Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between economists focused on designing competitive market mechanisms and engineers focused on the physical attributes and engineering requirements they perceive as being needed for operating a reliable electric power system. The paper starts by deriving the (second-best) optimal prices and investment program when there are price-insensitive retail consumers, but when their load serving entities can choose any level of rationing they prefer contingent on real time prices. It then examines the assumptions required for a competitive wholesale and retail market to achieve this optimal price and investment program. The paper analyses the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. First, it analyzes the interrelationships between regulator-imposed price caps and capacity obligations. It goes on to explore the implications of potential network collapses, the concomitant need for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices will provide incentives for investments consistent with these reserve requirements.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2007|
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- Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2005.
"A Capacity Market that Makes Sense,"
The Electricity Journal,
Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 43-54.
- Severin Borenstein & Stephen Holland, 2005.
"On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets with Time-Invariant Retail Prices,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(3), pages 469-493, Autumn.
- Severin Borenstein & Stephen P. Holland, 2003. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets With Time-Invariant Retail Prices," NBER Working Papers 9922, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frank Wolak, 2000. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(2), pages 1-39.
- Joskow, P. & Tirole, J., 2004.
"‘Retail Electricity Competition’,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0430, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Jean Tirole & Paul Joskow, 2006. "Retail Electricity Competition," Post-Print hal-00173713, HAL.
- Joskow, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Retail Electricity Competition," IDEI Working Papers 311, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Paul L. Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Retail Electricity Competition," NBER Working Papers 10473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Retail Electricity Competition," Working Papers 0409, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Green, Richard, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 107-124, March.
- Chao, Hung-po & Wilson, Robert, 1987. "Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 899-916, December.
- Allaz Blaise & Vila Jean-Luc, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-16, February.
- Littlechild, S.C., 2000. "Why We Need Electricity Retailers: A Reply to Joskow on Wholesale Spot Price pass-through," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0008, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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