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Peace agreements without commitment

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  • Beviá, Carmen
  • Corchón, Luis C.

Abstract

In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the "poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.

Suggested Citation

  • Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "Peace agreements without commitment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081508, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we081508
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    Cited by:

    1. Changxia Ke & Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2015. "Alliances In The Shadow Of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 854-871, April.
    2. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
    3. Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2012. "Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 168-184.
    4. Cubel Maria & Sanchez-Pages Santiago, 2012. "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-11, December.
    5. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    6. Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009. "Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
      [ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWER In the Federation]
      ," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2006. "Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Corchón, Luis C. & Yıldızparlak, Anıl, 2013. "Give peace a chance: The effect of ownership and asymmetric information on peace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 116-126.
    9. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2014. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 96-108.
    11. Erik O. Kimbrough & Kevin Laughren & Roman Sheremeta, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," Discussion Papers dp17-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    12. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions," MPRA Paper 31468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Chan, Kenneth S. & Laffargue, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 138-150.
    14. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
    15. Yildizparlak, Anil & Corchón Díaz, Luis Carlos, 2011. "Give peace a chance: the effect of incomplete and imperfect information on mediation," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1114, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    16. Gvozdeva, Margarita & Kazakova, M.V. & Kiblitskaya, T.R. & Lyubimov, I.L. & Nesterova, K.V., 2016. "Various Aspects of Natural Resource Wealth Effect on Economic Growth," Working Papers 2045, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    17. Antonis Adam & Petros G. Sekeris, 2010. "Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings," Working Papers 1014, University of Namur, Department of Economics.

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