IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v87y2021ics0167487021000520.html

What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game

Author

Listed:
  • Crosetto, Paolo
  • Güth, Werner

Abstract

Studies on the intuitive or deliberate nature of human actions often use time constraints for identification, assuming that constrained individuals fall back to intuitive behavior. This identification strategy disregards individual heterogeneity and self-priming, i.e. the behavioral rule that subjects can form during the instructions phase, and then apply irrespective of the time constraint. We use respondent data from an impunity game as an example of how subject heterogeneity can drive results. 24 respondents face 240 more or less unfair allocation proposals out of a small or large pie and can accept or reject the offer. Upon rejection respondents burn their own money, but not the proposer’s. Respondents decisions are communicated to the proposer. On average, emotional rejections take longer than deliberate acceptances. Including individual heterogeneity, though, we find that subjects who mostly accept (reject) take more time to reject (accept). Faster decisions are the ones conforming with the modal early reaction. We attribute this finding to heterogeneity in self-priming. Since self-priming is orthogonal to time constraints, it has the capacity to invalidate their use in the identification of dual decision modes.

Suggested Citation

  • Crosetto, Paolo & Güth, Werner, 2021. "What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:87:y:2021:i:c:s0167487021000520
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102419
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487021000520
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102419?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonidas Spiliopoulos & Andreas Ortmann, 2018. "The BCD of response time analysis in experimental economics," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 383-433, June.
    2. Capraro, Valerio, 2017. "Does the truth come naturally? Time pressure increases honesty in one-shot deception games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 54-57.
    3. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 171-198.
    4. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    5. Ian Krajbich & Björn Bartling & Todd Hare & Ernst Fehr, 2015. "Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 6(1), pages 1-9, November.
    6. Ben Greiner, 2015. "Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 114-125, July.
    7. Sutter, Matthias & Kocher, Martin & Strau[ss], Sabine, 2003. "Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 341-347, December.
    8. Ryan O. Murphy & Kurt A. Ackerman & Michel J. J. Handgraaf, 2011. "Measuring social value orientation," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 6(8), pages 771-781, December.
    9. Yi Yang Teoh & Ziqing Yao & William A. Cunningham & Cendri A. Hutcherson, 2020. "Attentional priorities drive effects of time pressure on altruistic choice," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 11(1), pages 1-13, December.
    10. Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami, 1995. "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-121, July.
    11. Amanda Kvarven & Eirik Strømland & Conny Wollbrant & David Andersson & Magnus Johannesson & Gustav Tinghög & Daniel Västfjäll & Kristian Ove R. Myrseth, 2020. "The intuitive cooperation hypothesis revisited: a meta-analytic examination of effect size and between-study heterogeneity," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 26-42, June.
    12. Hanna Fromell & Daniele Nosenzo & Trudy Owens, 2020. "Altruism, fast and slow? Evidence from a meta-analysis and a new experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 979-1001, December.
    13. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 113-115, May.
    14. Neo, Wei Siong & Yu, Michael & Weber, Roberto A. & Gonzalez, Cleotilde, 2013. "The effects of time delay in reciprocity games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 20-35.
    15. Cappelletti, Dominique & Güth, Werner & Ploner, Matteo, 2011. "Being of two minds: Ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 940-950.
    16. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Garagnani, Michele, 2020. "The cognitive foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 71-85.
    17. Eamonn Ferguson & John Maltby & Peter A Bibby & Claire Lawrence, 2014. "Fast to Forgive, Slow to Retaliate: Intuitive Responses in the Ultimatum Game Depend on the Degree of Unfairness," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(5), pages 1-8, May.
    18. Paolo Crosetto & Ori Weisel & Fabian Winter, 2012. "A flexible z-Tree implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy et al. 2011) - Manual -," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-062, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    19. David G. Rand & Alexander Peysakhovich & Gordon T. Kraft-Todd & George E. Newman & Owen Wurzbacher & Martin A. Nowak & Joshua D. Greene, 2014. "Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 5(1), pages 1-12, May.
    20. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    21. Gustav Tinghög & David Andersson & Caroline Bonn & Harald Böttiger & Camilla Josephson & Gustaf Lundgren & Daniel Västfjäll & Michael Kirchler & Magnus Johannesson, 2013. "Intuition and cooperation reconsidered," Nature, Nature, vol. 498(7452), pages 1-2, June.
    22. Barrafrem, Kinga & Hausfeld, Jan, 2020. "Tracing risky decisions for oneself and others: The role of intuition and deliberation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    23. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Fehr, Ernst & Netzer, Nick, 2021. "Time Will Tell: Recovering Preferences When Choices Are Noisy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 129(6), pages 1828-1877.
    24. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    25. Crosetto, Paolo & Weisel, Ori & Winter, Fabian, 2019. "A flexible z-Tree and oTree implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 46-53.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Greiner, Ben, 2023. "Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    2. Schütze, Tobias & Spitzer, Carsten & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2025. "Nudging: An experiment on transparency, accounting for reactance and response time," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    3. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Guarnieri, Pietro & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2023. "Delaying and motivating decisions in the (Bully) dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul, 2024. "Fast Then Slow: Choice Revisions Drive a Decline in the Attraction Effect," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(6), pages 3711-3733, June.
    5. Ou Li & Yan Shi & Kuangran Li, 2025. "Red, rather than blue can promote fairness in decision-making," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mischkowski, Dorothee & Glöckner, Andreas & Lewisch, Peter, 2018. "From spontaneous cooperation to spontaneous punishment – Distinguishing the underlying motives driving spontaneous behavior in first and second order public good games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 59-72.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
    3. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Guarnieri, Pietro & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2023. "Delaying and motivating decisions in the (Bully) dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    4. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Pablo Marcos-Prieto & Chiara Nardi, 2026. "Is hostile behavior intuitive or deliberative? A Hawk-Dove experiment with a varying harshness of conflict," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2603, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    5. Leonidas Spiliopoulos & Andreas Ortmann, 2018. "The BCD of response time analysis in experimental economics," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 383-433, June.
    6. Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019. "Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Recalde, María P. & Riedl, Arno & Vesterlund, Lise, 2018. "Error-prone inference from response time: The case of intuitive generosity in public-good games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 132-147.
    8. Fadong Chen & Urs Fischbacher, 2020. "Cognitive processes underlying distributional preferences: a response time study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 421-446, June.
    9. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    10. Fadong Chen & Yingshuai Zhao & Ulrich Thonemann, 2023. "The Value of Response Time Information in Supply Chain Bargaining," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 19-35, January.
    11. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aidas Masiliunas, 2021. "Market Concentration and Incentives to Collude in Cournot Oligopoly Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 1131, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    12. Krawczyk, Michał & Sylwestrzak, Marta, 2018. "Exploring the role of deliberation time in non-selfish behavior: The double response method," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 121-134.
    13. Avoyan, Ala & He, Haoran & Lu, Kelin, 2025. "Team work under time constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    14. Vincenz Frey & Hannah N. M. Mulder & Marlijn Bekke & Marijn E. Struiksma & Jos J. A. Berkum & Vincent Buskens, 2022. "Do self-talk phrases affect behavior in ultimatum games?," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 21(1), pages 89-119, June.
    15. Achtziger, Anja & Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Wagner, Alexander K., 2018. "Social preferences and self-control," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 161-166.
    16. Chisadza, Carolyn & Nicholls, Nicky & Yitbarek, Eleni, 2021. "Group identity in fairness decisions: Discrimination or inequality aversion?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    17. Emin Karagözoglu & Martin G. Kocher, 2015. "Bargaining under Time Pressure," CESifo Working Paper Series 5685, CESifo.
    18. Greiner, Ben, 2023. "Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    19. Lohse, Tim & Simon, Sven A. & Konrad, Kai A., 2018. "Deception under time pressure: Conscious decision or a problem of awareness?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 31-42.
    20. Manja Gärtner & David Andersson & Daniel Västfjäll & Gustav Tinghög, 2022. "Affect and prosocial behavior: The role of decision mode and individual processing style," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 17(1), pages 1-13, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:87:y:2021:i:c:s0167487021000520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.