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Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark?

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Finus

    (University of Graz, Austria)

  • Francesco Furini

    (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Abstract

Solar radiation management (SRM), as one form of geoengineering, has been proposed as a last exit strategy to address global warming. Even though SRM is expected to be cheap, it may be risky and associated with high collateral damages. We analyze how SRM affects equilibrium mitigation strategies, the governance architecture of a climate agreement and whether and how signatories to a climate agreement can avoid that non-signatories deploy SRM. We show under which conditions the threat to deploy geoengineering can stabilize a large climate agreement. Results are derived in a cartel formation game and all qualitative conclusions are confirmed in a repeated game framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Finus & Francesco Furini, 2022. "Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark?," Graz Economics Papers 2022-02, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2022-02
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mitigation-geoengineering game; solar radiation management; collateral damages; climate agreements.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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