Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games
Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10Â min.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2015.
"Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 565-588, December.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Working Papers 0463, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Papers 08-06, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David Cooper & E. Dutcher, 2011. "The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 519-546, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:113-115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.