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Delaying and motivating decisions in the (Bully) dictator game

Author

Listed:
  • Bilancini, Ennio
  • Boncinelli, Leonardo
  • Guarnieri, Pietro
  • Spadoni, Lorenzo

Abstract

We investigate experimentally how decisions in the Dictator Game are affected by cognitive manipulations aimed at promoting greater reliance on deliberation. Specifically, we run an online experiment where we have 6 distinct experimental conditions resulting from the combination of 2 conditions for the Dictator Game (non-bully: the dictator is initially endowed with all the money; bully: the initial endowment is equally split), and 3 conditions for the cognitive manipulations (time delay: decisions are delayed; motivated delay: decisions are delayed and a written motivation is required; control: no manipulation). We find that the equal initial endowment leads the dictator to get less, confirming in the online setting previous evidence from the lab. Further, our findings suggest that the request to write a motivation makes subjects take less for themselves with respect to the mere request to wait some time before choosing.

Suggested Citation

  • Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Guarnieri, Pietro & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2023. "Delaying and motivating decisions in the (Bully) dictator game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323001325
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102106
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    Keywords

    Dual process; Motivation; Deliberation; Intuition; Dictator game; Bully; Social norms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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