Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

---

Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2018

• Alcino Azevedo & Dean Paxson, 2018, "Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, volume 271, issue 2, pages 319-355, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10479-017-2752-4.
• Roman Mendelevitch, 2018, "Testing supply-side climate policies for the global steam coal market—can they curb coal consumption?," Climatic Change, Springer, volume 150, issue 1, pages 57-72, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10584-018-2169-3.
• Philippe Mongin, 2018, "A game-theoretic analysis of the Waterloo campaign and some comments on the analytic narrative project," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), volume 12, issue 3, pages 451-480, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11698-017-0162-0.
• Alessandra Buratto & Stefan Wrzaczek, 2018, "Advertising a product to face a competitor entry: a differential game approach," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 41, issue 2, pages 463-487, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-018-0210-7.
• Arianna Dal Forno & Ugo Merlone, 2018, "Reference group influence on binary choices dynamics," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 41, issue 2, pages 427-445, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-018-0216-1.
• Lorenzo Cerboni Baiardi & Ahmad K. Naimzada, 2018, "An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 41, issue 2, pages 313-333, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-018-0219-y.
• Anindya S. Chakrabarti & Ratul Lahkar, 2018, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Growth and Fluctuations with Negative Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 8, issue 4, pages 733-760, December, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-017-0234-6.
• Cars H. Hommes & Marius I. Ochea & Jan Tuinstra, 2018, "Evolutionary Competition Between Adjustment Processes in Cournot Oligopoly: Instability and Complex Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, volume 8, issue 4, pages 822-843, December, DOI: 10.1007/s13235-018-0238-x.
• Toshiji Kawagoe & Taisuke Matsubae & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2018, "Quantal response equilibria in a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma and step-level public goods games with binary decision," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, volume 15, issue 1, pages 11-23, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40844-017-0081-6.
• Leyla D. Karakas, 2018, "Appeasement and compromise under a referendum threat," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 19, issue 3, pages 261-283, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0208-1.
• Dionysius Glycopantis & Charitini Stavropoulou, 2018, "An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty: a game theory application to the doctor–patient interaction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 1, pages 15-28, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0120-9.
• Vincenzo Scalzo, 2018, "Weak maximal elements and weak equilibria in ordinal games with applications to exchange economies," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 1, pages 29-39, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0121-8.
• Makoto Hagiwara & Hirofumi Yamamura & Takehiko Yamato, 2018, "Implementation with socially responsible agents," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 1, pages 55-62, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-017-0123-6.
• Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018, "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 129-139, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8.
• Jesse A. Schwartz & Quan Wen, 2018, "Robust trading mechanisms with budget surplus and partial trade," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 201-208, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0138-7.
• Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan & Giorgio Gnecco & Marcello Sanguineti, 2018, "Commitment-Based Equilibrium Environmental Strategies Under Time-Dependent Absorption Efficiency," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, volume 27, issue 2, pages 235-249, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9545-7.
• Jasper N. Meya & Ulrike Kornek & Kai Lessmann, 2018, "How empirical uncertainties influence the stability of climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, volume 18, issue 2, pages 175-198, April, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-017-9378-5.
• Philippe Grégoire, 2018, "Psychology at work," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), volume 65, issue 2, pages 119-135, June, DOI: 10.1007/s12232-017-0286-3.
• Chiara Nardi, 2018, "Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), volume 4, issue 1, pages 91-106, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40797-017-0070-2.
• Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2018, "Self-enforcing capital tax coordination," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, volume 88, issue 7, pages 915-940, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11573-018-0895-7.
• Michihiro Kandori, 2018, "Replicability of Experimental Data and Credibility of Economic Theory," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 69, issue 1, pages 4-25, March, DOI: 10.1111/jere.12175.
• Nazaria Solferino & Viviana Solferino & Serena F. Taurino, 2018, "The economics analysis of a Q-learning model of cooperation with punishment and risk taking preferences," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, volume 13, issue 3, pages 601-613, October, DOI: 10.1007/s11403-017-0195-2.
• Bettina Rockenbach & Sebastian Schneiders & Marcin Waligora, 2018, "Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 4, issue 1, pages 73-85, July, DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0052-7.
• Chong Huang, 2018, "Coordination and social learning," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 1, pages 155-177, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1014-z.
• Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2018, "Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 2, pages 231-249, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1028-6.
• Caroline Thomas, 2018, "N-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 509-544, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-1030-z.
• Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, 2018, "Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 781-817, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1039-y.
• Ronen Gradwohl, 2018, "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 1, pages 65-103, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1054-z.
• Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2018, "Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 2, pages 265-299, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1067-7.
• Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Claudia Meo, 2018, "An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 2, pages 301-325, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1068-6.
• Yunjian Xu & Katrina Ligett, 2018, "Commitment in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 2, pages 449-489, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1069-5.
• Charlene Cosandier & Filomena Garcia & Malgorzata Knauff, 2018, "Price competition with differentiated goods and incomplete product awareness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 3, pages 681-705, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1050-3.
• Eddie Dekel & Ady Pauzner, 2018, "Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 3, pages 747-761, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1083-7.
• Rabah Amir, 2018, "Special issue: supermodularity and monotone methods in economics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 3, pages 547-556, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1153-5.
• Simon Dato & Andreas Grunewald & Daniel Müller, 2018, "Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 4, pages 901-928, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1072-x.
• Lars P. Metzger, 2018, "Evolution and correlated equilibrium," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 28, issue 2, pages 333-346, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0539-z.
• Olga Gorelkina, 2018, "The expected externality mechanism in a level-k environment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 103-131, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0579-5.
• Diego Aycinena & Hernán Bejarano & Lucas Rentschler, 2018, "Informed entry in auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 175-205, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9.
• Patrick Hummel, 2018, "Reserve prices in repeated auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 273-299, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0587-5.
• Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Bernd Irlenbusch & Rainer Michael Rilke & Gari Walkowitz, 2018, "Asymmetric outside options in ultimatum bargaining: a systematic analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 1, pages 301-329, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0588-4.
• Jun Honda, 2018, "Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint–Shubik conjecture," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 3, pages 893-912, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0609-3.
• Martin Kaae Jensen & Alexandros Rigos, 2018, "Evolutionary games and matching rules," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 3, pages 707-735, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1.
• Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2018, "A unifying model of strategic network formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 4, pages 1033-1063, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0592-8.
• Lionel Richefort, 2018, "Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 47, issue 4, pages 1211-1238, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z.
• Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, 2018, "Marital Infidelity: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), volume 16, issue 1, pages 227-233, March, DOI: 10.1007/s40953-017-0081-8.
• Erik O. Sterner & Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & H. J. Albers, 2018, "Location choice for renewable resource extraction with multiple non-cooperative extractors: a spatial Nash equilibrium model and numerical implementation," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, volume 11, issue 3, pages 315-331, October, DOI: 10.1007/s12076-018-0215-4.
• Debapriya Sen, 2018, "Potential games, path independence and Poisson’s binomial distribution," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), volume 88, issue 1, pages 125-146, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00186-018-0631-7.
• Francesco Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2018, "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 51, issue 3, pages 493-512, October, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1125-5.
• Leonardo Becchetti & Vittorio Pelligra & Francesco Salustri, 2018, "The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 51, issue 4, pages 595-619, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1130-8.
• Georgios Gioldasis & Antonio Musolesi & Michel Simioni, 2018, "Nonparametric estimation of international R&D spillovers," SEEDS Working Papers, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, number 0318, Mar, revised Mar 2018.
• Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2018, "An Evolutionary Approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, number 0418, Mar, revised Mar 2018.
• Alex Dickson & Ian A MacKenzie & Petros G Sekeris, 2018, "The role of markets and preferences on resource conflicts," Working Papers, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics, number 1819, Dec.
• Leonardo Becchetti & Francesco Salustri & Vittorio Pelligra & Alejandra Vásquez, 2018, "Gender differences in socially responsible consumption. An experimental investigation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 50, issue 33, pages 3630-3643, July, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1430341.
• Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018, "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 25, issue 6, pages 1420-1454, November, DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2018.1523207.
• Heifetz, Aviad & Kets, Willemien, 2018, "Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2018, "High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore, 2018, "Collusion constrained equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018, "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 18-019/I, Mar.
• Anita (A.G.) Kopanyi-Peuker, 2018, "Yes, I'll do it: a large-scale experiment on the volunteer's dilemma," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 18-072/II, Jul.
• Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2018, "Common pool resources: Is there support for conservationists?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 18-083/VIII, Nov.
• Schouten, Jop & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2018, "Unilateral Support Equilibria," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2018-011.
• Stienen, Valentijn & Engwerda, Jacob, 2018, "Measuring Impact of Uncertainty in a Stylized Macro-Economic Climate Model within a Dynamic Game Perspective," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2018-007.
• Xu, Xue & Potters, Jan, 2018, "An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 702bed95-24cb-49c0-ad61-f.
• Reuben, E. & Suetens, Sigrid, 2018, "Instrumental reciprocity as an error," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number bb75c476-bc08-4d64-b1b0-5.
• Mitri Kitti, 2018, "Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 120, Oct.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018, "Timing Games with Irrational Types: Leverage-Driven Bubbles and Crash-Contingent Claims," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1088, Jun.
• Guidon Fenig & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yoram Halevy, 2018, "Piercing the 'Payoff Function' Veil: Tracing Beliefs and Motives," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-619, Sep.
• Guidon Fenig & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yoram Halevy, 2018, "Piercing the "Payoff Function" Veil: Tracing Beliefs and Motives," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-625, Nov.
• Golombek, Rolf & Raknerud, Arvid, 2018, "Exit dynamics of start-up firms: Structural estimation using indirect inference," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, volume 205, issue 1, pages 204-225, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.03.011.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 1-18, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.001.
• Challe, Edouard & Chrétien, Edouard, 2018, "Market microstructure, information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 82-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.004.
• Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2018, "Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 125-149, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.01.005.
• Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018, "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 22-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.02.001.
• Neilson, William & Xiao, Yancheng, 2018, "Equilibrium vaccination patterns in incomplete and heterogeneous networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 174-192, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.008.
• Galeotti, Fabio & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2018, "Identifying voter preferences: The trade-off between honesty and competence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 27-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.007.
• Anbarcı, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick & Gürdal, Mehmet Y., 2018, "Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 172-190, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.07.003.
• Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andras, 2018, "On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries’ incentives to distort ratings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 20-48, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.005.
• Huppmann, Daniel & Siddiqui, Sauleh, 2018, "An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 266, issue 2, pages 622-638, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.09.032.
• Babonneau, Frédéric & Haurie, Alain & Vielle, Marc, 2018, "Welfare implications of EU Effort Sharing Decision and possible impact of a hard Brexit," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 470-489, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.06.024.
• Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Hulley, Hardy, 2018, "Are mutual fund investors paying for noise?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 58, issue C, pages 8-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2018.04.002.
• Fehr, Dietmar, 2018, "Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 123-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.001.
• Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2018, "Constitutions and groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 135-152, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022.
• Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018, "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 153-181, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004.
• Zhang, Huanren, 2018, "Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 203-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023.
• Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud, 2018, "Reward schemes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 21-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.019.
• Daskalova, Vessela, 2018, "Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 238-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.007.
• Hopkins, Ed, 2018, "Inequality and risk-taking behaviour," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 107, issue C, pages 316-328, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.007.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018, "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 331-340, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.012.
• Cheung, Man-Wah & Lahkar, Ratul, 2018, "Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 341-362, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.004.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Money as minimal complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 432-451, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.003.
• Dubey, Pradeep & Sahi, Siddhartha & Shubik, Martin, 2018, "Graphical exchange mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 452-465, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.002.
• Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Tonin, Simone, 2018, "Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 478-485, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.013.
• Ziliotto, Bruno, 2018, "Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 486-503, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.009.
• Solan, Eilon, 2018, "Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 523-540, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.011.
• Zhao, Jingang, 2018, "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 592-599, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.002.
• Béal, Sylvain & Ferrières, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2018, "The proportional Shapley value and applications," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 108, issue C, pages 93-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010.
• Britz, Volker, 2018, "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.005.
• Blume, Andreas, 2018, "Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 132-155, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.014.
• Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone, 2018, "Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 184-200, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.015.
• Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2018, "Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 294-310, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.003.
• Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018, "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 364-381, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.021.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018, "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 465-483, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Galanis, Spyros, 2018, "Speculation under unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 598-615, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.001.
• Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2018, "Volunteering under population uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 65-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.009.
• Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2018, "A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 82-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.012.
• Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor V., 2018, "A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 99-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010.
• Perea, Andrés, 2018, "Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 120-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.001.
• Ispano, Alessandro, 2018, "Information acquisition and the value of bad news," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 165-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.013.
• Mathevet, Laurent, 2018, "An axiomatization of plays in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 19-31, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.012.
• Balkenborg, Dieter, 2018, "Rationalizability and logical inference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 248-257, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.006.
• Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018, "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 330-339, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.017.
• Iskakov, M. & Iskakov, A. & d'Aspremont, C., 2018, "Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 58-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.011.
• Chen, Chun-Ting & Huang, Chen-Ying & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2018, "A window of cognition: Eyetracking the reasoning process in spatial beauty contest games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 143-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.007.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2018, "The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 16-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.008.
• Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018, "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 187-202, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004.
• Lombardi, M. & Yoshihara, N., 2018, "Treading a fine line: (Im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 203-216, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.004.
• Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018, "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 250-273, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.008.
• Leucci, Stefano & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Penna, Paolo, 2018, "No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 64-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.003.
• Jang, Dooseok & Patel, Amrish & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2018, "Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 85-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.004.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Van Essen, Matt, 2018, "King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 125-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.007.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2018, "Communication with evidence in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 139-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002.
• Meir, Reshef & Kalai, Gil & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2018, "Bidding games and efficient allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 166-193, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.005.
• Bonanno, Giacomo & Tsakas, Elias, 2018, "Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 231-241, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003.
• Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "Prospect dynamics and loss dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 98-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006.
• Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018, "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.11.005.
• Tauman, Yair & Zhao, Chang, 2018, "Patent licensing, entry and the incentive to innovate," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 56, issue C, pages 229-276, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.010.
• Dahm, Matthias, 2018, "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 256-282, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.09.003.
• Altınok, Ahmet & Yılmaz, Murat, 2018, "Dynamic voluntary contribution to a public project under time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 114-140, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.007.
• Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2018, "Population uncertainty in voluntary contributions of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 218-231, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.009.
• Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2018, "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 320-334, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020.
• Persson, Emil, 2018, "Testing the impact of frustration and anger when responsibility is low," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 435-448, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.001.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2018, "Unilateral and multilateral sanctions: A network approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 52-65, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.010.
• Burdin, Gabriel & Halliday, Simon & Landini, Fabio, 2018, "The hidden benefits of abstaining from control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 1-12, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.018.
• Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2018, "Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 115-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.002.
• Xu, Xue & Potters, Jan, 2018, "An experiment on cooperation in ongoing organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 28-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.023.
• Ong, David & Chan, Ho Fai & Torgler, Benno & Yang, Yu (Alan), 2018, "Collaboration incentives: Endogenous selection into single and coauthorships by surname initial in economics and management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 41-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.001.
• Huber, Juergen & Shubik, Martin & Sunder, Shyam, 2018, "Financing of public goods through taxation in a general equilibrium economy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, pages 171-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.018.
• Doğan, Serhat & Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018, "Multi-player race," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 123-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.008.
• Gauriot, Romain & Page, Lionel, 2018, "Psychological momentum in contests: The case of scoring before half-time in football," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 137-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.015.
• March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018, "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 114-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.020.
• Wen, Yuanji, 2018, "Voluntary information acquisition in an asymmetric-Information game:comparing learning theories in the laboratory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 150, issue C, pages 202-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.023.
• Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo & Iriberri, Nagore, 2018, "Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 192-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.010.
• Luo, Zijun & Xie, Xin, 2018, "A Model Of rivalries with endogenous prize and strength," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 215-223, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.013.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritschel, Alexander, 2018, "The reinforcement heuristic in normal form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 224-234, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.014.
• Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018, "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 123-142, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.016.
• Gächter, Simon & Renner, Elke, 2018, "Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 154, issue C, pages 321-334, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.001.
• Fallucchi, Francesco & Quercia, Simone, 2018, "Affirmative action and retaliation in experimental contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 23-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.10.006.
• Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael, 2018, "Costly switching from a status quo," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 156, issue C, pages 55-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.017.
• Stoop, Jan & van Soest, Daan & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2018, "Rewards and cooperation in social dilemma games," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, pages 300-310, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.12.007.
• De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros G. & Spengler, Dominic E., 2018, "Can violence harm cooperation? Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 342-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.06.008.
• Foucart, Renaud & Wan, Cheng, 2018, "Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 537-558, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006.
• Baisa, Brian & Burkett, Justin, 2018, "Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010.
• Camacho, Carmen & Kamihigashi, Takashi & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2018, "Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 288-299, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003.
• Cheung, Man-Wah & Wu, Jiabin, 2018, "On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 300-323, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.002.
• Bhattacharya, Vivek & Manuelli, Lucas & Straub, Ludwig, 2018, "Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 1-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.004.
• Rivera, Thomas J., 2018, "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 201-247, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.012.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Dufwenberg, Martin A., 2018, "Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 248-264, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013.
• Anderson, Edward & Holmberg, Pär, 2018, "Price instability in multi-unit auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 318-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.008.
• Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018, "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 58-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007.
• Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. & Hickman, Brent R., 2018, "College assignment as a large contest," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 88-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006.
• Sorokin, Constantine & Zakharov, Alexei, 2018, "Vote-motivated candidates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 232-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.010.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018, "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 372-392, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.006.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018, "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 408-443, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.004.
• Puppe, Clemens, 2018, "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 55-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.03.003.
• Hwang, Ilwoo, 2018, "Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 761-802, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.002.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2018, "Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 1-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.011.
• Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2018, "Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 101-125, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.016.
• Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018, "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 245-279, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.005.
• Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Sandholm, William H., 2018, "Riemannian game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 315-364, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.002.
• Baranov, Oleg, 2018, "An efficient ascending auction for private valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 495-517, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.005.
• Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018, "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 708-733, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002.
• Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018, "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 734-779, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.004.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. & Sachdeva, Ashish, 2018, "The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: A mousetracking study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 246-274, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.011.
• Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018, "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 275-293, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009.
• Hefti, Andreas, 2018, "Limited attention, competition and welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 318-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.012.
• Aoyagi, Masaki, 2018, "Bertrand competition under network externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 517-550, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.006.
• Kalai, Ehud & Shmaya, Eran, 2018, "Large strategic dynamic interactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 59-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001.
• Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018, "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 127, issue 2, pages 342-365, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.004.
• Panagiotou, Dimitrios & Stavrakoudis, Athanassios, 2018, "Free-on-board and uniform delivered pricing strategies in pure and mixed spatial duopolies: The strategic role of cooperatives," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, volume 18, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeca.2018.e00109.
• Rusch, Hannes, 2018, "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 64, issue C, pages 105-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.12.002.
• Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin & Montinari, Natalia & Panganiban, Marian & Ploner, Matteo & Werner, Benedikt, 2018, "On the malleability of fairness ideals: Spillover effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, pages 60-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.001.
• Angelovski, Andrej & Di Cagno, Daniela & Güth, Werner & Marazzi, Francesca & Panaccione, Luca, 2018, "Behavioral spillovers in local public good provision: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 116-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.05.003.
• Krockow, Eva M. & Pulford, Briony D. & Colman, Andrew M., 2018, "Far but finite horizons promote cooperation in the Centipede game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 191-199, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.07.002.
• Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018, "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 67, issue C, pages 34-46, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2018.03.003.
• Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018, "Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 68-78, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.005.
• Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2018, "Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 101-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007.
• Forges, Françoise & Horst, Ulrich, 2018, "Sender–receiver games with cooperation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 52-61, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002.
• Schwartz, Jesse A. & Wen, Quan, 2018, "A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 32-38, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.002.
• Xefteris, Dimitrios & Ziros, Nicholas, 2018, "Strategic vote trading under complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, pages 52-58, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.009.
• Belhaj, Mohamed & Deroïan, Frédéric, 2018, "Targeting the key player: An incentive-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 57-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.10.001.
• Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2018, "Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 83-94, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.003.
• Guha, Brishti, 2018, "Malice in the Rubinstein bargaining game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, pages 82-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.004.
• Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2018, "Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 51, issue C, pages 15-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.04.002.