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Team reasoning theory: an experimental analysis of common reason to believe and social distance

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  • Leonardo Becchetti

    ()

  • Giacomo Degli Antoni

    ()

  • Marco Faillo

    ()

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to study the role of the “common reason to believe” (Sugden in Philos Explor 16:165–181, 2003 ) and the reduction of social distance within the theory of team reasoning. The analysis draws on data collected through a Traveler’s Dilemma experiment. To study the role of the common reason to believe, players’ beliefs in their counterparts’ choices are elicited, and the correlation between the endorsement of team reasoning and beliefs is considered. The relation between social distance and team reasoning is analyzed by introducing a meeting between the two players after the game. We show that the common reason to believe appropriately explains the internal logic of team reasoning and that a reduction of social distance does not produce any statistically significant effect on the probability that team reasoning will be used. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Marco Faillo, 2013. "Team reasoning theory: an experimental analysis of common reason to believe and social distance," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(3), pages 269-291, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:60:y:2013:i:3:p:269-291
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-013-0182-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Team reasoning; Common reason to believe; Framing; Social distance; Traveler’s Dilemma; C72; C91; A13;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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