IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecomod/v442y2021ics0304380020304701.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modelling the effectiveness of collaborative schemes for disease and pest outbreak prevention

Author

Listed:
  • Bate, Andrew M.
  • Jones, Glyn
  • Kleczkowski, Adam
  • Touza, Julia

Abstract

Preventing disease outbreaks has widespread benefits that are dependent on the actions of many agents but can be undermined by the inaction of others. This paper explores whether a voluntary biosecurity-related assurance scheme can be an effective mechanism for curbing the risks of animal and plant pests and diseases. The decision to engage in such schemes is modelled using a coalition game where agents consider both direct costs of infection and regional outbreak costs like trade bans and movement restrictions. We find that government needs to support the scheme through incentives that reduce members’ outbreak costs like pre-agreed outbreak compensation or preferential regulatory treatment. Assurance schemes could provide significant improvements in biosecurity if membership is high; but without government incentives, stable coalitions are either small or ineffective at improving biosecurity. Government support can lead to large coalitions and robust improvement in overall biosecurity, with the optimal level of support being the smallest incentive that leads to a stable grand coalition. Policies that focus on either monetary or non-monetary incentives can lead to more robust improvements in biosecurity. In particular, targeting regional outbreak costs to members like movement restrictions leads to improved biosecurity for all levels of support.

Suggested Citation

  • Bate, Andrew M. & Jones, Glyn & Kleczkowski, Adam & Touza, Julia, 2021. "Modelling the effectiveness of collaborative schemes for disease and pest outbreak prevention," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 442(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:442:y:2021:i:c:s0304380020304701
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2020.109411
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304380020304701
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2020.109411?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Cornes, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 259-271.
    2. Finus, Michael & Sã Iz, M. Elena & Hendrix, Eligius M.T., 2009. "An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 117-137, February.
    3. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "The theory of international environmental agreements," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1516, Elsevier.
    4. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(3), pages 411-425, March.
    6. Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
    7. Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
    8. Ansink, Erik & Bouma, Jetske, 2013. "Effective support for community resource management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 94-103.
    9. David A. Hennessy & Christopher A. Wolf, 2018. "Asymmetric Information, Externalities and Incentives in Animal Disease Prevention and Control," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 226-242, February.
    10. Bate, Andrew M. & Jones, Glyn & Kleczkowski, Adam & MacLeod, Alan & Naylor, Rebecca & Timmis, Jon & Touza, Julia & White, Piran C.L., 2016. "Modelling the impact and control of an infectious disease in a plant nursery with infected plant material inputs," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 334(C), pages 27-43.
    11. Lansink, Alfons Oude, 2011. "Public and private roles in plant health management," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 166-170, April.
    12. Wolf, Christopher A., 2005. "Producer Livestock Disease Management Incentives and Decisions," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16.
    13. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2019. "Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1040, April.
    14. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Filiptseva, Anna & Filler, Günther & Odening, Martin, 2023. "Compensation schemes for plant quarantine pest costs: A case study for Germany," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1381-1395.
    2. Soliño, Mario & Raposo, Rosa, 2022. "Contributing to healthy forests: Social preferences for pest and disease mitigation programs in Spain," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    3. Hennessy, David A. & Rault, Arnaud, 2023. "On systematically insufficient biosecurity actions and policies to manage infectious animal disease," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marchiori, Carmen & Dietz, Simon & Tavoni, Alessandro, 2017. "Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 115-131.
    2. Kováč, Eugen & Schmidt, Robert C., 2021. "A simple dynamic climate cooperation model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    3. Jon Hovi & Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig, 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 665-688, December.
    4. Tibor Besedeš & Erik P. Johnson & Xinping Tian, 2020. "Economic determinants of multilateral environmental agreements," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 832-864, August.
    5. Robert C. Schmidt & Moritz Drupp & Frikk Nesje & Hendrik Hoegen, 2022. "Testing the free-rider hypothesis in climate policy," Papers 2211.06209, arXiv.org.
    6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks - Can issue linkage enhance cooperation?," Discussion Paper Series 2018_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jun 2018.
    7. Nahid Masoudi & Georges Zaccour, 2018. "Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 1-21, September.
    8. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    9. Achim Hagen & Jan Schneider, 2017. "Boon or Bane? Trade Sanctions and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers V-403-17, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    10. Sareh Vosooghi & Maria Arvaniti & Frederick Van Der Ploeg, 2022. "Self-enforcing climate coalitions for farsighted countries: integrated analysis of heterogeneous countries," Economics Series Working Papers 971, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    11. Buchholz Wolfgang & Heindl Peter, 2015. "Ökonomische Herausforderungen des Klimawandels," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 324-350, December.
    12. Piergiuseppe Pezzoli & Johannes Emmerling & Massimo Tavoni, 2023. "SRM on the table: the role of geoengineering for the stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(10), pages 1-21, October.
    13. Francois Bareille & Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2021. "Cooperative Management of Ecosystem Services: Coalition Formation, Landscape Structure and Policies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 79(2), pages 323-356, June.
    14. Kai Lessmann & Robert Marschinski & Michael Finus & Ulrike Kornek & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement—an Analysis of Coalition Stability," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82, pages 82-109, December.
    15. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2012. "International environmental agreements under uncertainty: does the 'veil of uncertainty' help?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 736-764, October.
    16. Brian Chi-ang Lin & Siqi Zheng & Doruk İriş, 2016. "Economic Targets And Loss-Aversion In International Environmental Cooperation," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 624-648, July.
    17. Athanasoglou, Stergios, 2022. "On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    18. Anna A. Klis, 2019. "Identity and equal treatment in negative externality agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 615-630, December.
    19. Stefano Carattini & Simon Levin & Alessandro Tavoni, 2019. "Cooperation in the Climate Commons," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(2), pages 227-247.
    20. Doruk Iris & Alessandro Tavoni, 2016. "Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 1603, Nam Duck-Woo Economic Research Institute, Sogang University (Former Research Institute for Market Economy).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:442:y:2021:i:c:s0304380020304701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/ecological-modelling .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.