Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2017

• David Cantala & Juan Sebastián Pereyra, 2017, "Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 1, pages 49-63, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0197-5.
• Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2017, "Simple versus rich language in disclosure games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 3, pages 163-175, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0203-y.
• Makoto Shimoji, 2017, "Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 21, issue 4, pages 231-252, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z.
• Simone Righi & Károly Takács, 2017, "The miracle of peer review and development in science: an agent-based model," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, volume 113, issue 1, pages 587-607, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11192-017-2244-y.
• Juan Vidal-Puga, 2017, "On the effect of taxation in the online sports betting market," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, volume 8, issue 2, pages 145-175, June, DOI: 10.1007/s13209-017-0156-y.
• Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017, "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 49, issue 1, pages 65-87, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1051-y.
• E. Gutiérrez & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano & M. A. Mosquera, 2017, "Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, volume 25, issue 2, pages 394-401, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3.
• Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017, "An Evolutionary approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, number 0517, Sep, revised Sep 2017.
• Alex Dickson, 2017, "Multiple-aggregate games," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics, number 1701, Feb.
• Marco Faravelli & Kenan Kalayci & Carlos Pimienta, 2017, "Costly Voting: A Large-scale Real Effort Experiment," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2017-16, Aug.
• Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017, "Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 24, issue 3, pages 318-343, July, DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2017.1335425.
• , & ,, 2017, "Bayesian games with a continuum of states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Iijima, Ryota & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2017, "Social distance and network structures," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 2, May.
• Barron, Daniel, 2017, "Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017, "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Bich, Philippe & Laraki, Rida, 2017, "On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017, "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 1, January.
• Hefti, Andreas, 2017, "Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Farinha Luz, Vitor, 2017, "Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 3, September.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017, "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 12, issue 2, May.
• Engwerda, Jacob, 2017, "Stabilization of an Uncertain Simple Fishery Management Game," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2017-031.
• Petropoulos, G. & Willems, Bert, 2017, "Providing Efficient Network Access to Green Power Generators : A Long-term Property Rights Perspective," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2017-010.
• Wolff, Irenaeus, 2017, "What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 83-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015.
• Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2017, "Exclusive contracts and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 1-3, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.021.
• March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2017, "Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 151, issue C, pages 23-27, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.032.
• Kim, Jeongsim & Kim, Bara, 2017, "An asymmetric lottery Blotto game with a possible budget surplus and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 31-35, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.029.
• Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2017, "New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 76-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009.
• Mao, Liang & Zhang, Tianyu, 2017, "A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 79-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.006.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2017, "Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 51-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.008.
• Mathews, Timothy & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2017, "A note on k-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 6-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.020.
• Ginzburg, Boris, 2017, "Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 120-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033.
• Balart, Pau & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2017, "Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 126-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.020.
• Hernández, Penélope & Martínez-Cánovas, Guillem & Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Sánchez, Angel, 2017, "Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 154-156, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.004.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2017, "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 155, issue C, pages 168-171, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.030.
• Luo, Xiaoyi, 2017, "Collective mass media bias, social media, and non-partisans," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 78-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.04.015.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2017, "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 167-170, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012.
• Wu, Zenan & Zheng, Jie, 2017, "Information sharing in private value lottery contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 36-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030.
• Gayer, Amit, 2017, "Endogenous duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 1-3, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.043.
• Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017, "A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 177-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032.
• Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 61-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.017.
• Dutta, Rohan, 2017, "Joint search with no information: An immediate agreement theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, pages 43-45, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.026.
• Meroni, Claudia, 2017, "Electoral competition with strategic voters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, pages 64-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.002.
• Iimura, Takuya & von Mouche, Pierre & Watanabe, Takahiro, 2017, "Best-response potential for Hotelling pure location games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, pages 73-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.025.
• Christensen, Finn, 2017, "A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique maximum with an application to potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 120-123, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.10.008.
• Mill, Wladislaw, 2017, "The spite motive in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 71-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028.
• Feicht, Robert & Grimm, Veronika & Rau, Holger A. & Stephan, Gesine, 2017, "On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 175-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004.
• Rosato, Antonio, 2017, "Sequential negotiations with loss-averse buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, pages 290-304, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.11.003.
• Fehr, Dietmar, 2017, "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 106-122, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.01.006.
• Grandjean, Gilles & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017, "Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 90-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.007.
• Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 84-102, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.012.
• Dickinson, David L. & McElroy, Todd, 2017, "Sleep restriction and circadian effects on social decisions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 57-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.05.002.
• Heinz, Matthias & Schumacher, Heiner, 2017, "Signaling cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 199-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.06.017.
• Stracke, Rudi & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Sunde, Uwe, 2017, "Coping with complexity – Experimental evidence for narrow bracketing in multi-stage contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 264-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.001.
• Julien, Ludovic A., 2017, "On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader–follower game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 256, issue 2, pages 650-662, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.06.070.
• Taheri, S. Saeid & Kazempour, Jalal & Seyedshenava, Seyedjalal, 2017, "Transmission expansion in an oligopoly considering generation investment equilibrium," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 55-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.03.003.
• AlKathiri, Nader & Al-Rashed, Yazeed & Doshi, Tilak K. & Murphy, Frederic H., 2017, "“Asian premium” or “North Atlantic discount”: Does geographical diversification in oil trade always impose costs?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 411-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.07.005.
• Baltensperger, Tobias & Füchslin, Rudolf M. & Krütli, Pius & Lygeros, John, 2017, "European Union gas market development," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 466-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.07.002.
• Fosu, Samuel & Ntim, Collins G. & Coffie, William & Murinde, Victor, 2017, "Bank opacity and risk-taking: Evidence from analysts’ forecasts," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, volume 33, issue C, pages 81-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.10.009.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 23-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Acharya, Avidit & Meirowitz, Adam, 2017, "Sincere voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 121-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010.
• Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2017, "Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 218-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.001.
• Palfrey, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard & Roy, Nilanjan, 2017, "How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 234-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2017, "Reciprocity networks and the participation problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 260-272, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.006.
• Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017, "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 6-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002.
• Echenique, Federico & Galichon, Alfred, 2017, "Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 101, issue C, pages 63-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002.
• Kimya, Mert, 2017, "Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 138-146, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003.
• Hong, Fuhai & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2017, "The emergence of compositional grammars in artificial codes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 255-268, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.009.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 269-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008.
• Lugovskyy, Volodymyr & Puzzello, Daniela & Sorensen, Andrea & Walker, James & Williams, Arlington, 2017, "An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 286-302, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.004.
• Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M., 2017, "An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 303-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.002.
• Bhattacharya, Sourav & Duffy, John & Kim, SunTak, 2017, "Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 316-338, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005.
• Wellman, Michael P. & Sodomka, Eric & Greenwald, Amy, 2017, "Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 339-372, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.007.
• Stauber, Ronald, 2017, "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 409-432, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.010.
• Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017, "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 462-476, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005.
• Sobel, Joel, 2017, "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 477-486, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008.
• Leo, Greg, 2017, "Taking turns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 525-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.003.
• Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017, "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 548-561, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.010.
• Vong, Allen I.K., 2017, "Strategic manipulation in tournament games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 562-567, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.011.
• Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries & Zseleva, Anna, 2017, "Zero-sum games with charges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 666-686, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.014.
• Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Poulsen, Anders U. & Roos, Michael W.M., 2017, "Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 687-699, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 116-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.003.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2017, "A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 185-198, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.006.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017, "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 19-29, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.005.
• Bravo, Mario & Mertikopoulos, Panayotis, 2017, "On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 41-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.004.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017, "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 67-82, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.007.
• Ding, Tingting & Schotter, Andrew, 2017, "Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 94-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004.
• Martin, Daniel, 2017, "Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 131-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007.
• Bjorndahl, A. & Halpern, J.Y. & Pass, R., 2017, "Reasoning about rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 146-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.006.
• Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017, "The curse of the first-in–first-out queue discipline," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 165-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.004.
• Laslier, Jean-François & Núñez, Matías & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017, "Reaching consensus through approval bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 241-251, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002.
• Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017, "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 293-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006.
• Perea, Andrés & Roy, Souvik, 2017, "A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 309-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.009.
• Renault, Jérôme & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2017, "Optimal dynamic information provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 329-349, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.010.
• Kim, Semin, 2017, "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 350-371, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.012.
• Arieli, Itai, 2017, "Payoff externalities and social learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 392-410, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.005.
• Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kim, Sang-Hyun, 2017, "“Small, yet Beautiful”: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 486-493, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012.
• Li, Jiangtao & Tang, Rui, 2017, "Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 563-567, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.003.
• Leduc, Matt V. & Jackson, Matthew O. & Johari, Ramesh, 2017, "Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 568-594, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.011.
• Kuzmics, Christoph, 2017, "Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 666-673, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.012.
• Brandl, Florian, 2017, "The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 674-680, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.017.
• Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Müller, Daniel & Strack, Philipp, 2017, "Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 681-705, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.010.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017, "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 744-759, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.014.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2017, "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 195-211, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.003.
• Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017, "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 212-229, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.008.
• Cerdeiro, Diego A., 2017, "Contagion exposure and protection technology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 230-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.007.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017, "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 297-315, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.009.
• Currarini, Sergio & Fumagalli, Elena & Panebianco, Fabrizio, 2017, "Peer effects and local congestion in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 40-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.015.
• Demange, Gabrielle, 2017, "Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 84-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.004.
• Marden, Jason R., 2017, "Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 114-133, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.007.
• Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017, "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 161-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.012.
• Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin, 2017, "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 239-259, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.009.
• Collins, Sean M. & James, Duncan & Servátka, Maroš & Woods, Daniel, 2017, "Price-setting and attainment of equilibrium: Posted offers versus an administered price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 277-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.012.
• Allouch, Nizar, 2017, "The cost of segregation in (social) networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 329-342, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.012.
• Gauer, F. & Hellmann, T., 2017, "Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 51-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.011.
• Seel, Christian & Tsakas, Elias, 2017, "Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, pages 75-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013.
• Bo, PingJing & Manduchi, Agostino, 2017, "Disclosure-based price discrimination by information exchange platforms," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 41, issue C, pages 54-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.08.003.
• Moraga-González, José Luis & Sándor, Zsolt & Wildenbeest, Matthijs R., 2017, "Nonsequential search equilibrium with search cost heterogeneity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 392-414, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.009.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Club good intermediaries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 430-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.007.
• Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Shaffer, Greg, 2017, "Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 460-472, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.03.002.
• Liu, Xuyuan & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Optimal prize-rationing strategy in all-pay contests with incomplete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 57-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.10.004.
• Rosar, Frank, 2017, "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 91-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.11.001.
• Seres, Gyula, 2017, "Auction cartels and the absence of efficient communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 282-306, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.002.
• Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017, "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 148-174, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2017, "Auctions with bid credits and resale," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 58-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.002.
• Zhang, Jingong & Tan, Ken Seng & Weng, Chengguo, 2017, "Optimal hedging with basis risk under mean–variance criterion," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2017.03.008.
• Brown, Alasdair & Chowdhury, Subhasish M., 2017, "The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 273-284, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.009.
• Sharma, Priyanka, 2017, "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, pages 269-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.002.
• Iriberri, Nagore & Rey-Biel, Pedro, 2017, "Stereotypes are only a threat when beliefs are reinforced: On the sensitivity of gender differences in performance under competition to information provision," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 99-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.012.
• Xiao, Erte, 2017, "Justification and conformity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 15-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.01.015.
• Chakrabarti, Anindya S. & Lahkar, Ratul, 2017, "Productivity dispersion and output fluctuations: An evolutionary model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 339-360, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.025.
• Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2017, "Deception and reception: The behavior of information providers and users," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 445-456, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.019.
• Lahkar, Ratul, 2017, "Equilibrium selection in the stag hunt game under generalized reinforcement learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 63-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.012.
• Jindapon, Paan & Yang, Zhe, 2017, "Risk attitudes and heterogeneity in simultaneous and sequential contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 138, issue C, pages 69-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.011.
• Chung, Keunsuk & Lee, Dongryul, 2017, "Inefficient competition in shadow-education investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 152-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.007.
• Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017, "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 214-251, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.018.
• Buckert, Magdalena & Oechssler, Jörg & Schwieren, Christiane, 2017, "Imitation under stress," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 252-266, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.014.
• Knyazev, Dmitriy, 2017, "Optimal prize structures in elimination contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 32-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.04.017.
• Duffy, John & Matros, Alexander, 2017, "Stochastic asymmetric Blotto games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, pages 88-105, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005.
• Cubitt, Robin & Gächter, Simon & Quercia, Simone, 2017, "Conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 110-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.013.
• Kopányi, Dávid, 2017, "The coexistence of stable equilibria under least squares learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 277-300, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.005.
• Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017, "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 320-330, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.028.
• Baader, Malte & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2017, "Interaction of reasoning ability and distributional preferences in a social dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 79-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.025.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2017, "The Streisand effect: Signaling and partial sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 1-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.001.
• Zhang, Yang & Du, Xiaomin, 2017, "Network effects on strategic interactions: A laboratory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 143, issue C, pages 133-146, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.08.017.
• Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Galbiati, Roberto & Henry, Emeric, 2017, "Investing to cooperate: Theory and experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 1-17, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.011.
• Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2017, "International environmental agreements for local and global pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 81, issue C, pages 38-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.001.
• Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2017, "Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 90-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.12.007.
• Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2017, "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.004.
• Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2017, "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 14-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.004.
• Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan, 2017, "Corrigendum to “Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior” [J. Econ. Theory 70 (1) (1996) 1–31]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 269-273, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.002.
• Lu, Shih En, 2017, "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, pages 177-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.004.
• Alexandrov, Alexei & Bedre-Defolie, Özlem, 2017, "LeChatelier–Samuelson principle in games and pass-through of shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, pages 44-54, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.006.
• Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017, "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 128-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.003.
• Boleslavsky, Raphael & Kelly, David L. & Taylor, Curtis R., 2017, "Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: Can asset markets inform policy?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 294-343, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.009.
• He, Wei & Sun, Yeneng, 2017, "Stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 35-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.007.
• Perea, Andrés, 2017, "Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 489-516, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.013.
• Çelen, Boğaçhan & Schotter, Andrew & Blanco, Mariana, 2017, "On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 62-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006.
• Amir, Rabah & Erickson, Philip & Jin, Jim, 2017, "On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 641-665, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.005.
• Frankel, David M., 2017, "Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 112-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.001.
• Cerdeiro, Diego A. & Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017, "Individual security, contagion, and network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 182-226, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.006.
• Duggan, John, 2017, "Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 426-463, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.008.
• Kuzmics, Christoph & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017, "On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 56-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.006.
• Amir, Rabah & De Castro, Luciano, 2017, "Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 220-246, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.004.
• Korenok, Oleg & Millner, Edward & Razzolini, Laura, 2017, "Feelings of ownership in dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 145-151, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.04.003.
• Grieco, Daniela & Faillo, Marco & Zarri, Luca, 2017, "Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 55-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.03.007.
• Ismayilov, Huseyn & Potters, Jan, 2017, "Elicited vs. voluntary promises," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, pages 295-312, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.005.
• Cox, Caleb A., 2017, "Rent-seeking and competitive preferences," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 102-116, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.002.
• Boyce, John R. & Bruner, David M., 2017, "Conflict resolution through voluntary provision of property protection," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 199-215, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.003.
• Büyükboyacı, Mürüvvet & Robbett, Andrea, 2017, "Collaboration and free-riding in team contests," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 162-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.11.001.
• Akamatsu, Takashi & Fujishima, Shota & Takayama, Yuki, 2017, "Discrete-space agglomeration model with social interactions: Multiplicity, stability, and continuous limit of equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 22-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.007.
• Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017, "On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 147-153, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007.
• Ceparano, Maria Carmela & Quartieri, Federico, 2017, "Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 154-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.011.
• Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017, "Inequity-averse preferences in general equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 166-175, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.009.
• Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017, "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, pages 135-151, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.05.004.
• Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017, "Divide and compromise," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 100-110, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.04.004.
• Serena, Marco, 2017, "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 46, issue C, pages 15-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008.
• Brangewitz, Sonja & Brockhoff, Sarah, 2017, "Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 1-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003.
• Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2017, "Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 71-83, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.12.008.
• Dekel, Sagi & Fischer, Sven & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017, "Potential Pareto Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 87-96, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.12.007.
• Xu, Lili & Lee, Sang-Ho & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2017, "Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 1-7, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.023.
• Krieg, Justin & Samek, Anya, 2017, "When charities compete: A laboratory experiment with simultaneous public goods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, pages 40-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.009.
• Samahita, Margaret, 2017, "Venting and gossiping in conflicts: Verbal expression in ultimatum games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 111-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.12.003.
• Guilfoos, Todd & Kurtz, Kenneth J., 2017, "Evaluating the role of personality trait information in social dilemmas," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, pages 119-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.04.006.
• Girtz, Robert & Hill, Joshua & Owens, Mark, 2017, "Risk preferences, responsibility, and self-monitoring in a Stag Hunt," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, pages 53-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.03.004.
• Emara, Noha & Owens, David & Smith, John & Wilmer, Lisa, 2017, "Serial correlation in National Football League play calling and its effects on outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 125-132, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.01.007.
• Yasushi Asako & Yukihiko Funaki & Kozo Ueda & Nobuyuki Uto, 2017, "Symmetric Information Bubbles: Experimental Evidence," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2017-05, Jan.
• Anthropelos, Michail & Kardaras, Constantinos, 2017, "Equilibrium in risk-sharing games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 69767, Jul.
• Michael Finus & Alaa Al Khourdajie, 2017, "Strategic Environmental Policy, International Trade and Self-enforcing Agreements: The Role of Consumers' Taste for Variety," Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Bath, Department of Economics, number 60/17, Feb.
• Hans Gersbach & Philippe Muller & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "A Dynamic Model of Electoral Competition with Costly Policy Changes," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/270, Apr.
• Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/272, Jun.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/283, Dec.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "Assessment Voting in Large Electorates," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/284, Dec.
• Jörg Spiller & Friedel Bolle, 2017, "Experimental investigations of coordination games: high success rates, invariant behavior, and surprising dynamics," Discussion Paper Series RECAP15, RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), number 28, Nov.
• Anne-Sarah Chiambretto, 2017, "Voluntary agreements as correlated equilibria of a subscription game : on the impact of a background regulatory threat," Working Papers, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, number 2017.23, Oct.
• Cheng-Zhong Qin & Dandan Zhu & Shengping Zhang, 2017, "A Model of Endogenous Cross-Holdings in Oligopoly," Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, Higher Education Press, volume 12, issue 3, pages 465-479, September.
• Joosung Lee, 2017, "Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.27, Jun.
• Sareh Vosooghi, 2017, "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.28, Jun.
• Lionel Richefort, 2017, "Warm-Glow Giving in Networks with Multiple Public Goods," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.32, Jul.
• Spiros Bougheas, 2017, "Contagion in Stable Networks," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.50, Sep.