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Prisoners and their dilemma

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  • Khadjavi, Menusch
  • Lange, Andreas

Abstract

We report insights into the behavior of prisoners in dilemma situations that so famously carry their name. We compare female inmates and students in a simultaneous and a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma. In the simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma, the cooperation rate among inmates exceeds the rate of cooperating students. Relative to the simultaneous dilemma, cooperation among first-movers in the sequential Prisoner's Dilemma increases for students, but not for inmates. Students and inmates behave identically as second movers. Hence, we find a similar and significant fraction of inmates and students to hold social preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Prisoners and their dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 163-175.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:92:y:2013:i:c:p:163-175
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Khadjavi, Menusch, 2014. "Deterrence works for criminals," Kiel Working Papers 1938, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    2. Philip R. P. Coelho & James E. McClure, 2016. "The evolution of human cooperation," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 65-78, April.
    3. Schwirplies, Claudia & Dütschke, Elisabeth & Schleich, Joachim & Ziegler, Andreas, 2017. "Consumers' willingness to offset their CO2 emissions from traveling: A discrete choice analysis of framing and provider contributions," Working Papers "Sustainability and Innovation" S05/2017, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
    4. Joachim Schleich & Claudia Schwirplies & Andreas Ziegler, 2014. "Private provision of public goods: Do individual climate protection efforts depend on perceptions of climate policy?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201453, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Geerling, Wayne & Magee, Gary B. & Brooks, Robert, 2015. "Cooperation, defection and resistance in Nazi Germany," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 125-139.
    6. Alain Cohn & Michel André Maréchal & Thomas Noll, 2015. "Bad Boys: How Criminal Identity Salience Affects Rule Violation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1289-1308.
    7. Ali al-Nowaihi & Sanjit Dhami, 2015. "Evidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games of complete information Working Paper Version," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/21, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
    8. Nese, Annamaria & O'Higgins, Niall & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Scudiero, Maurizio, 2016. "Cooperation, Punishment and Organized Crime: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Southern Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 9901, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Khadjavi, Menusch & Sipangule, Kacana & Thiele, Rainer, 2016. "Social capital and large-scale agricultural investments: An experimental investigation in Zambia," Kiel Working Papers 2056, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    10. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2013. "Evidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/25, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner's Dilemma; Inmates; Lab experiment; Lab-in-the-field experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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