Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2021

• Kendall, Ryan, 2021, "Sequential competitions with a middle-mover advantage," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101667.
• Siebert, Jan & Yang, Guanzhong, 2021, "Coordination problems triggered by sunspots in the laboratory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101741.
• McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B., 2021, "Does Playing Against An Error Prone Opponent Influence Learning in Nim?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2021.101763.
• Tatsushi Okuda & Tomohiro Tsuruga & Francesco Zanetti, 2021, "Imperfect information, heterogeneous demand shocks, and inflation dynamics," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2021-29, Mar.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021, "Strategic interpretations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 108660, Mar.
• Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021, "Designing Interrogations," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 2021-02.
• Dominik Boniecki & Elzbieta Marciszewska, 2021, "Non-Cooperative Game Theory in Measuring Strategic Interactions between Airline Joint-Venture Alliances," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, volume 0, issue 2 - Part , pages 152-164.
• Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2021, "Pendular Voting," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 21/350, May.
• Jan Libich & Martin Machacek & Dat Thanh Nguyen, 2021, "Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, volume 71, issue 4, pages 282-305, December.
• Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2021.09, Apr.
• Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2021.32, Dec.
• Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2021, "The Effect of Access to Clean Technology on Pollution Reduction: an Experiment," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_01_01, Jan.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2021, "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_07_01, Mar.
• Luke A. Boosey & Christopher Brown, 2021, "Contests with Network Externalities: Theory & Evidence," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_07_02, Jul.
• Uwe Dulleck & Andreas Löffler, 2021, "μ – σ Games," Games, MDPI, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-12, January.
• Sémirat, S. & Forges, F., 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2021-03.
• Boucekkine, R. & Fabbri, G. & Federico, S. & Gozzi, F., 2021, "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2021-04.
• Francesco Carbonero & Jeremy Davies & Ekkehard Ernst & Sayantan Ghosal & Leaza McSorley, 2021, "Anxiety, Expectations Stabilization and Intertemporal Markets: Theory, Evidence and Policy," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2021_12, Jun.
• Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2021, "An Experiment on the Nash Program: Comparing two Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2021-07, Feb.
• Michael Finus & Francesco Furini & Anna Viktoria Rohrer, 2021, "The Efficacy of International Environmental Agreements when Adaptation Matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg Leadership," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2021-04, Apr.
• Michael Finus & Francesco Furini & Anna Viktoria Rohrer, 2021, "International Environmental Agreements and the Paradox of Cooperation: Revisiting and Generalizing Some Previous Results," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2021-05, May.
• Christos A Ioannou & Miltiadis Makris & Carmine Ornaghi, 2021, "R&D Productivity And The Nexus Between Product Substitutability And Innovation: Theory And Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-03525445, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.027.

2020

• Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2020, "Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526.
• Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805.
• Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2020, "Centralized versus decentralized contests with risk-averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108816.
• Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2020, "Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108931.
• Eichenseer, Michael & Moser, Johannes, 2020, "Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108941.
• Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020, "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962.
• Yoon, Kiho, 2020, "Implementability with contingent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108966.
• Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020, "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000.
• Amorós, Pablo, 2020, "Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068.
• Chen, Bo, 2020, "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122.
• Chugunova, Marina & Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2020, "When to leave carrots for sticks: On the evolution of sanctioning institutions in open communities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109155.
• Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020, "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164.
• Jelnov, Artyom & Klunover, Doron, 2020, "When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, David, 2020, "Task arrangement in team competitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109329.
• Ao, Wallice & Wu, Jiabin, 2020, "The silent majority?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109350.
• Klunover, Doron & Morgan, John, 2020, "Contests with a constrained choice set of effort," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2020, "Finite blockchain games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109614.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020, "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2020, "Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616.
• Jiao, Qian & Xu, Jin, 2020, "Competition for networked agents in the lottery Blotto game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109644.
• Harri, Ardian & Zhllima, Edvin & Imami, Drini & Coatney, Kalyn T., 2020, "Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania," Economic Systems, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2020.100783.
• Karaivanov, Alexander & Xing, Xiaochuan & Xue, Yi, 2020, "Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103353.
• Boucher, Vincent, 2020, "Equilibrium homophily in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103370.
• Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020, "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103408.
• Avoyan, Ala & Schotter, Andrew, 2020, "Attention in games: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103410.
• Kornek, Ulrike & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2020, "The strategic dimension of financing global public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103423.
• Isoni, Andrea & Sugden, Robert & Zheng, Jiwei, 2020, "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428.
• Wu, Jiemai, 2020, "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103454.
• Duersch, Peter & Lambrecht, Marco & Oechssler, Joerg, 2020, "Measuring skill and chance in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103472.
• Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020, "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103519.
• Freeman, David J. & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2020, "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103543.
• Sugden, Robert & Wang, Mengjie, 2020, "Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103597.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2020, "Sanctions in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103606.
• Gil-Moltó, Maria José & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Rodrigues-Neto, José A. & Zikos, Vasileios, 2020, "Mixed oligopoly, cost-reducing research and development, and privatisation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 283, issue 3, pages 1094-1106, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.071.
• Fandel, Günter & Trockel, Jan, 2020, "Job Allocation and Profits in Service Production," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 287, issue 3, pages 1052-1061, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.055.
• He, Qiao-Chu & Yang, Yun & Bai, Lingquan & Zhang, Baosen, 2020, "Smart energy storage management via information systems design," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104542.
• Hesamzadeh, M.R. & Biggar, D.R. & Bunn, D.W. & Moiseeva, E., 2020, "The impact of generator market power on the electricity hedge market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104649.
• Fuentes González, Fabián & van der Weijde, Adriaan Hendrik & Sauma, Enzo, 2020, "The promotion of community energy projects in Chile and Scotland: An economic approach using biform games," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104677.
• Fernández, Mauricio & Muñoz, Francisco D. & Moreno, Rodrigo, 2020, "Analysis of imperfect competition in natural gas supply contracts for electric power generation: A closed-loop approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104717.
• Petropoulos, Georgios & Willems, Bert, 2020, "Long-term transmission rights and dynamic efficiency," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104714.
• Sobhani, Seyed Omid & Sheykhha, Siamak & Madlener, Reinhard, 2020, "An integrated two-level demand-side management game applied to smart energy hubs with storage," Energy, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2020.118017.
• Zhou, Deqing, 2020, "Strategic trading with transaction cost in the long run," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 32, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.12.035.
• Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020, "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2020, "Entry-deterring agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 172-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.012.
• Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020, "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 197-215, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.001.
• He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin, 2020, "Compromise and coordination: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 216-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003.
• Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu, 2020, "Perfect and proper equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 288-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005.
• Grech, Philip D. & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020, "Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 309-338, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.004.
• Solan, Eilon & Solan, Omri N. & Solan, Ron, 2020, "Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 383-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.008.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.001.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020, "The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 132-143, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.009.
• Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2020, "Weak belief and permissibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 154-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007.
• Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020, "Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 193-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003.
• Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2020, "Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 225-245, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008.
• Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020, "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 257-288, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico, 2020, "Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 28-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.005.
• García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020, "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 391-433, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.007.
• Sun, Ching-jen, 2020, "A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 86-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.004.
• Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020, "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 96-120, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.011.
• Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020, "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 329-367, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004.
• Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2020, "Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 368-381, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.002.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio, 2020, "Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 533-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.009.
• Michaeli, Moti, 2020, "Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 90-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002.
• Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid, 2020, "Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 150-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.006.
• Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020, "A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 240-255, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.012.
• Talamàs, Eduard & Vohra, Rakesh, 2020, "Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 277-289, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.001.
• Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Julien, Ludovic, 2020, "Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 318-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004.
• Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A., 2020, "On self-serving strategic beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 341-353, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016.
• Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2020, "Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 370-390, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.003.
• Leister, C. Matthew, 2020, "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 453-475, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.006.
• Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020, "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 83-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.004.
• Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena, 2020, "Fictitious play in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 182-206, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.006.
• DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura K., 2020, "Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 210-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.004.
• Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020, "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 240-271, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.008.
• Li, Chen & Turmunkh, Uyanga & Wakker, Peter P., 2020, "Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 272-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.007.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2020, "Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 288-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009.
• Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020, "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 327-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009.
• Bilò, Vittorio & Flammini, Michele & Moscardelli, Luca, 2020, "The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 359-376, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.010.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan, 2020, "Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 68-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.004.
• Song, Yangbo & Zhang, Jiahua, 2020, "Social learning with coordination motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 81-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.002.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020, "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 105-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.015.
• Shafer, Rachel C., 2020, "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 281-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020, "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 386-405, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014.
• Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2020, "Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 534-553, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.008.
• Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020, "Framing and repeated competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 604-619, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.002.
• Friedman, Evan, 2020, "Endogenous quantal response equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 620-643, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.003.
• Chen, Yin & Dang, Chuangyin, 2020, "An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 659-670, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023.
• García-Pola, Bernardo, 2020, "Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 82-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.013.
• Funaki, Yukihiko & Shino, Junnosuke & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2020, "Vulnerability of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations to overbidding: An experimental approach," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, volume 46, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2019.100489.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102623.
• Li, Yanhai, 2020, "Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102624.
• Heinsalu, Sander, 2020, "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102660.
• Grossmann, Martin & Hottiger, Dieter, 2020, "Liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102658.
• Lake, James & Nken, Moïse & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2020, "Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.103279.
• Bensalem, Sarah & Santibáñez, Nicolás Hernández & Kazi-Tani, Nabil, 2020, "Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 369-386, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.05.006.
• Elten, Jonas van & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2020, "Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 158-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.006.
• Brünner, Tobias, 2020, "Self-selection with non-equilibrium beliefs: Predicting behavior in a tournament experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 389-396, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.028.
• Okada, Akira, 2020, "The cultural transmission of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 53-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.025.
• Alcocer, Christian Diego & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Shupp, Robert, 2020, "Naive and sophisticated mixing: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 157-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.002.
• Liu, Jia & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Zhang, Ruike, 2020, "Firing the right bullets: Exploring the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism in the provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 222-243, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.007.
• Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2020, "Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 244-267, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.006.
• Zylbersztejn, Adam & Babutsidze, Zakaria & Hanaki, Nobuyuki, 2020, "Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 268-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.009.
• van der Weele, Joël J. & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2020, "Bracelets of pride and guilt? An experimental test of self-signaling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 280-291, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.001.
• Miettinen, Topi & Kosfeld, Michael & Fehr, Ernst & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020, "Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 1-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.018.
• Chan, Nathan W. & Wolk, Leonard, 2020, "Cost-effective giving with multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 130-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.011.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2020, "Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 150-172, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.035.
• Dawid, Herbert & Hellmann, Tim, 2020, "R&D investments under endogenous cluster formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 253-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.039.
• Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020, "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 38-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.014.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2020, "Why should majority voting be unfair?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 281-295, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.015.
• Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020, "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 314-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.023.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Garagnani, Michele, 2020, "The cognitive foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 71-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.019.
• Tolotti, Marco & Yepez, Jorge, 2020, "Hotelling-Bertrand duopoly competition under firm-specific network effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 105-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.004.
• Grabiszewski, Konrad & Horenstein, Alex, 2020, "Effort is not a monotonic function of skills: Results from a global mobile experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 634-652, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.011.
• Calford, Evan M., 2020, "Uncertainty aversion in game theory: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 720-734, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.011.
• Mauleon, Ana & Schopohl, Simon & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020, "Competition for leadership in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 19-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.026.
• Feldhaus, Christoph & Rockenbach, Bettina & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2020, "Inequality in minimum-effort coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 341-370, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.009.
• Send, Jonas, 2020, "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 858-874, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.009.
• Lejarraga, Tomás & Lucena, Abel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2020, "Beliefs estimated from choices in Proposer-Responder Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 442-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.017.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020, "Iterative dominance in young children: Experimental evidence in simple two-person games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 623-637, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.006.
• Alan, Sule & Ertac, Seda & Gumren, Mert, 2020, "Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 681-701, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.015.
• Andreoni, James & Di Girolamo, Amalia & List, John A. & Mackevicius, Claire & Samek, Anya, 2020, "Risk preferences of children and adolescents in relation to gender, cognitive skills, soft skills, and executive functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 729-742, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.002.
• Bruhin, Adrian & Janizzi, Kelly & Thöni, Christian, 2020, "Uncovering the heterogeneity behind cross-cultural variation in antisocial punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 291-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.005.
• Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian, 2020, "Information about average evaluations spurs cooperation: An experiment on noisy reputation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 334-356, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.014.
• Jindani, Sam, 2020, "Community enforcement using modal actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104972.
• Bochet, Olivier & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2020, "Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104952.
• Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2020, "Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957.
• Bobkova, Nina, 2020, "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104975.
• Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020, "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105002.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2020, "Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105015.
• Osawa, Minoru & Akamatsu, Takashi, 2020, "Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105025.
• Mensch, Jeffrey, 2020, "On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105026.
• Kim, Jinwoo & Koh, Youngwoo, 2020, "Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105029.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
• Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020, "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068.
• Galperti, Simone & Trevino, Isabel, 2020, "Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105039.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2020, "Network formation with multigraphs and strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105033.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel Y., 2020, "The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020, "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105065.
• Müller, Christoph, 2020, "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038.
• Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020, "Order on types based on monotone comparative statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105082.
• Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2020, "The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105083.
• Alaoui, Larbi & Janezic, Katharina A. & Penta, Antonio, 2020, "Reasoning about others' reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105091.
• Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl H., 2020, "Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105092.
• Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020, "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105106.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020, "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105116.
• Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2020, "A game of hide and seek in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119.
• March, Christoph & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 2020, "Altruistic observational learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105123.
• Boyer, Pierre C. & Kempf, Hubert, 2020, "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 41, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2017.09.002.
• Schniter, E. & Shields, T.W. & Sznycer, D., 2020, "Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102253.
• Crosetto, Paolo & Filippin, Antonio & Katuščák, Peter & Smith, John, 2020, "Central tendency bias in belief elicitation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102273.
• Barr, Abigail & Miller, Luis, 2020, "The effect of education, income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102276.
• Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2020, "Why is dishonesty difficult to mitigate? The interaction between descriptive norm and monetary incentive," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102292.
• Ingene, Charles A. & Parry, Mark E. & Xu, Zibin, 2020, "Resale Price Maintenance: Customer Service Without Free Riding," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, volume 96, issue 4, pages 563-577, DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2020.05.001.
• Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020, "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, pages 42-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.003.
• Kashyap, Ravi, 2020, "David vs Goliath (You against the Markets), A dynamic programming approach to separate the impact and timing of trading costs," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, volume 545, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.122848.
• Grepperud, Sverre & Pedersen, Pål Andreas, 2020, "Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101853.
• Cordella, Tito & Onder, Harun, 2020, "Sharing oil rents and political violence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101882.
• Crutzen, Benoît S Y & Flamand, Sabine & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020, "A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109.
• Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020, "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2020.107205.
• Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020, "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2019.101122.
• Mao, Liang, 2020, "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101167.
• Guzmán, Ricardo & Harrison, Rodrigo & Abarca, Nureya & Villena, Mauricio G., 2020, "A game-theoretic model of reciprocity and trust that incorporates personality traits," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101497.
• Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2020, "Direct response and the strategy method in an experimental cheap talk game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101498.
• Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R. & Norton, Douglas & Stinn, Joseph, 2020, "Cooperation, contributor types, and control questions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101489.
• Butz, Britta & Harbring, Christine, 2020, "Donations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101510.
• Barron, Kai & Nurminen, Tuomas, 2020, "Nudging cooperation in public goods provision," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101542.
• Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020, "Open Rule Legislative Bargaining," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 20/346, Nov.
• Gerard Domènech i Gironell, 2020, "Introducing media in a model of electoral competition with candidate quality," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2020/401.
• Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Christian Zimmermann, 2020, "Collaboration in Bipartite Networks, with an Application to Coauthorship Networks," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, number 2020-030, Aug, DOI: 10.20955/wp.2020.030.
• Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020, "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/06, Jul.
• Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020, "Trouble Comes in Threes: Core stability in Minimum Cost Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/07, Jul.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Trine Tornøe Platz, 2020, "Decentralized Task Coordination," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/11, Oct.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2020, "Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/14, Dec, revised 09 Feb 2021.
• Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "Entry in group contests," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2020_02_01, Feb.
• Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2020_07_01, Jul.