Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2017

• Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Grilli, Luca, 2017, "Quality competition in healthcare services with regional regulators: A differential game approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81758, Oct.
• Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2017, "Public debt, pollution and environmental taxes: Nash and Stackelberg equilibria," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 81982, Oct.
• Woods, Daniel & Servátka, Maroš, 2017, "Nice to You, Nicer to Me: Does Self-Serving Generosity Diminish the Reciprocal Response?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82111, Sep.
• Satoh, Atsuhiro & Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2017, "Sion's minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric multi-person zero-sum game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82148, Oct.
• Csató, László, 2017, "European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup can be manipulated," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82652, Nov.
• Tagiew, Rustam & Ignatov, Dmitry I., 2017, "Behavior Mining in h-index Ranking Game," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82795, Sep.
• Duan, Lian, 2017, "Optimal degree of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with multiple public enterprises," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82896.
• Sandomirskaia, Marina, 2017, "Nash-2 equilibrium: selective farsightedness under uncertain response," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 83152, Dec.
• Walkowitz, Gari, 2017, "On the Validity of Cost-Saving Methods in Dictator-Game Experiments: A Systematic Test," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 83309, Nov.
• Smolin, Alex, 2017, "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84133, Oct.
• Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017, "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 84134, Oct.
• Mao, Liang, 2017, "Designing International Environmental Agreements under Participation Uncertainty," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86248, May.
• Bobkova, Nina, 2017, "Asymmetric Budget Constraints in a First Price Auction," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 88628, Feb, revised Aug 2018.
• Johannes Hörner & Xiaosheng Mu & Nicolas Vieille, 2017, "Keeping Your Story Straight: Truthtelling and Liespotting," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2017-5, Apr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017, "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program., number 089_2017, Feb.
• Georges SARAFOPOULOS & Kosmas PAPADOPOULOS, 2017, "On A Cournot Duopoly Game With Differentiated Goods, Heterogeneous Expectations And A Cost Function Including Emission Costs," Scientific Bulletin - Economic Sciences, University of Pitesti, volume 16, issue 1, pages 11-22.
• David Gill & Victoria Prowse, 2017, "Strategic complexity and the value of thinking," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1296, Aug.
• Yaroslav Rosokha & Julian Romero, 2017, "The Evolution of Cooperation: The Role of Costly Strategy Adjustments," Purdue University Economics Working Papers, Purdue University, Department of Economics, number 1300, Jul.
• Aurélie Bonein & Stéphane Turolla, 2017, "Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment," Working Papers SMART, INRAE UMR SMART, number 17-12.
• Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2017, "Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 17, Mar.
• Breitmoser, Yves, 2017, "Knowing Me, Imagining You:," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 36, Jun.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2017, "Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 50, Oct.
• Schwarz, Marco A., 2017, "The Impact of Social Media On Belief Formation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 57, Nov.
• George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2017, "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," 2017 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 89.
• Michelle Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2017, "Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2017-13, Nov.
• Klaus B. Beckmann, 2017, "Bounded rationality in differential games," Working Paper, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, number 178/2017, Dec.
• Leonardo Becchetti & Maurizio Fiaschetti & Francesco Salustri, 2017, "The Impact of Cash Mobs in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 401, Apr, revised 18 Apr 2017.
• Eloisa Campioni & Vittorio Larocca & Loredana Mirra & Luca Panaccione, 2017, "Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 402, Apr, revised 07 Jul 2017.
• Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2017, "Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 201702, Feb.
• Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2017, "Perfect Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 201703, Feb.
• Jan Kersting & Vicki Duscha & Matthias Weitzel, 2017, "Cooperation on Climate Change under Economic Linkages: How the Inclusion of Macroeconomic Effects Affects Stability of a Global Climate Coalition," The Energy Journal, , volume 38, issue 4, pages 19-42, July, DOI: 10.5547/01956574.38.4.jker.
• Alessandro Moro, 2017, "Distribution dynamics of property crime rates in the United States," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, volume 54, issue 11, pages 2613-2630, August, DOI: 10.1177/0042098016652535.
• David Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & J. Philipp Reiss, 2017, "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp17-04, Feb.
• Eungik Lee, 2017, "Strategic Interactions on Networks: An Experimental Approach," Working Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University, number no95, Feb.
• Luca Grilli & Michele Bisceglia, 2017, "A differential game in a duopoly with instantaneous incentives," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 40, issue 1, pages 317-333, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-017-0189-5.
• Giovanni Paolo Crespi & Davide Radi & Matteo Rocca, 2017, "Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 40, issue 1, pages 177-198, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-017-0199-3.
• Jean Paul Rabanal, 2017, "On the Evolution of Continuous Types Under Replicator and Gradient Dynamics: Two Examples," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 1, pages 76-92, March, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0164-0.
• Arieh Gavious & Ella Segev, 2017, "Price Discrimination Based on Buyers’ Purchase History," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 2, pages 229-265, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0179-6.
• Ratul Lahkar, 2017, "Large Population Aggregative Potential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 443-467, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0190-6.
• Reinhard Ullrich, 2017, "The Continuous Time Infection–Immunization Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 492-506, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0191-5.
• Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017, "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 360-385, September, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z.
• Gilles Grandjean & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2017, "Strongly rational sets for normal-form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 1, pages 35-46, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0095-y.
• Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017, "Disclosure of endogenous information," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 1, pages 47-56, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0099-7.
• Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Nick Netzer, 2017, "On the convergence of logit-response to (strict) Nash equilibria," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 1, pages 1-8, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0104-1.
• Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Nicolas Treich, 2017, "Risky rents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 2, pages 151-164, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0109-9.
• Philippe Bich & Rida Laraki, 2017, "Externalities in economies with endogenous sharing rules," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 5, issue 2, pages 127-137, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3.
• Hiroaki Hayakawa, 2017, "The tragedy of the commons: the logic of entry and the dynamic process under two scenarios," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, volume 7, issue 3, pages 311-328, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40822-017-0076-y.
• Tomas Björk & Mariana Khapko & Agatha Murgoci, 2017, "On time-inconsistent stochastic control in continuous time," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 21, issue 2, pages 331-360, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-017-0327-5.
• Michail Anthropelos & Constantinos Kardaras, 2017, "Equilibrium in risk-sharing games," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 21, issue 3, pages 815-865, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-017-0323-9.
• Kjell Hausken & Mthuli Ncube, 2017, "Policy makers, the international community and the population in the prevention and treatment of diseases: case study on HIV/AIDS," Health Economics Review, Springer, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-12, December, DOI: 10.1186/s13561-016-0139-x.
• Andree Ehlert & Thomas Wein & Peter Zweifel, 2017, "Overcoming resistance against managed care – insights from a bargaining model," Health Economics Review, Springer, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-15, December, DOI: 10.1186/s13561-017-0156-4.
• Siegfried K. Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Charlotte Klempt & Kerstin Pull, 2017, "Assessing Mental Models via Recording Decision Deliberations of Pairs," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 34, issue 2, pages 97-115, November, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-017-0051-6.
• Ken Binmore, 2017, "On the Foundations of Decision Theory," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, volume 34, issue 4, pages 259-273, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41412-017-0056-1.
• Ulrike Kornek & Jan Christoph Steckel & Kai Lessmann & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2017, "The climate rent curse: new challenges for burden sharing," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, volume 17, issue 6, pages 855-882, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-017-9352-2.
• Kaushik Basu, 2017, "The globe and the circle," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 52, issue 1, pages 93-101, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-017-0007-6.
• Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Guido Voigt, 2017, "Strategic risk in supply chain contract design," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 87, issue 1, pages 125-153, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-015-0790-4.
• Johanna Jauernig & Matthias Uhl & Christoph Luetge, 2017, "Voluntary agreements between competitors: trick or truth?," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 87, issue 9, pages 1173-1191, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-017-0862-8.
• Volker Benndorf & Claudia Moellers & Hans-Theo Normann, 2017, "Experienced vs. inexperienced participants in the lab: do they behave differently?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 3, issue 1, pages 12-25, July, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0036-z.
• Brent J. Davis & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Regine Oexl, 2017, "Is reciprocity really outcome-based? A second look at gift-exchange with random shocks," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 3, issue 2, pages 149-160, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0041-2.
• Peter J. Hammond, 2017, "Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 1, pages 1-50, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0970-7.
• James C. D. Fisher & John Wooders, 2017, "Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 1, pages 211-231, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1013-0.
• Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017, "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 2, pages 407-430, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0.
• Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017, "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 2, pages 347-386, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z.
• Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2017, "The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 63, issue 4, pages 925-942, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3.
• Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017, "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 2, pages 239-264, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0983-2.
• John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017, "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 2, pages 265-304, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0998-8.
• Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017, "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 3, pages 449-475, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0990-3.
• Bahar Leventoğlu, 2017, "Bargaining with habit formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 64, issue 3, pages 477-508, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z.
• Weijun Zeng & Minqiang Li & Nan Feng, 2017, "The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 27, issue 3, pages 435-459, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-016-0489-x.
• Akio Matsumoto & Ugo Merlone & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2017, "Extended oligopolies with contingent workforce," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 27, issue 5, pages 989-1005, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0500-1.
• Gian Italo Bischi & Ugo Merlone, 2017, "Evolutionary minority games with memory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 27, issue 5, pages 859-875, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0526-4.
• Gilad Bavly, 2017, "Uncertainty in the traveler’s dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 1-12, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0508-4.
• Ezra Einy & Mridu Prabal Goswami & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2017, "Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 79-102, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0524-4.
• Chih Chang & Cheng-Cheng Hu, 2017, "A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 1, pages 185-204, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7.
• Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017, "Characterizations of perfect recall," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 2, pages 311-326, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0534-x.
• Pablo Brañas-Garza & Debrah Meloso & Luis Miller, 2017, "Strategic risk and response time across games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 2, pages 511-523, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0541-y.
• Fabrizio Germano & Peio Zuazo-Garin, 2017, "Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 595-629, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0547-5.
• Ilan Kremer & Zvi Wiener & Eyal Winter, 2017, "Flow auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 3, pages 655-665, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3.
• Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal, 2017, "Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot–Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 4, pages 975-990, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0566-x.
• Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2017, "Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 4, pages 1015-1036, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0568-8.
• Edward Cartwright & Anna Stepanova, 2017, "Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 46, issue 4, pages 1163-1191, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1.
• David Cantala & Juan Sebastián Pereyra, 2017, "Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 1, pages 49-63, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017, "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 3, pages 163-175, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0203-y.
• Makoto Shimoji, 2017, "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 4, pages 231-252, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z.
• Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2017, "The miracle of peer review and development in science: an agent-based model," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, volume 113, issue 1, pages 587-607, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11192-017-2244-y.
• Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017, "On the effect of taxation in the online sports betting market," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 145-175, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-017-0156-y.
• Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017, "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 49, issue 1, pages 65-87, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1051-y.
• E. Gutiérrez & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano & M. A. Mosquera, 2017, "Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, volume 25, issue 2, pages 394-401, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3.
• Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017, "An Evolutionary approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, number 0517, Sep, revised Sep 2017.
• Alex Dickson, 2017, "Multiple-aggregate games," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics, number 1701, Feb.
• Marco Faravelli & Kenan Kalayci & Carlos Pimienta, 2017, "Costly Voting: A Large-scale Real Effort Experiment," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2017-16, Aug.
• Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017, "Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 24, issue 3, pages 318-343, July, DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2017.1335425.
• , & ,, 2017, "Bayesian games with a continuum of states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Iijima, Ryota & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2017, "Social distance and network structures," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 2, May.
• Barron, Daniel, 2017, "Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017, "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Bich, Philippe & Laraki, Rida, 2017, "On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017, "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Hefti, Andreas, 2017, "Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Farinha Luz, Vitor, 2017, "Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017, "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 2, May.
• Engwerda, Jacob, 2017, "Stabilization of an Uncertain Simple Fishery Management Game," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2017-031.
• Petropoulos, G. & Willems, Bert, 2017, "Providing Efficient Network Access to Green Power Generators : A Long-term Property Rights Perspective," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2017-010.
• Petropoulos, G. & Willems, Bert, 2017, "Providing Efficient Network Access to Green Power Generators : A Long-term Property Rights Perspective," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center, number 2017-007.
• Petropoulos, G. & Willems, Bert, 2017, "Providing Efficient Network Access to Green Power Generators : A Long-term Property Rights Perspective," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6d7117f0-0893-4db9-a668-c.
• Ismayilov, H. & Potters, Jan, 2017, "Elicited vs. voluntary promises," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7e354b03-0fa0-4303-8a40-1.
• Petropoulos, G. & Willems, Bert, 2017, "Providing Efficient Network Access to Green Power Generators : A Long-term Property Rights Perspective," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number f70cf82e-fedd-4e68-8e8f-a.
• Yutaka Kayaba & Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2017, "Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1056, Jul.
• Finn Christensen, 2017, "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for a Unique Maximum with an Application to Potential Games," Working Papers, Towson University, Department of Economics, number 2017-04, Aug, revised Oct 2017.
• Feicht, Robert & Grimm, Veronika & Rau, Holger A. & Stephan, Gesine, 2017, "On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 175-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004.
• Rosato, Antonio, 2017, "Sequential negotiations with loss-averse buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, pages 290-304, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.11.003.
• Fehr, Dietmar, 2017, "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 106-122, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.006.
• Grandjean, Gilles & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017, "Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 90-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.007.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 84-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.012.
• Dickinson, David L. & McElroy, Todd, 2017, "Sleep restriction and circadian effects on social decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 57-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.05.002.
• Heinz, Matthias & Schumacher, Heiner, 2017, "Signaling cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 199-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.017.
• Stracke, Rudi & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sunde, Uwe, 2017, "Coping with complexity – Experimental evidence for narrow bracketing in multi-stage contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 264-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.001.
• Julien, Ludovic A., 2017, "On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader–follower game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 256, issue 2, pages 650-662, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.06.070.
• Taheri, S. Saeid & Kazempour, Jalal & Seyedshenava, Seyedjalal, 2017, "Transmission expansion in an oligopoly considering generation investment equilibrium," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 55-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.03.003.
• AlKathiri, Nader & Al-Rashed, Yazeed & Doshi, Tilak K. & Murphy, Frederic H., 2017, "“Asian premium” or “North Atlantic discount”: Does geographical diversification in oil trade always impose costs?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 411-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.07.005.
• Baltensperger, Tobias & Füchslin, Rudolf M. & Krütli, Pius & Lygeros, John, 2017, "European Union gas market development," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 466-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.07.002.
• Fosu, Samuel & Ntim, Collins G. & Coffie, William & Murinde, Victor, 2017, "Bank opacity and risk-taking: Evidence from analysts’ forecasts," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, volume 33, issue C, pages 81-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.10.009.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 23-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Acharya, Avidit & Meirowitz, Adam, 2017, "Sincere voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 121-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010.
• Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2017, "Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 218-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.001.
• Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 234-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2017, "Reciprocity networks and the participation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 260-272, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.006.
• Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017, "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 6-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002.
• Echenique, Federico & Galichon, Alfred, 2017, "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 63-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002.
• Kimya, Mert, 2017, "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 138-146, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003.
• Hong, Fuhai & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2017, "The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 255-268, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.009.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 269-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008.
• Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Sorensen, Andrea & Walker, James & Williams, Arlington, 2017, "An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 286-302, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.004.
• Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M., 2017, "An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 303-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.002.
• Bhattacharya, Sourav & Duffy, John & Kim, SunTak, 2017, "Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 316-338, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005.
• Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017, "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 339-372, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.007.
• Stauber, Ronald, 2017, "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 409-432, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010.
• Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017, "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 462-476, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005.
• Sobel, Joel, 2017, "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 477-486, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008.
• Leo, Greg, 2017, "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 525-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003.
• Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017, "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 548-561, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010.
• Vong, Allen I.K., 2017, "Strategic manipulation in tournament games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 562-567, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.011.
• Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries & Zseleva, Anna, 2017, "Zero-sum games with charges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 666-686, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.014.
• Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017, "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 687-699, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 116-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.003.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2017, "A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 185-198, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.006.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017, "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 19-29, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.005.
• Bravo, Mario & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, 2017, "On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 41-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.004.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017, "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 67-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007.
• Ding, Tingting & Schotter, Andrew, 2017, "Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 94-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004.
• Martin, Daniel, 2017, "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 131-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007.
• Bjorndahl, A. & Halpern, J.Y. & Pass, R., 2017, "Reasoning about rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 146-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.006.
• Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017, "The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 165-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.004.
• Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017, "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 241-251, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002.
• Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 293-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006.
• Perea, Andrés & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 309-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.009.
• Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017, "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 329-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.010.
• Kim, Semin, 2017, "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 350-371, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012.
• Arieli, Itai, 2017, "Payoff externalities and social learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 392-410, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.005.
• Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kim, Sang-Hyun, 2017, "“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 486-493, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012.
• Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2017, "Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 563-567, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.003.
• Leduc, Matt V. & Jackson, Matthew O. & Johari, Ramesh, 2017, "Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 568-594, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.011.
• Kuzmics, Christoph, 2017, "Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 666-673, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.012.
• Brandl, Florian, 2017, "The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 674-680, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.017.
• Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Müller, Daniel & Strack, Philipp, 2017, "Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 681-705, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.010.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 744-759, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2017, "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 195-211, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.003.
• Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 212-229, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008.
• Cerdeiro, Diego A., 2017, "Contagion exposure and protection technology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 230-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.007.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017, "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 297-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009.
• Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2017, "Peer effects and local congestion in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 40-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.015.
• Demange, Gabrielle, 2017, "Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 84-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.004.
• Marden, Jason R., 2017, "Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 114-133, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.007.
• Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017, "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 161-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.012.
• Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin, 2017, "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 239-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.009.
• Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Woods, Daniel, 2017, "Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 277-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.012.
• Allouch, Nizar, 2017, "The cost of segregation in (social) networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 329-342, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.012.
• Gauer, F. & Hellmann, T., 2017, "Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 51-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.011.
• Seel, Christian & Tsakas, Elias, 2017, "Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 75-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013.
• Bo, PingJing & Manduchi, Agostino, 2017, "Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue C, pages 54-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.08.003.
• Moraga-González, José Luis & Sándor, Zsolt & Wildenbeest, Matthijs R., 2017, "Nonsequential search equilibrium with search cost heterogeneity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 392-414, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.009.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Club good intermediaries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 430-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007.
• Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Shaffer, Greg, 2017, "Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 460-472, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.03.002.
• Liu, Xuyuan & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 57-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.10.004.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 58-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002.
• Zhang, Jingong & Tan, Ken Seng & Weng, Chengguo, 2017, "Optimal hedging with basis risk under mean–variance criterion," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.03.008.
• Brown, Alasdair & Chowdhury, Subhasish M., 2017, "The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 273-284, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.009.
• Sharma, Priyanka, 2017, "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 269-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.002.
• Iriberri, Nagore & Rey-Biel, Pedro, 2017, "Stereotypes are only a threat when beliefs are reinforced: On the sensitivity of gender differences in performance under competition to information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 99-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.012.
• Xiao, Erte, 2017, "Justification and conformity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 15-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.015.
• Chakrabarti, Anindya S. & Lahkar, Ratul, 2017, "Productivity dispersion and output fluctuations: An evolutionary model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 339-360, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.025.
• Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2017, "Deception and reception: The behavior of information providers and users," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 445-456, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.019.
• Lahkar, Ratul, 2017, "Equilibrium selection in the stag hunt game under generalized reinforcement learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 63-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.012.
• Jindapon, Paan & Yang, Zhe, 2017, "Risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 69-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.011.
• Chung, Keunsuk & Lee, Dongryul, 2017, "Inefficient competition in shadow-education investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 152-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.007.