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Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance

Author

Listed:
  • Karaivanov, Alexander
  • Xing, Xiaochuan
  • Xue, Yi

Abstract

In a random sample of clients of CFPAM, the largest microlender in China, 73% of all joint-liability groups practice Lei Da Hu. That is, one person uses all group members’ loans in a single project. We call such borrower groups ‘bogus groups’. The Lei Da Hu practice violates a key premise of group lending, that each borrower must use their loan in a separate project (what we call ‘standard group’). We extend the theory of group lending by analyzing the endogenous formation and coexistence of standard and bogus groups and characterize the efficient lending terms. The chosen group form depends on the borrower productivities and probability of success. Bogus groups are formed by heterogeneous borrowers, when the gains from larger expected output exceed the foregone default risk diversification. Accounting for bogus groups in their lending strategy can help MFIs raise productive efficiency and borrower welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Karaivanov, Alexander & Xing, Xiaochuan & Xue, Yi, 2020. "Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:122:y:2020:i:c:s0014292119302144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103353
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microfinance; Group lending; Joint liability; Lei Da Hu; Phantom borrowers; Strategic default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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