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Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?

Author

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  • Erik Ansink

    () (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    () (Wageningen University)

Abstract

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2018. "Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-083/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180083
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    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/18083.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ansink, Erik & Bouma, Jetske, 2013. "Effective support for community resource management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 94-103.
    2. Heintzelman, Martin D. & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan, 2009. "Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 309-320, May.
    3. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard & Cees Withagen, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements with Support," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-015/VIII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Jul 2017.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel games; Coalition formation; Common Pool Resources; Support;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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