Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
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More about this item
KeywordsBargaining; Rent-seeking; Surplus destruction; Discount factor; Timing; Commitment;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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