Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.013
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May.
- Johannes Hörner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015.
"Mediation and Peace,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1483-1501.
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1765, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Hoerner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2011. "Mediation and Peace," Economics Working Papers ECO2011/19, European University Institute.
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000133, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2015. "Mediation and Peace," Working Papers 541, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani, 2010. "Mediation and Peace," Economics Working Papers ECO2010/32, European University Institute.
- Horner, Johannes & Morelli, Massimo & Squintani, Francesco, 2011. "Mediation and Peace," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 67, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(6), pages 793-807, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010.
"Peace agreements without commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2008. "Peace Agreements Without Commitment," Working Papers 340, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Beviá, Carmen, 2008. "Peace agreements without commitment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081508, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Hoffman, Philip T., 2012. "Why Was It Europeans Who Conquered the World?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 601-633, August.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1999.
"Legal Expenditure as a Rent-Seeking Game,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(3-4), pages 271-288, September.
- Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 1999. "Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 379-396, Springer.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709,
Elsevier.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Brito, Dagobert L. & Intriligator, Michael D., 1985. "Conflict, War, and Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 943-957, December.
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000.
"Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters,"
Papers
99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000011, David K. Levine.
- Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001.
"Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May.
- Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On The Relationship Between Security and Trade," Papers 00-01-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Durham, Yvonne & Hirshleifer, Jack & Smith, Vernon L., 2008.
"The Paradox of Power,"
Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 127-137,
Elsevier.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Paradox Of Power," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 177-200, November.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
- Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2007.
"Political Bias and War,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1353-1373, September.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Morelli, Massimo, "undated". "Political bias and war," Working Papers 1247, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros G. & Vargas, Juan F., 2018.
"Beyond divide and rule: Weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 205-221.
- Giacomo De Luca & Petros G. Sekeris & Juan F. Vargas, 2011. "Beyond divide and rule: weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict," Documentos de Trabajo 8893, Universidad del Rosario.
- Alberto Vesperoni & Anıl Yıldızparlak, 2019. "Inequality and conflict outbreak," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 135-173, June.
- Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Stergios Skaperdas, 2003.
"Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance,"
Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 2003. "Restraining the genuine homo economicus: why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance [Die Beschränkung des genuinen Homo Economicus: Warum wirtschaftliche Prozesse und Governancestruktur," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-03, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot be Divorced from its Governance," CESifo Working Paper Series 901, CESifo.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709,
Elsevier.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010.
"Civil War,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
- Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War," NBER Working Papers 14801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Blattman, Christopher & Miguel, Edward, 2009. "Civil War," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt90n356hs, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Blattman, Christopher & Miguel, Edward, 2009. "Civil War," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt90n356hs, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Christopher Blattman, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012.
"Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," CERDI Working papers halshs-00553119, HAL.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Post-Print halshs-00689738, HAL.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2010. "Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited," Working Papers 101107, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2006.
"Bargaining Versus Fighting,"
Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Working Papers 060705, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012.
"Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
- Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota Graziosi, Gregoire, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models," MPRA Paper 24084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Magnus Hoffmann, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent‐Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers halshs-00553119, HAL.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Magnus HOFFMANN, 2010. "Endogenous Timing in General Rent?Seeking and Conflict Models," Working Papers 201024, CERDI.
- Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Post-Print halshs-00689738, HAL.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010.
"Peace agreements without commitment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "Peace agreements without commitment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081508, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón, 2008. "Peace Agreements Without Commitment," Working Papers 340, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020.
"War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
- Erik O. Kimbrough & Kevin Laughren & Roman Sheremeta, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," Discussion Papers dp17-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Kimbrough, Erik & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," MPRA Paper 80277, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Erik O. Kimbrough & Kevin Laughren & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," Working Papers 17-13, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009.
"Principles of Conflict Economics,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
- Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521698658, December.
- Long, Iain W., 2015.
"Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 46-61.
- Long, Iain W., 2014. "Better Feared than Loved: Reputations and the Motives for Conflict," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2014/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Corchón, Luis C. & Yildizparlak, Anil, 2011. "Give peace a chance: the effect of incomplete and imperfect information on mediation," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1114, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- McBride, Michael & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2014.
"Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 75-89.
- Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," Working Papers 080922, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Michael McBride & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 2897, CESifo.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021.
"Overconfidence and conflict,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
- Maxime Menuet & Petros Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Post-Print hal-03532938, HAL.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2021.
"Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 148-178.
- Garfinkel, Michelle & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2020. "Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2020-7, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2021. "Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo," CESifo Working Paper Series 8858, CESifo.
- Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016.
"Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
- Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2009. "Warlords, Famine and Food Aid: Who Fights, Who Starves?," Cahiers de recherche 0947, CIRPEE.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2019.
"Problems of commitment in arming and war: how insecurity and destruction matter,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(3), pages 349-369, March.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2018. "Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter," Working Papers 181901, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Garfinkel, Michelle & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2018. "Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-8, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
- Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, 2001.
"Conflict and Renewable Resources,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 719-742, December.
- Rafael Reuveny & John W. Maxwell, "undated". "Conflict and Renewable Resources," Working Papers 2004-26, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
More about this item
Keywords
Peace; War; Asymmetric information; Contests; Litigation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:92:y:2013:i:c:p:116-126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.