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No moral wiggles in e5 and e1,000 dictator games under ambiguity


  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo
  • Kovářík, Jaromír
  • Lopez-Martin, Maria del Carmen


This paper explores excuse-driven behavior in giving. In our powered laboratory experiment, participants play Dictator Games sharing 5e or 1,000e under certainty or ambiguity with a charity. In contrast to previous papers using MPLs {that necessarily introduce additional layers of uncertainty{our subjects participate in two DGs. We �nd no evidence that people use moral wiggles to hide their sel�shness. They share equally out of 5e under certainty and ambiguity and as much out of 1,000e under ambiguity as they do under certainty in the previous literature. These �findings raise the question whether previous results might be an artifact.

Suggested Citation

  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Kovářík, Jaromír & Lopez-Martin, Maria del Carmen, 2020. "No moral wiggles in e5 and e1,000 dictator games under ambiguity," MPRA Paper 98132, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98132

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    Giving; charity; uncertainty; ambiguity; stakes.;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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