Independence and Uniqueness of the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Social Networks
We develop topological analysis of social-network effect on game equilibrium in the context of two- player asymmetric normal-form games and also in evolutionary sense. Firstly, it is confirmed that the game equilibrium in many social networks cannot be established through that in a well-mixed population. In other words, we have proved the independence of the mixedstrategy equilibrium in social networks. Secondly, it is demonstrated that the game equilibrium exhibits injective property with respect to the corresponding social-network effect under consideration. That is, the uniqueness of the mixed-strategy game equilibrium in a given social network is identified. Thirdly, it is argued that uniqueness implies independence for a wide range of social networks and we have even derived the biggest sets of social networks in which independence and uniqueness hold true, respectively, in the underlying game. To sum up, we have provided qualitative characterizations about topological properties of the mixed-strategy game equilibrium in general social networks.
Volume (Year): 6 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://ijbesar.teiemt.gr/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
- U. Horst & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2010.
"Equilibria in Systems of Social Interactions,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
506439000000000119, David K. Levine.
- Ivan Ivanov & Julia Dobreva, 2010. "Modeling Labor Supply through Duality and the Slutsky Equation," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology (EMATTECH), Kavala, Greece, vol. 3(2), pages 111-122, December.
- Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1995.
"Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows,"
Boston University - Institute for Economic Development
64, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "Social relations and cooperation in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-25, January.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999.
"Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning,"
Game Theory and Information
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, 02.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2049, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 567-588.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
- Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006.
"Network formation with heterogeneous players,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
- Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
- Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2010. "Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 3-29.
- Sanjeev Goyal, 2007.
"Introduction to Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks
[Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks]," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tei:journl:v:6:y:2013:i:3:p:79-96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kostas Stergidis)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.