Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2013

• Youngsup Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2013, "Egalitarian Equivalence and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem," Working Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University, number no89, Apr.
• Simon Cornée & David Masclet, 2013, "Long-Term Relationships, Group lending and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: New Experimental Evidence," Working Papers CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 13-026, May.
• Stephanie Kremer & Alexander Bick & Dieter Nautz, 2013, "Inflation and growth: new evidence from a dynamic panel threshold analysis," Empirical Economics, Springer, volume 44, issue 2, pages 861-878, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00181-012-0553-9.
• Matt Van Essen, 2013, "Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 1, issue 1, pages 57-68, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0007-3.
• R. R. Routledge, 2013, "On the existence of coalition-proof Bertrand equilibrium," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 1, issue 1, pages 21-31, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0011-7.
• Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013, "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, volume 13, issue 3, pages 387-403, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-012-9196-8.
• Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Marco Faillo, 2013, "Team reasoning theory: an experimental analysis of common reason to believe and social distance," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), volume 60, issue 3, pages 269-291, September, DOI: 10.1007/s12232-013-0182-4.
• Maxim Ivanov, 2013, "Information revelation in competitive markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 1, pages 337-365, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0629-3.
• Spyros Galanis, 2013, "Unawareness of theorems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 1, pages 41-73, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0683-x.
• Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2013, "Large extensive form games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 1, pages 75-102, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y.
• Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013, "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 2, pages 589-630, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0657-z.
• John Duffy & Huan Xie & Yong-Ju Lee, 2013, "Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 2, pages 669-708, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0659-x.
• Daniel Krähmer & Rebecca Stone, 2013, "Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 2, pages 709-728, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0661-3.
• Subhasish Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2013, "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 3, pages 833-861, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0670-2.
• Alex Dickson & Roger Hartley, 2013, "Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 52, issue 3, pages 979-1004, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0676-9.
• Cédric Wasser, 2013, "Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 53, issue 1, pages 239-268, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5.
• Mamoru Kaneko & J. Kline, 2013, "Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 53, issue 1, pages 27-59, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0519-0.
• Pavlo Prokopovych, 2013, "The single deviation property in games with discontinuous payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 53, issue 2, pages 383-402, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0696-0.
• Peter Postl, 2013, "Efficiency versus optimality in procurement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 53, issue 2, pages 425-472, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0699-x.
• Iryna Topolyan, 2013, "Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 53, issue 3, pages 697-705, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0701-7.
• Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2013, "Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 54, issue 1, pages 1-26, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0727-x.
• Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013, "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 54, issue 1, pages 131-151, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2.
• Vincenzo Scalzo, 2013, "Essential equilibria of discontinuous games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 54, issue 1, pages 27-44, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0726-y.
• Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013, "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 54, issue 2, pages 359-403, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0720-4.
• Natalia Lazzati, 2013, "Comparison of equilibrium actions and payoffs across players in games of strategic complements," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 54, issue 3, pages 777-788, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0736-9.
• Shira Fano & Marco LiCalzi & Paolo Pellizzari, 2013, "Convergence of outcomes and evolution of strategic behavior in double auctions," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 513-538, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-011-0226-4.
• Antonio Cabrales & José-Ramón Uriarte, 2013, "Doubts and equilibria," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 23, issue 4, pages 783-810, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-012-0269-1.
• Francesco Feri & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, 2013, "Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 23, issue 5, pages 955-1000, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9.
• Koji Takamiya, 2013, "Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 1, pages 115-130, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x.
• Tim Hellmann, 2013, "On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 1, pages 211-237, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0335-9.
• Markus Kinateder, 2013, "Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 1, pages 283-294, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3.
• Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013, "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 1, pages 295-303, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0354-6.
• Valeska Groenert, 2013, "Trimmed equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 1, pages 99-114, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0317-3.
• Yuan Ju, 2013, "Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer–counteroffer mechanism with two players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 2, pages 501-520, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0336-8.
• Indrajit Ray & Sonali Gupta, 2013, "Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 2, pages 541-562, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0360-8.
• Wiebe Hoek & Cees Witteveen & Michael Wooldridge, 2013, "Program equilibrium—a program reasoning approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 3, pages 639-671, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0314-6.
• Burkhard Schipper, 2013, "Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 3, pages 725-753, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0321-2.
• Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Li-Chau Wu, 2013, "Imitation, local interaction, and coordination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 1041-1057, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0353-7.
• Igal Milchtaich, 2013, "Representation of finite games as network congestion games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 1085-1096, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0363-5.
• Ro’i Zultan, 2013, "Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 789-800, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0323-0.
• Marcin Dziubiński, 2013, "Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 801-833, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0324-z.
• Pablo Amorós, 2013, "Picking the winners," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 845-865, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0332-z.
• Inbar Aricha & Rann Smorodinsky, 2013, "Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 42, issue 4, pages 931-946, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0346-6.
• John Kleppe & Peter Borm & Ruud Hendrickx, 2013, "Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), volume 78, issue 2, pages 171-186, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5.
• Toyotaka Sakai, 2013, "An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 17, issue 1, pages 17-26, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5.
• Gael Giraud & Hubert Stahn, 2013, "Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 17, issue 1, pages 43-62, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0138-2.
• Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013, "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 17, issue 3, pages 183-203, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0143-0.
• Shasikanta Nandeibam, 2013, "The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 17, issue 3, pages 205-238, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0130-x.
• Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013, "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 40, issue 2, pages 329-352, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0602-x.
• Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2013, "Electing a parliament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 40, issue 3, pages 715-737, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1.
• David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013, "The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 40, issue 4, pages 937-956, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x.
• Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Di Guida & Luca Polonio, 2013, "An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games," LEM Papers Series, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy, number 2013/05, Feb.
• Daniele Condorelli & Andrea Galeotti & Vasiliki Skreta, 2013, "Selling Through Referrals," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 13-06.
• Vasiliki Skreta, 2013, "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 13-08.
• Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013, "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 13-16.
• Dickson Alex, 2013, "Cobb-Douglas preferences in bilateral oligopoly," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics, number 1306, Jun.
• Anton Kolotilin, 2013, "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2013-19, Jul.
• Attila Ambrus & Ben Greiner & Parag Pathak, 2013, "How individual preferences get aggregated in groups - An experimental study," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2013-24, Sep.
• Newton, Jonathan & Angus, Simon D., 2013, "Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics, number 2013-02, Jan.
• Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2013, "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics, number 2013-09, Jun, revised Jul 2014.
• Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2013, "Innovation in a generalized timing game," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics, number 2013-16, Aug, revised Mar 2015.
• Darong Dai, 2013, "Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH), Kavala Campus, Greece, volume 6, issue 3, pages 79-96, December.
• Robert P. Gilles & Dimitrios Diamantaras, 2013, "Platform Competition as Network Contestability," DETU Working Papers, Department of Economics, Temple University, number 1303, Oct.
• , & , M. & ,, 2013, "Hierarchical cheap talk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 1, January.
• , & ,, 2013, "Specialization and partisanship in committee search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 3, September.
• Balkenborg, Dieter G. & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2013, "Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 1, January.
• , & Katsoulakis, Markos & ,, 2013, "Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 3, September.
• ,, 2013, "On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 2, May.
• ,, 2013, "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 2, May.
• , & ,, 2013, "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 1, January.
• , & ,, 2013, "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 8, issue 1, January.
• Jona Linde & Joep Sonnemans & Jan Tuinstra, 2013, "Strategies and Evolution in the Minority Game: A Multi- Round Strategy Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 13-043/I, Mar.
• Jia-Ping Huang & Maurice Koster & Ines Lindner, 2013, "Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 13-208/II, Dec.
• Gürkan, G. & Ozdemir, O. & Smeers, Y., 2013, "Strategic Generation Capacity Choice under Demand Uncertainty : Analysis of Nash Equilibria in Electricity Markets," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2013-044.
• Engwerda, J.C., 2013, "A Numerical Algorithm to find All Scalar Feedback Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2013-050.
• Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013, "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2013-008.
• Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013, "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b5dd75eb-d5be-4788-97b4-f.
• Isoni, Andrea & Poulsen, Anders & Sugden, Robert & Tsutsui, Kei, 2013, "Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 167-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.12.005.
• Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Casari, Marco & Gambetta, Diego, 2013, "It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 129-146, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.08.009.
• Gerber, Anke & Neitzel, Jakob & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2013, "Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 209-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.002.
• Fallucchi, Francesco & Renner, Elke & Sefton, Martin, 2013, "Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 223-240, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.003.
• Sutter, Matthias & Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco, 2013, "Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 395-410, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.06.003.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2013, "Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 98-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.08.007.
• Zugno, Marco & Morales, Juan Miguel & Pinson, Pierre & Madsen, Henrik, 2013, "A bilevel model for electricity retailers' participation in a demand response market environment," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 36, issue C, pages 182-197, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.12.010.
• Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2013, "Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 44-56, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.035.
• Ansink, Erik & Bouma, Jetske, 2013, "Effective support for community resource management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 37, issue C, pages 94-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2013.01.007.
• Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013, "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 100-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.003.
• Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013, "To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 138-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.004.
• Okano, Yoshitaka, 2013, "Minimax play by teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 168-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.003.
• Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros, 2013, "Admissibility and event-rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 21-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.012.
• Xiao, Erte, 2013, "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 321-344, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.010.
• Britz, Volker, 2013, "Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 345-351, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.013.
• Maximiano, Sandra & Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep, 2013, "Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.004.
• Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013, "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 77-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.004.
• Pearson, Matthew & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013, "Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.008.
• Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric, 2013, "Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 103-120, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.002.
• Saran, Rene & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2013, "Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 72-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.001.
• Capraro, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco, 2013, "Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 163-180, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.010.
• Samet, Dov, 2013, "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 192-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008.
• McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B., 2013, "Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 223-232, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.003.
• Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013, "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 30-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.007.
• Hernández, Penélope & Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Sánchez, Ángel, 2013, "Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 56-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.004.
• Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013, "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 67-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.003.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Seymour, Robert M., 2013, "Reinforcement learning in population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 10-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.006.
• Carpenter, Jeffrey & Graham, Michael & Wolf, Jesse, 2013, "Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 115-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.012.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013, "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 147-156, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010.
• Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito, 2013, "The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 179-185, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.001.
• Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2013, "Competition for procurement shares," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 193-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007.
• Kushnir, Alexey, 2013, "Harmful signaling in matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 209-218, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.002.
• Csapó, Gergely & Müller, Rudolf, 2013, "Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 229-242, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.014.
• Kreindler, Gabriel E. & Young, H. Peyton, 2013, "Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 39-67, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.004.
• Miettinen, Topi, 2013, "Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 68-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.002.
• Kıbrıs, Özgür & Kıbrıs, Arzu, 2013, "On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 85-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.007.
• Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013, "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 101-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.004.
• Moulin, Hervé & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2013, "The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 11-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.012.
• Andersson, Tommy & Erlanson, Albin, 2013, "Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 116-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.001.
• Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2013, "Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 145-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.002.
• Bigoni, Maria & Fort, Margherita, 2013, "Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 192-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.006.
• Acemoglu, Daron & Jensen, Martin Kaae, 2013, "Aggregate comparative statics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 27-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.009.
• Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013, "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 50-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.003.
• Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2013, "Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 69-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.005.
• Triossi, Matteo, 2013, "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 169-191, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008.
• Juarez, Ruben, 2013, "Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 218-239, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005.
• Aflaki, Sam, 2013, "The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 240-253, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.011.
• Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013, "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 327-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.006.
• Wasser, Cédric, 2013, "Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 350-368, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014.
• Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013, "Strategic information exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 444-467, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010.
• Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2013, "Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 490-502, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.002.
• Yang, Jian & Qi, Xiangtong, 2013, "The nonatomic supermodular game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 609-620, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.005.
• Müller, Wieland & Tan, Fangfang, 2013, "Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 658-674, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007.
• Candogan, Ozan & Ozdaglar, Asuman & Parrilo, Pablo A., 2013, "Dynamics in near-potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 66-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.001.
• Wright, Julian, 2013, "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 91-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.012.
• Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013, "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 211-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.007.
• Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2013, "Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 238-247, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.001.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2013, "Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 261-266, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.005.
• Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013, "Side-payments and the costs of conflict," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 278-286, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.01.005.
• Mago, Shakun D. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Yates, Andrew, 2013, "Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 287-296, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.006.
• Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2013, "Endogenous strength in conflicts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 3, pages 297-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.09.002.
• Niedermayer, Andras & Wu, Jianjun, 2013, "Breaking up a research consortium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 4, pages 342-353, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.05.002.
• Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013, "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 5, pages 438-451, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.07.009.
• Zhang, Jun, 2013, "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 5, pages 452-461, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.08.001.
• Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013, "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 89, issue 1, pages 68-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.04.003.
• Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2013, "Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 91, issue 2, pages 179-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2013.09.001.
• Wielhouwer, Jacco L., 2013, "When is public enforcement of insider trading regulations effective?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 34, issue C, pages 52-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2012.12.001.
• Gamba, Astrid, 2013, "Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 112-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009.
• Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi & Ploner, Matteo, 2013, "Group membership, team preferences, and expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, pages 183-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.003.
• Crettez, Bertrand & Deloche, Régis, 2013, "On experimental economics and the comparison between the last two versions of Molière's Tartuffe," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, pages 66-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.002.
• Cartwright, Edward & Patel, Amrish, 2013, "How category reporting can improve fundraising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, pages 73-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.01.003.
• Kolmar, Martin & Rommeswinkel, Hendrik, 2013, "Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, pages 9-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.02.006.
• Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013, "Learning to be fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 181-195, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.005.
• Manapat, Michael L. & Nowak, Martin A. & Rand, David G., 2013, "Information, irrationality, and the evolution of trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 90, issue S, pages 57-75, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.018.
• Bernard, Mark & Dreber, Anna & Strimling, Pontus & Eriksson, Kimmo, 2013, "The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, pages 122-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009.
• Conrads, Julian & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2013, "Strategic ignorance in ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 104-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.010.
• Corchón, Luis C. & Yıldızparlak, Anıl, 2013, "Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 116-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013, "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 127-140, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.001.
• Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas, 2013, "Prisoners and their dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 163-175, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.015.
• Samak, Anya C., 2013, "Is there a gender gap in preschoolers’ competitiveness? An experiment in the U.S," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 22-31, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.014.
• Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013, "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 94-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.012.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2013, "Deception: The role of guilt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 227-232, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.033.
• Huang, Ching-I & Chen, Jong-Rong & Lee, Chiu-Yu, 2013, "Buyer behavior under the Best Offer mechanism: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from eBay Motors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 11-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.07.003.
• Stahl, Dale O., 2013, "An experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 116-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.014.
• Schniter, Eric & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Sznycer, Daniel, 2013, "Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 242-256, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.011.
• Rietz, Thomas A. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W. & Smith, Vernon L., 2013, "Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 257-267, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.019.
• Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2013, "Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 268-277, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.023.
• Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013, "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 52-67, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.07.014.
• Fu, Qiang & Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2013, "Communication and commitment in contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 1-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.011.
• Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013, "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 111-125, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.015.
• Dodonova, Anna, 2013, "Preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with externality," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 35-44, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2013.05.002.
• Antoniadou, Elena & Koulovatianos, Christos & Mirman, Leonard J., 2013, "Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 1, pages 28-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.05.005.
• Karp, Larry & Simon, Leo, 2013, "Participation games and international environmental agreements: A non-parametric model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 2, pages 326-344, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.09.002.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Ely, Jeffrey C., 2013, "Mechanism design without revenue equivalence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 1, pages 104-133, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.014.
• Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013, "Extremal incentive compatible transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 1, pages 134-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.012.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2013, "Hidden symmetries and focal points," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 1, pages 226-258, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003.
• Ueda, Kenichi, 2013, "Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 1, pages 322-352, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.003.
• Schumacher, Heiner, 2013, "Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 1, pages 409-417, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.008.
• Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013, "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 2, pages 424-447, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015.
• Bochet, Olivier & İlkılıç, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé, 2013, "Egalitarianism under earmark constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 2, pages 535-562, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016.
• Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2013, "Finite-order type spaces and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 2, pages 689-719, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.007.
• Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2013, "Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 2, pages 858-870, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.002.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & McLennan, Andrew & Tourky, Rabee, 2013, "Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 3, pages 1074-1101, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.001.
• Anton, James J. & Biglaiser, Gary, 2013, "Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 3, pages 1179-1212, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.006.
• Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David & Ralph, Daniel, 2013, "Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 4, pages 1509-1551, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.020.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013, "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 1891-1928, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.017.
• Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013, "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 1929-1952, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011.
• Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2013, "Gambling in contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 2033-2048, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.005.
• Han, Seungjin, 2013, "Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 2068-2095, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.014.
• Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013, "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 2096-2123, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013.
• Korpela, Ville, 2013, "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 5, pages 2183-2193, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.013.
• Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013, "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 6, pages 2344-2382, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014.
• Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013, "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 6, pages 2620-2637, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.006.
• Laraki, Rida & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, 2013, "Higher order game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 6, pages 2666-2695, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.08.002.
• van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2013, "A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 148, issue 6, pages 2737-2748, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.018.
• Shino, Junnosuke, 2013, "A positive theory of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations in an accommodative financial environment," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, volume 32, issue C, pages 595-610, DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2012.05.026.
• Martinsson, Peter & Pham-Khanh, Nam & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2013, "Conditional cooperation and disclosure in developing countries," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 34, issue C, pages 148-155, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.09.005.
• Chaudhuri, Ananish & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud & Shen, Lifeng, 2013, "Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness: Individuals, single sex and mixed sex groups," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 34, issue C, pages 181-194, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.09.013.
• Van Beest, Ilja & Scheepers, Daan, 2013, "Challenge and threat responses to anger communication in coalition formation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 38, issue C, pages 50-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.005.
• Qin, Xiangdong & Wang, Siyu, 2013, "Using an exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 39, issue C, pages 1-10, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.07.002.