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An index of competitiveness and cooperativeness for normal-form games

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  • Thomas Demuynck
  • Christian Seel
  • Giang Tran

Abstract

We develop an index of competitiveness and cooperativeness that is based on the primitives of a normal-form game, i.e., players, strategies and payoffs. The index relies on the unique decomposition of a given game into a zero-sum game and a common interest game. The index decreases in the distance to its zero-sum part and increases in the distance to its common interest part. The comparative statics of our index coincide with economic intuition. The index also supports experimental findings in well-known classes of games in the sense that more cooperative and less competitive behavior correlates with lower values of the index.
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  • Thomas Demuynck & Christian Seel & Giang Tran, 2022. "An index of competitiveness and cooperativeness for normal-form games," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/359109, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/359109
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    Cited by:

    1. Ryan Kendall, 2022. "Decomposing coordination failure in stag hunt games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1109-1145, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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