Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9247-3
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Keywords
International environmental agreements; Non-cooperative game theory; Pareto efficiency; Weak renegotiation proofness;All these keywords.
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