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Allowing for reflection time does not change behavior in dictator and cheating games

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  • Andersen, Steffen
  • Gneezy, Uri
  • Kajackaite, Agne
  • Marx, Julie

Abstract

Reaction time, usually measured in seconds, has been shown to be correlated with decisions in experimental games. In this paper, we study how allowing for a full day of “reflection time” alters behavior. We compare behavior in dictator and cheating games when participants make immediate choices with behavior when participants have an extra day to decide, and find that allowing for more time does not affect behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersen, Steffen & Gneezy, Uri & Kajackaite, Agne & Marx, Julie, 2018. "Allowing for reflection time does not change behavior in dictator and cheating games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 24-33.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:145:y:2018:i:c:p:24-33
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2015. "Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 171(4), pages 565-588, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheating; Dictator; Delay; Reflection;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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