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Imperfect competition in electricity markets with partially flexible technologies

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  • Crampes, Claude
  • Renault, Jérôme

Abstract

The producers of electricity using dispatchable plants rely on partially flexible technologies to match the variability of demand and intermittent renewables. We analyse flexibility in a two-stage decision process where production decided at the last moment is more costly than if it is planned in advance. We first determine the first best outputs, prices and gains. We then consider a model where two partially flexible firms compete in quantities to supply a random residual demand. We determine the subgame perfect equilibria corresponding to two market designs: one where all trade occurs in a spot market with known demand, the other where a day-ahead market with random demand is added to the ex-post market, first in a general setting, then using a quadratic specification. We show that when all trade occurs ex post, the least flexible firm is not necessarily disadvantaged. We also show that adding a day-ahead market makes consumers better off and firms worse off by increasing total output. It increases welfare but it also transfers risks from firms to consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2021. "Imperfect competition in electricity markets with partially flexible technologies," TSE Working Papers 21-1198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:125447
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Reliability and competitive electricity markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 60-84, March.
    2. Crampes, Claude & Renault, Jérôme, 2019. "How many markets for wholesale electricity when supply ispartially flexible?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 465-478.
    3. Bistline, John E., 2017. "Economic and technical challenges of flexible operations under large-scale variable renewable deployment," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 363-372.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Flexibility; electricity; market design; production costs; risk transfer;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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