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Strategic dimensions of solar geoengineering: Economic theory and experiments

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  • Heyen, Daniel
  • Tavoni, Alessandro

Abstract

Solar geoengineering denotes a set of technologies that would enable a fast and relatively cheap global temperature reduction. Besides potential physical side-effects, a major concern is the strategic dimension: Who is going to use solar geoengineering and how would it affect others? How does the presence of solar geoengineering change the strategic incentives surrounding other climate policy instruments such as mitigation? We review the existing theoretical and experimental contributions to those questions and outline promising lines of future economic research.

Suggested Citation

  • Heyen, Daniel & Tavoni, Alessandro, 2024. "Strategic dimensions of solar geoengineering: Economic theory and experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s2214804324001083
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102271
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