Tong & Wakrim, Ahmed, 2022, "Public communication with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 177-196, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003.
• Fallucchi, Francesco & Luccasen, R. Andrew & Turocy, Theodore L., 2022, "The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 31-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.004.
• Ding, Sihua, 2022, "Link investment substitutability: A factor influencing network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 340-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.001.
• Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022, "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 389-402, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007.
• Biró, Péter & Klijn, Flip & Pápai, Szilvia, 2022, "Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 428-453, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.006.
• Rojo Arjona, David & Sitzia, Stefania & Zheng, Jiwei, 2022, "Overcoming coordination failure in games with focal points: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 505-523, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.010.
• Guarino, Pierfrancesco & Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022, "Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 559-585, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.012.
• Lafky, Jonathan & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022, "Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 92-116, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.08.002.
• Barrachina, Alex & Forner-Carreras, Teresa, 2022, "Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfare," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100964.
• Li, Danping & Young, Virginia R., 2022, "Stackelberg differential game for reinsurance: Mean-variance framework and random horizon," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 42-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2021.11.006.
• Cao, Jingyi & Li, Dongchen & Young, Virginia R. & Zou, Bin, 2022, "Stackelberg differential game for insurance under model ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 128-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2022.06.003.
• Jiao, Qian & Ke, Changxia & Liu, Yang, 2022, "When to disclose the number of contestants: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, pages 146-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.018.
• Cubel, María & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2022, "Gender differences in equilibrium play and strategic sophistication variability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 194, issue C, pages 287-299, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.014.
• te Velde, Vera L., 2022, "Heterogeneous norms: Social image and social pressure when people disagree," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 194, issue C, pages 319-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.12.013.
• Alonso, Ricardo & Rantakari, Heikki, 2022, "The art of brevity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, pages 257-271, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.014.
• Toraubally, Waseem A., 2022, "Strategic trading and Ricardian comparative advantage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, pages 428-447, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.10.031.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022, "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, pages 40-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.027.
• Kraft, Holger & Meyer-Wehmann, André & Seifried, Frank Thomas, 2022, "Endogenous habits and equilibrium asset prices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, pages 279-300, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.005.
• Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022, "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, pages 325-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.02.024.
• Deck, Cary & Pate, Jennifer, 2022, "High time to study the relationship between marijuana use and economic behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.018.
• Angelova, Vera & Giebe, Thomas & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2022, "Competition and fatigue," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 236-249, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.032.
• Usvitskiy, Alexander, 2022, "Strategic risk-taking in dynamic contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 511-534, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.011.
• Bayona, Anna & Peia, Oana, 2022, "Financial contagion and the wealth effect: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, pages 1184-1202, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.001.
• Bulutay, Muhammed & Cornand, Camille & Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2022, "Learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, pages 1318-1343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.023.
• Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2022, "Monetary policy obeying the Taylor principle turns prices into strategic substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, pages 1357-1371, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.022.
• Funai, Naoki, 2022, "Reinforcement learning with foregone payoff information in normal form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, pages 638-660, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.021.
• Qi, Tianxiao & Xu, Bin & Wu, Jinshan & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2022, "On the Stochasticity of Ultimatum Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, pages 227-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.005.
• Carrasco, Jose A. & Harrison, Rodrigo & Villena, Mauricio G., 2022, "Strategic reciprocity and preference formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, pages 368-381, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.09.008.
• Loginova, Oksana, 2022, "Branded websites and marketplace selling: Competing during COVID-19," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, pages 577-592, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.09.020.
• Marx, Robert & Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco, 2022, "The Keynesian beauty contest revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, pages 164-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.029.
• Liu, Tracy Xiao & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2022, "Efficient public good provision by lotteries with nonlinear pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, pages 680-698, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.033.
• Li, Zhi & Liu, Pengfei & Swallow, Stephen K., 2022, "The performance of multi-type environmental credit trading markets: Lab experiment evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102563.
• Bediako, Kwabena & Nkuiya, Bruno, 2022, "Stability of international fisheries agreements under stock growth uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2022.102664.
• Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022, "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105377.
• Loertscher, Simon & Muir, Ellen V. & Taylor, Peter G., 2022, "Optimal market thickness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105383.
• Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan & Sun, Yang, 2022, "A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105396.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Sayan & Roy, Souvik, 2022, "Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105398.
• Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022, "The value of a coordination game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105419.
• Kneeland, Terri, 2022, "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105421.
• Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2022, "Robust perfect equilibrium in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105433.
• Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022, "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105443.
• Fernández-Duque, Mauricio, 2022, "The probability of pluralistic ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105449.
• Pintér, Miklós, 2022, "How to make ambiguous strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105459.
• Bavly, Gilad & Heller, Yuval & Schreiber, Amnon, 2022, "Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105462.
• Hu, Ju & Zhou, Zhen, 2022, "Disclosure in epidemics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105469.
• Carré, Sylvain & Collin-Dufresne, Pierre & Gabriel, Franck, 2022, "Insider trading with penalties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105461.
• Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2022, "The measurement of the value of a language," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105468.
• Rigos, Alexandros, 2022, "The normality assumption in coordination games with flexible information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105485.
• Oechssler, Joerg & Reischmann, Andreas & Sofianos, Andis, 2022, "The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods – The general case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105488.
• Chen, Jaden Yang, 2022, "Biased learning under ambiguous information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105492.
• Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022, "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105490.
• Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022, "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105498.
• Hara, Kazuhiro, 2022, "Coalitional strategic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105512.
• Wagner, Peter A. & Klein, Nicolas, 2022, "Strategic investment and learning with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105523.
• Friedman, Daniel & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A. & Zhao, Shuchen, 2022, "On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105531.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022, "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541.
• Jindani, Sam, 2022, "Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105551.
• Külpmann, Philipp & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2022, "Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105554.
• Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2022, "Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553.
• Goryunov, Maxim & Rigos, Alexandros, 2022, "Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105557.
• Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022, "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105569.
• Xu, Jin & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2022, "Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105571.
• Sofianos, Andis, 2022, "Self-reported & revealed trust: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102451.
• Folli, Dominik & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2022, "Biases in belief reports," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102458.
• Arechar, Antonio A. & Rand, David G., 2022, "Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2022.102490.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2022, "Ordinal status games on networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102647.
• Edwards, Robert A. & Routledge, Robert R., 2022, "Information, Bertrand–Edgeworth competition and the law of one price," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102658.
• Kim, Chulyoung & Kim, Sang-Hyun & Lee, Jinhyuk & Lee, Joosung, 2022, "Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102219.
• Ginzburg, Boris & Guerra, José-Alberto & Lekfuangfu, Warn N., 2022, "Counting on my vote not counting: Expressive voting in committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104555.
• Boitier, Vincent, 2022, "Why do similar firms export differently?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 4, pages 373-385, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2022.09.002.
• Krause, Andreas, 2022, "Strategic default and optimal audit resources with costly state verification," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue 4, pages 413-421, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2022.09.005.
• Abdul Baki, Ghina & Marrouch, Walid, 2022, "Environmental taxation in the Bertrand differentiated duopoly: New insights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2022.101329.
• Yang, Jie & Zhao, Daozhi & Wang, Zeyu & Xu, Chunqiu, 2022, "Impact of regulation on on-demand ride-sharing service: Profit-based target vs demand-based target," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2021.101138.
• Lin, Yen-Ju, 2022, "Consumer welfare, licensing, and exclusive dealing with vertically- and horizontally-differentiated products," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 147-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.02.035.
• Oladi, Reza & Gilbert, John, 2022, "Electoral rivalry and financial campaign contributions: The case of US Congressional elections," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 822-834, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.02.080.
• Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 2022, "Bonding by guilt: A resolution of the finite horizon prisoners’ dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2022.101899.