Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2018

• Keser, Claudia & Özgümüs, Asri, 2018, "Trust, vulnerability and trustworthiness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 149-151, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.012.
• Poulsen, Odile & Saral, Krista J., 2018, "Coordination and focality under gain–loss framing: Experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 164, issue C, pages 75-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.006.
• Hellmann, T. & Panebianco, F., 2018, "The transmission of continuous cultural traits in endogenous social networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 51-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.019.
• Klunover, Doron, 2018, "A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, pages 90-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.025.
• Ewerhart, Christian & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2018, "Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 51-54, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.010.
• Yang, Chih-Chun, 2018, "Perfect forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 113-116, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.008.
• Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2018, "Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 115-118, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.021.
• Thöni, Christian & Volk, Stefan, 2018, "Conditional cooperation: Review and refinement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 37-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.022.
• Hagiwara, Makoto, 2018, "A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 51-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008.
• Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2018, "Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 28-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.014.
• Aiche, Avishay & Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Sela, Aner & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2018, "Tullock contests reward information advantages," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 34-36, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017.
• Nawar, Abdel-Hameed & Sen, Debapriya, 2018, "kth price auctions and Catalan numbers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 69-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.018.
• Golombek, Rolf & Raknerud, Arvid, 2018, "Exit dynamics of start-up firms: Structural estimation using indirect inference," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 205, issue 1, pages 204-225, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.03.011.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.001.
• Challe, Edouard & Chrétien, Edouard, 2018, "Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 82-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.004.
• Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2018, "Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 125-149, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.01.005.
• Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018, "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 22-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.02.001.
• Neilson, William & Xiao, Yancheng, 2018, "Equilibrium vaccination patterns in incomplete and heterogeneous networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 174-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.008.
• Galeotti, Fabio & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2018, "Identifying voter preferences: The trade-off between honesty and competence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 27-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.007.
• Anbarcı, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick & Gürdal, Mehmet Y., 2018, "Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 172-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.07.003.
• Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andras, 2018, "On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries’ incentives to distort ratings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 20-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.005.
• Huppmann, Daniel & Siddiqui, Sauleh, 2018, "An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 266, issue 2, pages 622-638, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.09.032.
• Babonneau, Frédéric & Haurie, Alain & Vielle, Marc, 2018, "Welfare implications of EU Effort Sharing Decision and possible impact of a hard Brexit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 470-489, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.06.024.
• Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Hulley, Hardy, 2018, "Are mutual fund investors paying for noise?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, pages 8-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2018.04.002.
• Fehr, Dietmar, 2018, "Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 123-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.001.
• Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2018, "Constitutions and groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 135-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022.
• Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018, "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 153-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004.
• Zhang, Huanren, 2018, "Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 203-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023.
• Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud, 2018, "Reward schemes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 21-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.019.
• Daskalova, Vessela, 2018, "Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 238-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.007.
• Hopkins, Ed, 2018, "Inequality and risk-taking behaviour," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 316-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.007.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018, "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 331-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.012.
• Cheung, Man-Wah & Lahkar, Ratul, 2018, "Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 341-362, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.004.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Money as minimal complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 432-451, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.003.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Graphical exchange mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 452-465, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.002.
• Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Tonin, Simone, 2018, "Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 478-485, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.013.
• Ziliotto, Bruno, 2018, "Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 486-503, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.009.
• Solan, Eilon, 2018, "Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 523-540, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.011.
• Zhao, Jingang, 2018, "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 592-599, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.002.
• Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018, "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 93-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010.
• Britz, Volker, 2018, "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.005.
• Blume, Andreas, 2018, "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 132-155, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.014.
• Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2018, "Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 184-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.015.
• Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2018, "Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 294-310, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.003.
• Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018, "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 364-381, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018, "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 465-483, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Galanis, Spyros, 2018, "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 598-615, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.001.
• Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2018, "Volunteering under population uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 65-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.009.
• Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2018, "A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 82-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.012.
• Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor V., 2018, "A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 99-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010.
• Perea, Andrés, 2018, "Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 120-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.001.
• Ispano, Alessandro, 2018, "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 165-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.013.
• Mathevet, Laurent, 2018, "An axiomatization of plays in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 19-31, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.012.
• Balkenborg, Dieter, 2018, "Rationalizability and logical inference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 248-257, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.006.
• Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018, "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 330-339, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.017.
• Iskakov, M. & Iskakov, A. & d'Aspremont, C., 2018, "Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 58-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.011.
• Chen, Chun-Ting & Huang, Chen-Ying & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2018, "A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 143-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.007.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2018, "The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 16-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.008.
• Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018, "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 187-202, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004.
• Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018, "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 203-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004.
• Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018, "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 250-273, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.008.
• Leucci, Stefano & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Penna, Paolo, 2018, "No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 64-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.003.
• Jang, Dooseok & Patel, Amrish & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2018, "Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 85-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.004.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt, 2018, "King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 125-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.007.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018, "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 139-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002.
• Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2018, "Bidding games and efficient allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 166-193, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.005.
• Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias, 2018, "Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 231-241, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003.
• Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "Prospect dynamics and loss dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 98-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006.
• Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018, "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.005.
• Tauman, Yair & Zhao, Chang, 2018, "Patent licensing, entry and the incentive to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 229-276, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.010.
• Dahm, Matthias, 2018, "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 256-282, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.003.
• Altınok, Ahmet & Yılmaz, Murat, 2018, "Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project under time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 114-140, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.007.
• Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2018, "Population uncertainty in voluntary contributions of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 218-231, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.009.
• Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2018, "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 320-334, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020.
• Persson, Emil, 2018, "Testing the impact of frustration and anger when responsibility is low," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 435-448, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.001.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2018, "Unilateral and multilateral sanctions: A network approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 52-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.010.
• Burdin, Gabriel & Halliday, Simon & Landini, Fabio, 2018, "The hidden benefits of abstaining from control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 1-12, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.018.
• Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2018, "Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 115-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.002.
• Xu, Xue & Potters, Jan, 2018, "An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 28-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.023.
• Ong, David & Chan, Ho Fai & Torgler, Benno & Yang, Yu (Alan), 2018, "Collaboration incentives: Endogenous selection into single and coauthorships by surname initial in economics and management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 41-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.001.
• Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2018, "Financing of public goods through taxation in a general equilibrium economy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, pages 171-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.018.
• Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018, "Multi-player race," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 123-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.008.
• Gauriot, Romain & Page, Lionel, 2018, "Psychological momentum in contests: The case of scoring before half-time in football," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 137-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.015.
• March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018, "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 114-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020.
• Wen, Yuanji, 2018, "Voluntary information acquisition in an asymmetric-Information game:comparing learning theories in the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 202-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.023.
• Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2018, "Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 192-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.010.
• Luo, Zijun & Xie, Xin, 2018, "A Model Of rivalries with endogenous prize and strength," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 215-223, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.013.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritschel, Alexander, 2018, "The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 224-234, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.014.
• Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018, "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 123-142, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016.
• Gächter, Simon & Renner, Elke, 2018, "Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 321-334, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.001.
• Fallucchi, Francesco & Quercia, Simone, 2018, "Affirmative action and retaliation in experimental contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 23-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.006.
• Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018, "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 55-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.017.
• Stoop, Jan & van Soest, Daan & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2018, "Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, pages 300-310, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.12.007.
• De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros G. & Spengler, Dominic E., 2018, "Can violence harm cooperation? Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 342-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008.
• Foucart, Renaud & Wan, Cheng, 2018, "Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 537-558, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018, "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010.
• Camacho, Carmen & Kamihigashi, Takashi & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018, "Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 288-299, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003.
• Cheung, Man-Wah & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 300-323, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.002.
• Bhattacharya, Vivek & Manuelli, Lucas & Straub, Ludwig, 2018, "Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 1-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004.
• Rivera, Thomas J., 2018, "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 201-247, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.012.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018, "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 248-264, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013.
• Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2018, "Price instability in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 318-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.008.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018, "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 58-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007.
• Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. & Hickman, Brent R., 2018, "College assignment as a large contest," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 88-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006.
• Sorokin, Constantine & Zakharov, Alexei, 2018, "Vote-motivated candidates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 232-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.010.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018, "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 372-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018, "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 408-443, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.004.
• Puppe, Clemens, 2018, "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 55-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.003.
• Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018, "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 761-802, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.002.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2018, "Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 1-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.011.
• Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2018, "Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 101-125, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.016.
• Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018, "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 245-279, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005.
• Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Sandholm, William H., 2018, "Riemannian game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 315-364, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.002.
• Baranov, Oleg, 2018, "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 495-517, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005.
• Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018, "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 708-733, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002.
• Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018, "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 734-779, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.004.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Sachdeva, Ashish, 2018, "The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: A mousetracking study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 246-274, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.011.
• Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018, "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 275-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009.
• Hefti, Andreas, 2018, "Limited attention, competition and welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 318-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.012.
• Aoyagi, Masaki, 2018, "Bertrand competition under network externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 517-550, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.006.
• Kalai, Ehud & Shmaya, Eran, 2018, "Large strategic dynamic interactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 59-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001.
• Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018, "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 127, issue 2, pages 342-365, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.004.
• Panagiotou, Dimitrios & Stavrakoudis, Athanassios, 2018, "Free-on-board and uniform delivered pricing strategies in pure and mixed spatial duopolies: The strategic role of cooperatives," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, volume 18, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeca.2018.e00109.
• Rusch, Hannes, 2018, "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 105-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.12.002.
• Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin & Montinari, Natalia & Panganiban, Marian & Ploner, Matteo & Werner, Benedikt, 2018, "On the malleability of fairness ideals: Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, pages 60-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.001.
• Angelovski, Andrej & Di Cagno, Daniela & Güth, Werner & Marazzi, Francesca & Panaccione, Luca, 2018, "Behavioral spillovers in local public good provision: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 116-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.05.003.
• Krockow, Eva M. & Pulford, Briony D. & Colman, Andrew M., 2018, "Far but finite horizons promote cooperation in the Centipede game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 191-199, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.07.002.
• Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018, "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 34-46, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.03.003.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018, "Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 68-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.005.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018, "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 101-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007.
• Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018, "Sender–receiver games with cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 52-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002.
• Schwartz, Jesse A. & Wen, Quan, 2018, "A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 32-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.002.
• Xefteris, Dimitrios & Ziros, Nicholas, 2018, "Strategic vote trading under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 52-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.009.
• Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2018, "Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 57-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.10.001.
• Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2018, "Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 83-94, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.003.
• Guha, Brishti, 2018, "Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 82-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.004.
• Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2018, "Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 15-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.04.002.
• McBride, Michael & Skaperdas, Stergios & Tsai, Pi-Han, 2018, "Why go to court? Bargaining failure under the shadow of trial with complete information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 151-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.12.001.
• Reischmann, Andreas & Oechssler, Joerg, 2018, "The Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision in dynamic settings — Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 104-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.009.
• Cox, Caleb A. & Stoddard, Brock, 2018, "Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 31-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.03.007.
• Kartal, Melis & Tremewan, James, 2018, "An offer you can refuse: The effect of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 161, issue C, pages 44-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.003.
• Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018, "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 53-62, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.004.
• Nishizaki, Katsuhiko, 2018, "Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 3, pages 379-383, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.07.003.
• Balletta, Luigi & Modica, Salvatore, 2018, "Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 72, issue 4, pages 511-517, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.10.001.
• Levy, Nadav & Klein, Ido & Ben-Elia, Eran, 2018, "Emergence of cooperation and a fair system optimum in road networks: A game-theoretic and agent-based modelling approach," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, pages 46-55, DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2017.09.010.
• Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Shen, Junyi, 2018, "Mate choice mechanism for solving a quasi-dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 1-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.10.004.
• Auerswald, Heike & Schmidt, Carsten & Thum, Marcel & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018, "Teams in a public goods experiment with punishment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, pages 28-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.001.
• Ramalingam, Abhijit & Morales, Antonio J. & Walker, James M., 2018, "Varying experimental instructions to improve comprehension: Punishment in public goods games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, pages 66-73, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.01.008.
• Cartwright, Edward & Singh, Thomas B., 2018, "Observation and contagion effects in cooperation: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 151-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.006.
• Achtziger, Anja & Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Wagner, Alexander K., 2018, "Social preferences and self-control," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 161-166, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.009.
• Kandul, Serhiy & Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2018, "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects when lies can be delegated," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 70-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.03.006.
• Carrasco, José A. & Harrison, Rodrigo & Villena, Mauricio, 2018, "Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 68-75, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.08.002.
• Sun, Huojun & Bigoni, Maria, 2018, "A fine rule from a brutish world? An experiment on endogenous punishment institution and trust," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 158-169, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.013.
• Chakraborti, Rik & Maloney, Matt & Roberts, Gavin & Shogren, Jason F., 2018, "Social capital and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 196-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.10.007.
• Angelovski, Andrej & Di Cagno, Daniela & Güth, Werner & Marazzi, Francesca & Panaccione, Luca, 2018, "Does heterogeneity spoil the basket? The role of productivity and feedback information on public good provision," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 40-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.006.
• Vyrastekova, Jana & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2018, "Cooperation in a sequential dilemma game: How much transparency is good for cooperation?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 88-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.09.014.
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Exclusionary vertical restraints and antitrust: experimental law and economics contributions," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 3, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 9, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Martin Kaae Jensen, 2018, "Aggregative games," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 4, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
• Daan Lindeman & Marius I. Ochea, 2018, "Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 2018-15.
• Sun-Ki Chai & Dolgorsuren Dorj & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2018, "Cultural Values and Behavior in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "Experimental Economics and Culture", DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620180000020005.
• Gauthier de Maere d'Aertrycke & Andreas Ehrenmann & Daniel Ralph & Yves Smeers, 2018, "Risk trading in capacity equilibrium models," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1720, Jan.
• Ibrahim Abada & Andreas Ehrenmann & Xavier Lambin, 2018, "Unintended consequences: The snowball effect of energy communities," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1812, Apr.
• M. R. Hesamzadeh & P. Holmberg & M. Sarfati, 2018, "Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Design," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1813, May.
• M. Sarfati & M.R. Hesamzadeh & P. Holmberg, 2018, "Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I: Concept Analysis," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1837, Nov.
• M. Sarfati & M.R. Hesamzadeh & P. Holmberg, 2018, "Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part II: Solution Algorithm," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1838, Nov.
• Brent Eldridge & Richard O'Neill & Benjamin F. Hobbs, 2018, "Pricing in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets with Near-Optimal Unit Commitment," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG 1840, Nov.
• Galeotti, Andrea & Golub, Benjamin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2018, "Targetting interventions in networks," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics, number 21698, Mar.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2018, "Lock-in through passive connections," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics, number 23348, Oct.
• GALEOTTI, Andrea; GOLUB, Benjamin; GOYAL, Sanjeev, 2018, "Targeting interventions in networks," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 2018/01.
• Julia de Frutos Cachorro & Gwen Willeghems & Jeroen Buysse, 2018, "Strategic investment decisions under the nuclear power debate in Belgium," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2018/383.
• Martin Gregor, 2018, "Electives Shopping, Grading Competition, and Grading Norms," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, number 2018/29, Oct, revised Oct 2018.
• Emerson Melo, 2018, "A Variational Approach to Network Games," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2018.05, Feb.
• Banchongsan Charoensook, 2018, "Bi and Branching Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Models: a Generalized Sufficient Condition," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2018.12, May.
• Matakos, Konstantinos & Savolainen, Riikka & Troumpounis, Orestis & Tukiainen, Janne & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018, "Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion," Working Papers, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 109.
• Sebastian Infante & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2018, "Collateral Runs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 2018-022, Apr, DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2018.022.
• Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Christian Zimmermann, 2018, "Superstar Economists: Coauthorship networks and research output," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, number 2018-28, Oct, DOI: 10.20955/wp.2018.028.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2018, "Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 18-21, Oct, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.20.
• Emanuela Migliaccio & Thierry Verdier, 2018, "On the Spatial Diffusion of Cooperation with Endogenous Matching Institutions," Games, MDPI, volume 9, issue 3, pages 1-27, August.
• Ernesto Reuben & Sigrid Suetens, 2018, "Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error," Games, MDPI, volume 9, issue 3, pages 1-9, September.
• Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2018, "Monetary Policy obeying the Taylor Principle Turns Prices into Strategic Substitutes," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1805.
• Adhen Benlahlou, 2018, "Team production," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1822.
• Fabbri, G. & Faggian, S. & Freni, G., 2018, "Spatial resource wars: A two region example," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2018-04.
• Goyal, Ashima, 2018, "The Indian Fiscal-Monetary Framework: Dominance or Coordination?," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-13.
• Michela Chessa & Patrick Loiseau, 2018, "Incentivizing Efficiency in Local Public Good Games and Applications to the Quantification of Personal Data in Networks," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2018-02, Feb.
• Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018, "What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2018-17, Jul.
• Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018, "Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, number 2018-29, Nov.
• Epiphane Assouan & Tina Rambonilaza & Bénédicte Rulleau, 2018, "Renewal of water-related infrastructure and user\'s contribution: a few benchmarks," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019), Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA), number 2018-19.
• Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2018, "A case of evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium in the lab," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-05, Feb.
• Michael Guenther & Christoph Kuzmics & Antoine Salomon, 2018, "A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327 360]," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-16, Sep.
• Sun-Ki Chai & Dolgorsuren Dorj & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2018, "Cultural values and behavior in dictator, ultimatum and trust games: an experimental study," Working Papers, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics, number 201805, May.
• Nobuyuki Hanaki & Emily Tanimura & Nicolaas J Vriend, 2019, "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number hal-01714582, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.014.