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Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Author

Listed:
  • Manfred Milinski

    (Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, Germany)

  • Christian Hilbe

    (Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University
    Institute of Science and Technology Austria)

  • Dirk Semmann

    (Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, Germany)

  • Ralf Sommerfeld

    (Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, Germany)

  • Jochem Marotzke

    (Max Planck Institute for Meteorology)

Abstract

Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives. However, the behaviour of representatives in social dilemmas has not been investigated experimentally. Here inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions reductions, we experimentally study a collective-risk social dilemma that involves representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members. Representatives can be re-elected or voted out after each consecutive collective-risk game. Selfish players are preferentially elected and are hence found most frequently in the ‘representatives’ treatment. Across all treatments, we identify the selfish players as extortioners. As predicted by our mathematical model, their steadfast strategies enforce cooperation from fair players who finally compensate almost completely the deficit caused by the extortionate co-players. Everybody gains, but the extortionate representatives and their groups gain the most.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Milinski & Christian Hilbe & Dirk Semmann & Ralf Sommerfeld & Jochem Marotzke, 2016. "Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 7(1), pages 1-9, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:7:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms10915
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms10915
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    Cited by:

    1. Deng, Wenfeng & Huang, Keke & Yang, Chunhua & Zhu, Hongqiu & Yu, Zhaofei, 2018. "Promote of cooperation in networked multiagent system based on fitness control," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 339(C), pages 805-811.
    2. Wang, Chaoqian & Huang, Chaochao & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2022. "Modeling the social dilemma of involution on a square lattice," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    3. Ben Balmford & Madeleine Marino & Oliver P. Hauser, 2024. "Voting Sustains Intergenerational Cooperation, Even When the Tipping Point Threshold is Ambiguous," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(1), pages 167-190, January.
    4. Andrews, Talbot M. & Delton, Andrew W. & Kline, Reuben, 2022. "Anticipating moral hazard undermines climate mitigation in an experimental geoengineering game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    5. Christian Hilbe & Kristin Hagel & Manfred Milinski, 2016. "Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-14, October.
    6. Manfred Milinski & Jochem Marotzke, 2022. "Economic experiments support Ostrom’s polycentric approach to mitigating climate change," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-9, December.
    7. Jay J. Van Bavel & Katherine Baicker & Paulo S. Boggio & Valerio Capraro & Aleksandra Cichocka & Mina Cikara & Molly J. Crockett & Alia J. Crum & Karen M. Douglas & James N. Druckman & John Drury & Oe, 2020. "Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 4(5), pages 460-471, May.
    8. Friedrich, Thomas, 2016. "Aquila non captat muscas :Homo Economicus between exploration and exploitation," MPRA Paper 75601, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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